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A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative
Law and Military Deference
JONATHAN MASUR*
INTRODUCTION
On May 8, 2002, Jos6 Padilla, an American citizen accused of
planning an attack on the United States in collaboration with al Qaeda,
was arrested at O'Hare Airport in Chicago, Illinois.' He was not charged
with any crime; to date he has never been charged with a crime. Rather,
since his arrest he has been held without trial in Charleston, South
Carolina as an "enemy combatant,"2 a member of an organization with
which the United States is at war. Soon after his arrest, Padilla filed suit
in the federal district court for the Southern District of New York,
protesting that this indeterminate detention-imposed upon him without
an opportunity to confront the accusations against him-had been
undertaken in violation of his right to due process.3
Two years later, Rumsfeld v. Padilla4 and its companion matter,
* Law clerk to the Honorable Richard A. Posner, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Chicago,
IL. J.D., magna cum laude, Harvard Law School, 2003; B.S. & A.B. with Distinction, Stanford
University, 1999. 1 would like to thank Todd Rakoff for his insightful guidance and tireless assistance
at all stages of the development of this article. Many thanks are also due to Laurence Tribe, Richard
Posner, David Rosenberg, Fred Bloom, Douglas Bloom, and Jonathan Patchen for their numerous
helpful suggestions and comments regarding previous incarnations and iterations. I owe a particular
debt of gratitude to Kenneth Walczak for his inimitable editorial assistance.
I. See Padilla v. Bush (Padilla 1), 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd sub nom.
Padilla v. Rumsfeld (Padilla 111), 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd Rumsfeld v. Padilla (Padilla IV),
124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
2. The United States government often employs this linguistic formulation as an alternative to
"unlawful combatant," the usual terminology for one who has taken up arms in war without wearing a
uniform or distinguishing oneself as a member of an enemy force. Under international law, unlawful
combatants are not subject to the protections provided by the laws of war, while "lawful
combatants" -soldiers who have abided by the laws of war by taking actions such as wearing a
uniform - are generally allowed to avail themselves of those protections and are treated as prisoners of
war, with all of the attendant rights that such status guarantees. See United States v. Lindh, 212 F.
Supp. 2d 541, 554 (E.D. Va. 2002) (citing numerous authorities). But see Douglas Jehl & Neil A.
Lewis, U.S. Military Disputed Protected Status of Prisoners Held in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, at
Aio.
3. See Padilla 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 569.
4. Rumsfeld v. Padilla (Padilla IV), 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004)
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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,5 arrived before the Supreme Court as this
generation's two most important tests of the President's constitutional
powers as Commander-in-Chief. Two interrelated issues were framed in
stark relief by these cases: what are the scope and contours of the
President's authority to designate and detain "enemy combatants" in
times of war, and what role might the judiciary properly play in
reviewing the Executive's determinations and its actions? On June 28,
2004, the Supreme Court issued a series of landmark decisions,
dismissing Padilla's case on procedural grounds while answering these
questions posed via the concomitant litigation involving Yaser Hamdi. In
Hamdi, the Court held that while the President's wartime power extends
to the detention of American citizens deemed to be unlawful
combatants, individuals so designated have the opportunity to contest
the evidence against them before an impartial arbiter.
Much has already been written about these momentous legal
rulings,7 and in the coming months the literature on these issues is likely
to grow into a vibrant body of scholarship. The vast majority of the
attention generated by the Supreme Court's decisions has focused upon
the twin legal questions described above. Consequently, an underlying
issue of fundamental importance-one that may in the end determine
whether Padilla and Hamdi constitute a reaffirmation of the rule of law
or a blow to its foundations-has gone relatively unnoticed. At the heart
of the debate over the President's wartime authority lies the question of
the degree of deference that courts must afford the Executive's factual
determinations and conclusions in wartime, and thus (in the context of
Padilla and Hamdi) the standard of proof and credibility to which the
government's classifications would be held.
The story of this issue begins-and, as this Article will demonstrate,
ultimately ends-not with the Supreme Court, but with the Southern
District of New York, Jos6 Padilla's first point of judicial contact. On
December 4, 2002, the district court held that while Padilla would be
allowed to consult with an attorney and to present evidence disproving
that he was an enemy combatant, the Administration would be required
to provide only "some evidence" of his status to maintain indefinite
custody over him." In adopting this highly deferential posture towards the
Administration's interpretation of the facts surrounding Padilla's
detention, the court relied predominantly upon what it believed to be the
Department of Defense's essentially limitless statutory and constitutional
5. See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi llI), 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
6. Id. at 2635.
7. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Access to Courts, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2oo4, at Ai; Walter
Dellinger & Dahlia Lithwick, A Supreme Court Dialogue: Are Pragmatic Compromises Lawless?,
SLATE, June 29, 2004, at http://www.slate.com/id/21o2895 (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
8. Padilla 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 61o.
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authority over military matters.9  Nevertheless, the court also
acknowledged the lack of anything approaching a "lush and vibrant
jurisprudence governing" those questions."
On this last point, the Padilla court was particularly mistaken. There
exists an entire doctrinal area of law devoted to issues that arise when
the judiciary must oversee the actions and determinations of expert
organizations empowered with far-reaching authority and possessing
tremendous proficiency over broad and critical fields of activity. That
field is administrative law, a jurisprudential domain whose generalizable
rational structuralist approach to issues of deference incorporates a
degree of searching judicial review well beyond what the Padilla district
court applied. That case, and nearly all others that might be categorized
as "wartime" or "military" cases," are striking for their lack of any
explicit or implicit application of the principles gleaned from the
Supreme Court's administrative law jurisprudence. This Article will
examine the alternative approaches to executive determinations outlined
in administrative law and in military jurisprudence and explore the
potential legal and practical theories that might be used to justify these
dichotomous attitudes. The absence of a meaningful distinction between
military cases and quotidian administrative adjudications casts serious
doubt upon the basis for the judiciary's disengagement with cases it
believes invoke national security in light of its far more strenuous
involvement in traditionally peacetime administrative affairs.
Courts have diverged drastically from the principles outlined in
Supreme Court administrative law jurisprudence when confronted with
cases they understand as involving military or wartime matters. This
divergence has come despite administrative law's direct pertinence to
questions of the deference due expert agencies. The deviations have
assumed two predominant forms.
First, courts have merged issues of authority and constraint, arguing
that the Executive's broad constitutional (and sometimes statutory)
authority over national security immunizes its decisions from serious
scrutiny under other restraining legal provisions.'2 This Hohfeldian
9. See id. at 6o7-o8.
io. Id. at 6o7.
i i. Throughout this article the words "wartime" and "military" are used to describe those cases
that the adjudicating courts understand to have national security implications, regardless of whether
the cases actually arise during a declared war or involve events in what might be even loosely termed a
war zone.
12. In the course of this article I will refer to two types of legal constraints imposed upon
executive and legislative actors, constraints whose enforcement is entrusted to Article III courts. The
first are "internal" constraints, those contained within the statutory or constitutional authorization
that empowers the actor, and within whose boundaries that actor must lawfully remain. For instance,
Congressional action under the commerce power of Article I, Section 8 is lawful only if the law
regulates interstate commerce; the grant of authority contained in that provision carries with it
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"category mistake" contravenes both the general American
constitutional framework and the principle, enunciated in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,3 that with
respect to broadly empowered administrative bodies, legal grants of
authority and legal restraints operate sequentially and independently.
Second, courts have relied on the expertise and experience of the
President and the military in dealing with issues of national security to a
degree far out of proportion with their concomitant reliance upon the
competence of civilian administrative agencies. This deference conflicts
with administrative law's "hard look review" and "substantial evidence"
doctrines, according to which courts must act at least to ensure that
executive and legislative bodies are operating within the factual scope of
governing law, even when the legal topic is one with which courts are
comparatively unfamiliar.
Part I of this Article describes and catalogues the causes and
consequences of courts' deference to the Executive's wartime factual
determinations, illustrating the extent to which notions of deference have
compelled courts to abdicate their archetypal fact-finding obligations and
thereby short-circuited the process of judicial review. Part II deconstructs
the underpinnings of the various deference doctrines captured within the
broader field of administrative law and demonstrates their applicability
to military, as well as civilian, cases. Part III addresses five possible
distinctions that might be drawn between the proper juridical approaches
to military and civilian . administrative adjudications, eventually
concluding that none of these distinctions offers an adequate explanation
for diverging these two correlated lines of doctrine. Part IV attempts to
assemble a coherent explanation for courts' unwillingness to engage
military cases with the same level of intellectual rigor they have long
brought to administrative law. At the core of these transcendent wartime
legal questions of detention and freedom lies the factual determinations
that have been deployed to immunize or justify the Executive's
challenged actions. The judiciary's silent march away from meaningful
judicial review of those determinations threatens to transform the
overarching legal questions into little more than a series of foregone
conclusions.
inherent legal limitations. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552-57 (995); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 6o8-o9 (2ooo). The second are "external" constraints, those that derive from
grants of individual rights or restrictions of state action outside of the authorizing provisions
themselves, such as the Free Speech, Due Process, or Equal Protection clauses. See U.S. CoNsT.
amends. I, V, XIV. For the purposes of this article, distinctions between these types of constraints exist
generally as differences in degree (such as the applicable standard of review), not of kind.
Nonetheless, clarity of nomenclature is important, as these dichotomous constraints often operate
concurrently, either independently or as mutually reinforcing strictures upon executive authority.
13. See, e.g., 467 U.S. 837,844-45 (1984).
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I. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN WARTIME
The perceived duty of courts and judges to defer to the factual
assertions and judgments of executive branch actors in times of war
represents the unifying principle of all modem wartime cases.
"Deference" has become a shibboleth that courts believe they must
invoke if their wartime rulings are to have any hope of withstanding
appellate (and public) scrutiny. Even a court that eventually concludes
that no deference is due the executive branch often appears compelled to
recite a statement of judicial fealty to the deference principle for fear of
signaling an inappropriate lack of respect for the authority of the
coordinate branches in wartime. 4 Judicial deference to administrative
decision-making in times of war remains inescapably and intuitively
attractive. This Article should not be understood to suggest that courts
should exercise anything approaching de novo review over executive
decisions in military situations. Yet within wartime jurisprudence, the
doctrine of judicial deference has overwhelmed the legal strictures
established to constrain the operation of executive power. Courts sitting
in judgment of the Executive's wartime actions have permitted the
military to effectively define the constitutional scope of its own authority.
Within the legal lexicon, the phrase "judicial deference" captures a
broad swath of courts' attitudes and actions united by a single
generalized principle: courts will require some heightened measure of
proof or surety before overturning a conclusion reached or a judgment
made by a different branch of government. 5 Much attention has been
given to what one might describe as "legal deference" to the military, or
juridical acceptance of the executive branch's extraordinarily broad
construction of its own statutory and constitutional powers during
wartime. 6 The President's extant power to declare war sua sponte (and
14. Compare Padilla v. Rumsfeld (Padilla 111), 352 F-3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 2003) ("We agree that
great deference is afforded the President's exercise of his authority as Commander-in-Chief."), with
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 713 ("The Supreme Court has long counseled that while the Executive should be
'indulge[d] the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain his exclusive function to command the
instruments of national force, at least when turned against the outside world for the security of our
society,' he enjoys 'no such indulgence' when 'it is turned inward."' (quoting Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 645 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring))).
15. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining defer as "yield to the opinion of");
cf. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66 ("Chevron deference"); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 44o n.14 (2oos) (appellate deference to district court's findings of fact).
16. For a brief sampling of this multifarious and rich literature, see, for example Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (i98i) ("None of this is to say that Congress is free to disregard the
Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs. In that area, as any other, Congress remains
subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause ... but the tests and limitations to be applied may
differ because of the military context.") (citations omitted) and compare Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
756-58 (1974) (rejecting vagueness and overbreadth challenges to provisions of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and noting that "[w]hile the members of the military are not excluded from the
protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of
February 2005]
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without an act of Congress) stands as a paradigmatic example of this
phenomenon.
7
Yet interwoven with this widely acknowledged legal deference-and
operating in concert with it-is a separate, more subtle, and far more
neglected type of judicial deference: courts' inclination to accept without
question or argument the factual determinations and conclusions
proffered by the executive order to defend or justify its wartime actions.
I designate this category "factual deference."' Factual assessments gain
legal significance when a court must test the Executive's wartime actions
against some constitutional or statutory limitation that itself requires
factual inquiry, such as the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause in Korematsu v. United States.'9 Credulous acceptance of the
factual predicate necessary to surmount a constitutional protection is
tantamount to legal evisceration of that same safeguard. Although courts
frequently apply both types of deference in mutually reinforcing and (as
the military mission requires a different application of those protections"); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (936) ("In this vast external realm [of foreign affairs and
international relations], with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation."); Rachel E. Barkow, More
Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy,
102 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 270 (2002) (analyzing the relationship between judicial deference to the
military and the political question doctrine); Kirstin S. Dodge, Countenancing Corruption: A Civil
Republican Case Against Judicial Deference to the Military, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM I, 3-13 (1992)
(addressing Supreme Court deference to the military regarding issues of speech and associational
rights, employment discrimination, and tort liability); Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and
the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REv. 499,565-75 (i99s) (discussing the deference
granted the military in the treatment of its own soldiers); John F. O'Connor, The Origins and
Application of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV. i61, 162 n.4 (2000) (listing articles
critiquing legal deference to the military with respect to constitutional challenges on a variety of
grounds); Kalyani Robbins, Framers' Intent and Military Power: Has Supreme Court Deference to the
Military Gone Too Far?, 78 OR. L. REV. 767, 770 (ig99) (arguing that the Supreme Court has engaged
in rational basis scrutiny of military actions while claiming to subject those actions to more legally
robust evaluation under the rubric of strict scrutiny); Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L.
Schwartz, With All Due Deference: Judicial Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 HOFsTRA L. REV. 795,
8o'-15 (2004) (collecting and providing brief expositions of a series of cases involving legal
presumptions of the constitutionality of military action); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal
Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell", io8 YALE L.J. 485,
540-43 (1998) (refuting the argument that deference to the military's own construction of the law
could be used to defend the policy of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell").
I7. Compare The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862), with U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. II ("The Congress shall have Power... To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,
and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water."); see also John C. Yoo, War and the
Constitutional Text, 69 U. Cm. L. REv. 1639, 1681-84 (2002) (arguing that Congress's appropriations
power acts as a sufficient check upon the executive's authority to unilaterally wage war, and
concluding that other constraints-be they judicial or congressional-are unnecessary).
I8. At least one commentator has provided some general insight into this topic. See Daniel J.
Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 945,
998-1003 (1999) (discussing the relationship between facts and legal rules and describing the operation
of judicial fact deference during the Japanese internment cases).
19. 323 U.S. 214 0944).
[Vol. 56:441
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discussed further below) mutually catalytic fashions, this Article focuses
upon the functioning of factual deference and its role in determining the
outcome of modern wartime decisions.
The courts' overwrought factual deference has its roots in two
judicial tendencies that have grown to the point of logical absurdity in
times of war. First, courts have come to conceive of the President's
expansive commander-in-chief power as not only an open grant of
authority for the President to act during wartime, but also as a
prerogative that truncates the reach of all other constitutional rights or
liberties that might oppose it. The effect of this concept upon the courts'
level of factual deference to the Executive has been quite direct: as the
commander-in-chief power has waxed, the factual showing the
Administration must make in order to overcome a due process challenge
(for instance) has waned. Second, courts have placed too great an
emphasis upon what they view as the Executive's comparatively greater
expertise in national security matters, describing themselves as ill-
equipped to second-guess the Administration's "expert" judgments and
refusing to challenge the Executive's conceptions of "facts on the
ground."
These two complaisant judicial tendencies have in turn induced
courts to assume too deferential a posture towards the Executive's
wartime factual determinations. This posture has become manifest in two
respects. First, courts have failed to require the Executive to put forth
any meaningful quanta of proof in support of its determinations and
conclusions. Thus, court have accepted meager (or nonexistent) proffers
as sufficient to satisfy what in peacetime would be searching
constitutional review. Second, courts have refused to examine or
challenge the logical reasoning and inferences-the paths from extant
facts to administrative conclusions-used by the Executive to justify
actions that might otherwise be held unconstitutional, even when those
inferences involve nothing more than the type of punctilious logic and
reasoning the assessment of which forms judges' bailiwick. It is through
these miscalculations that courts have most significantly hindered the
Constitution's ability to constrain executive conduct in wartime. When
only minimal facts will suffice, and when all conclusions are accepted at
face value, there exists no constitutional bulwark that cannot be
overcome.
The sections that follow below will describe and analyze the
judiciary's overly deferential wartime posture. Section A will deconstruct
and critique the courts' overly inflated view of the President's war
powers and describe that view's role in catalyzing the courts' exaggerated
posture of factual deference. Section B will perform the same analysis on
the courts' overestimation of the role of administrative expertise in
military cases. Sections C and D will examine the operation of the two
February 2005]
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forms of exaggerated factual deference-failure to demand substantial
proof and refusal to scrutinize logical inferences -within the modern
military cases, highlighting their dispositive role in the most important
wartime jurisprudence in a generation.
A. DEFERENCE BY CATEGORY MISTAKE: JUDICIAL INFLATION OF THE
PRESIDENT'S WAR POWERS
For nearly one hundred and fifty years, the judiciary's conception of
the reach of the Executive's war-making powers has known few bounds.
Beginning with The Prize Cases" in 1862, the Supreme Court has read
the President's commander-in-chief power broadly to encompass nearly
any necessary war-related actions, even without a formal declaration of
war." The Court's maxim, gleaned from Hirabayashi v. United States,
that "the war power of the Government is 'the power to wage war
successfully,' .... has given rise to an understanding of presidential power
that encompasses activities that do not involve the deployment of troops
in the field,23 such as the Japanese-American internment, as well as
20. The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 668-7 1. This set of four consolidated cases arose
from challenges to the President's authority to impose a naval blockade (an act of war) against
Secessionist Southern states in the absence of a congressional declaration of war. The Supreme Court
rejected these challenges, observing that "war may exist without a declaration on either side,"
rendering the President "bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative
authority." Id. at 668 (citation omitted).
21. One consequence of this broadening of presidential authority is that Congress's Article I
power to declare war has, as a practical matter, been read completely out of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 6i, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that no Congressional declaration of
war was required for the President to prosecute the war in Vietnam); Mass. v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 31-
32 (ist Cir. I97) (same); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1971) (same).
22. Korematsu v. United States (Korematsu 1), 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 8t, 93 (I943)).
23. See, e.g., Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. i6o, 164-65 (1948) (deportation of nationals of a
hostile foreign power); Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297, 306-07 (I909) (confiscation
and destruction of enemy property). The pre-eminent counter-example is Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), in which the Court denied the President the power to seize the
steel industries during the Korean War in order to maintain their operation during a potential strike.
In Youngstown, Congress had explicitly refused to award the President statutory authority for the
seizure, thus narrowing the President's scope of action to powers he held directly under the
Constitution, and placing the President's power as Commander-in-Chief in conflict with Congress's
greater authority to regulate economic affairs. Id. at 586-87. The case is most renowned for Justice
Jackson's concurring opinion dividing these questions of presidential power into three categories:
those in which Congress has granted the President statutory authority over the matter at hand, those
in which Congress has explicitly denied to the President any such legal authority (e.g. Youngstown
itself), and those in which "the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, [where] he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain." Id. at
635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). The judiciary's expansive statutory interpretations that placed cases
in the first category, or its voluminous view of the Presidential dominion in the "zone of twilight,"
have prevented most other courts from reaching the same result as Youngstown.
There exists one modern anomaly within this apparent juridical monolith. In December 2003,
the Second Circuit overturned the Southern District of New York's decision in Padilla I and held that
[Vo1. 56:441
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foreign policy making authority not directly tied to national security or
the military.24 In some cases, the Supreme Court has refused even to
entertain cases that attempt to demarcate limitations on the President's
constitutional military powers. 5
This expansive understanding of the President's wartime authority
has led the Executive to argue that an entire range of military questions
or executive measures are entirely beyond the courts' reach as either
non-justiciable or otherwise unsuitable for judicial review. Courts have
accepted this argument most decisively in areas that hew closely to the
actual mechanics of armed conflict, such as presidential decisions
committing American forces to battle or selecting the means and
mechanisms of waging war. 6 Yet the judiciary has hardly confined its
the President's commander-in-chief power did not include the authority to order military detentions of
American citizens captured on American soil. Padilla v. Rumsfeld (Padilla llI), 352 F.3d 695. 718 (2d
Cir. 2003) ("Based on the text of the Constitution and the cases interpreting it, we reject the
government's contention that the President has inherent constitutional power to detain Padilla under
the circumstances presented here."). Even more surprisingly, the court held that the Joint Resolution
for the use of force did not confer this power upon the President by statute, Id. at 722-23 ("[T]here is
no reason to suspect from the language of the Joint Resolution that Congress believed it would be
authorizing the detention of an American citizen already held in a federal correctional institution and
not 'arrayed against our troops' in the field of battle." (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi 1), 316
F.3d 450, 467 (4 th Cir. 2003))); see also infra notes 309-320 and accompanying text. The Padilla III
decision represents perhaps the most substantial curtailment of the President's war powers since Ex
pane Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), the Civil War case that held that the President could not
suspend the writ of habeas corpus without an act of Congress. The Supreme Court's subsequent
reversal of the Second Circuit's decision-formally in Padilla IV, and effectively in Hamdi III-thus
came as little surprise. These decisions are discussed at greater length in sections I.C.I-2, infra.
24. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668, 680, 686 (i98i) (holding that the
President maintained the power to suspend American claims against Iran as an exercise of his
authority over foreign affairs and Congress's traditional statutory granting of such power to the
President, invoking Justice Jackson's notion of a "zone of twilight"): United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (writing that the President wields "delicate, plenary and exclusive
power... as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations-a power
which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress").
25. See, e.g., Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 934 (1968) (cert. denied) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("There exist in this case questions of great magnitude.... I. Is the present United States military
activity in Vietnam a 'war' within the meaning of Article I, Section 8, Clause I I of the Constitution?
II. If so, may the Executive constitutionally order the petitioners to participate in that military activity,
when no war has been declared by the Congress?").
26. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) ("Certainly it is not the function of
the Judiciary to entertain private litigation ... which challenges the legality, wisdom, or the propriety
of the Commander-in-Chief in sending our armed forces abroad or to any particular region.");
Freeborn v. The Protector, 79 U.S. (I2 Wall.) 700, 702 (1871) (treating executive proclamations as
conclusive evidence of when the Civil War began and ended); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) I9,
30 (1827) ("We are all of opinion, that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen [to call
forth the militia and require men to serve], belongs exclusively to the President, and that his decision is
conclusive upon all other persons."); Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3 d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman,
J., concurring) ("I read the Prize Cases to stand for the proposition that the President has independent
authority to repel aggressive acts by third parties even without specific congressional authorization,
and courts may not review the level of force selected."); Ornato v. Hoffman, 546 F.2d Io, 14 (2d Cir.
1976) (holding that the Army's decision to order a reservist to active duty is "committed to agency
February 20051
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deferential posture to such intimately military questions. 7 Courts have
concluded that even administrative decisions implicating traditional
judicial authority and significant constitutional or statutory legal
structures must command substantial judicial deference. Prominent
among the actions receiving such deference are detentions of American
citizens who have not been charged with crimes.8
This doctrinal movement forms the basis for the judiciary's first
movement towards amplified deference in military cases. Courts have
conflated the separate questions of: first, what authority the Executive
holds, and second, what "exogenous law" 9 exists to which the Executive
must be held in order to vindicate the rule of law. In so doing, they have
fallen prey to a "category mistake, a failure to recognize that rights and
powers are not simply the absence of one another but that rights can cut
across or 'trump' powers.' 30 Few would dispute the idea that the
President's decision whether to attack an enemy position with one
battalion or two, for example, is unreviewable. Yet this is so not simply
because the President holds so-called "plenary" constitutional authority
over military commands, but rather because there is no further "law to
apply" on the subject, and no relevant legal stricture that constrains
executive action. A naval battle at Midway Island in 1942 does not
implicate the due process or equal protection rights of the soldiers and
sailors involved; the internment of Japanese-Americans (and only
Japanese-Americans) on the West Coast that same year certainly does.3
On the contrary, in the wartime cases discussed, there exists further
exogenous law to apply-such as individual constitutional freedoms
unabridged by the simple power to act." It is this externally applicable
discretion" and cannot be judicially reviewed).
27. Cf Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643-44 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("There are indications that the
Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will
constitute him also Commander in Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants. He has no
monopoly of 'war powers,' whatever they are.").
28. See Padilla v. Bush (Padilla 1), 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
(Hamdi 1), 316 F.3 d 450, 471-73 (4th Cir. 2003).
29. By "exogenous" I mean simply a legal restraint external to-and separate from-the grant of
legal authority pursuant to which the executive has acted. For example, the President might decide to
detain a suspected terrorist without a warrant and without trial. This action, undertaken under the
auspices of the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief, is nonetheless subject to review under
the Fifth Amendment as a deprivation of liberty without due process. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. In
that situation, the Fifth Amendment operates as the exogenous check upon unbridled administrative
power.
30. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 36 (I980); see also Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16, 40-70 (913)
(illuminating the mistakes that have occurred in the traditional taxonomy of juridical relations and
describing the manner in which "rights" and "powers," for instance, might cross-cut the same legal
relationships).
31. See generally Korematsu v. United States (Korematsu 1), 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
32. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (The Federal
[Vol. 56:441
A HARD LOOK OR A BLIND EYE?
law that triggers justiciability and ought to invite more searching scrutiny
of factual administrative decision-making rather than the near-complete
deference courts generally afford.
By way of illustration, consider a hypothetical law passed by
Congress establishing post offices throughout the United States but
prohibiting Caucasian males from being hired as postal workers. A
Caucasian male postal worker denied employment under this law sues
the United States, challenging the law on equal protection grounds.
Congress might first claim that its decision is simply judicially
unreviewable - the Constitution grants Congress sole power to establish
post offices, just as it grants the President sole power over military
actions as Commander-in-Chief.33 A court would surely reject this line of
argument due to the rather obvious fact that Congress's power as a
lawmaking body is limited by other sections of the Constitution, such as
the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress might then attempt to justify such
a preposterous law by claiming that white male postal workers are
statistically more likely to become violent than any other demographic
Governments war power "is a power to wage war successfully, and thus it permits the harnessing of
the entire energies of the people in a supreme co6perative effort to preserve the nation. But even the
war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties."); cf. Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343-45 (i96o) (rejecting the contention that states possess unbridled power
over municipal boundaries, despite their obvious constitutional role in managing these sorts of internal
affairs, and holding that "[legislative control of municipalities, no less than other state power, lies
within the scope of relevant limitations imposed by the United States Constitution.... [Sluch power,
extensive though it is, is met and overcome by the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States."). In addition to its ubiquity within the legal arguments advanced (and often accepted)
in the wartime cases discussed below, this type of category mistake has become the Bush
Administration's veritable mantra when describing and defending its conduct of the "war on terror."
For instance, administration lawyers argued in an internal memo that both international treaties
prohibiting torture and federal anti-terror laws did not apply to President Bush's actions as
Commander-in-Chief of American forces in that war:
In order to respect the President's inherent constitutional authority to manage a military
campaign, 18 U.S.C. § 234oA (the prohibition against torture) must be construed as
inapplicable to interrogation undertaken pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief
authority.... Congress may no more regulate the President's ability to detain and
interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movements on
the battlefield.... Any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of unlawful
combatants and [terrorists] would violate the Constitution's sole vesting of the
Commander-in-Chief authority in the President.
Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of
Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations, Mar. 6, 2003, at 21, 24, available at
http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2oo 4 /images/o6/o9/pentagonreportparti.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2005); see also
Neil A. Lewis & Eric Schmitt, The Reach of War: Legal Opinions; Lawyers Decided Bans on Torture
Didn't Bind Bush, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2004, at At; Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to
the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under i8 U.S.C. §§ 23 4o-234 oA, Aug. 1, 2002,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmem020028oI
.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2005). Aside from the flagrant category mistake present in that Defense
Department's argument, the Administration's point of view forces one to wonder why, precisely, an
anti-torture treaty or law might ever exist, if not to bind the executive branch during wartime.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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group and that the threat of violence from disgruntled postal workers is
sufficiently severe to constitute a compelling governmental interest.
3 4
Congress might support this claim with studies (of however dubious
reliability) that appear to demonstrate that white males do pose a greater
threat and that the number of deaths from postal violence could run into
the thousands in coming years. Congress would then demand heightened
judicial deference to its findings because it is the body best situated and
constitutionally charged to make this sort of finding, and the costs of
mistake could be enormous.
As should be readily apparent, any judge who acceded to Congress's
demand for significant deference in this situation-and refused to subject
Congress's factual findings to traditionally strict scrutiny-would be
summarily reversed. The Supreme Court has, for better or worse, treated
Congressional findings of fact with minimal deference in far less extreme
cases, including most notably United States v. Lopez and United States v.
Morrison.35 Nonetheless, Congress's stance in this example is hardly
more radical than the position the Administration has taken (and seen
approved) in several wartime cases.
The conclusion dictated by this thought experiment is not that
military factual determinations are completely undeserving of deference
and that courts should scrutinize all military actions de novo when there
exists applicable law. Nor is it that the President's particular
constitutional role in military and foreign affairs is completely irrelevant
to issues of judicial deference. Rather, administrative law principles
indicate that the Executive's singular role in matters of national security
cannot be invoked as a talismanic guarantee of deference beyond that to
which other civilian administrative agencies may lay claim. There may be
legitimate reasons (such as those discussed in Part III) that military
decisions warrant further deference than standard administrative
determinations. Indeed, rationality review (which recognizes the value of
administrative expertise) already demands significant judicial deference
in comparison to the ordinary standard of scrutiny in cases that involve
fundamental rights. Yet, according to the Supreme Court's
administrative law doctrine, adherence to the rule of law requires greater
34. Laws that discriminate on the basis of race must be strictly scrutinized, and are allowed to
stand only if they further a compelling governmental interest and are narrowly tailored to meet that
interest. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
35. Lopez and Morrison involved Congress's affirmative power to make law under the
Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, respectively.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).
In each case Congress had made factual findings that the law in question would have the type of
impact that would bring it within the scope of Congress's affirmative power. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563
n.4; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614. In each case, the Court subjected Congress's determinations to
significant scrutiny, eventually rejecting them and striking down the laws in question. Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 567-68; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626-27.
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involvement than courts currently undertake.
B. DEFERENCE FROM EXPERTISE: KOREMATSU, ENDO, AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF MILITARY
PRONOUNCEMENTS
A court's recognition that the Executive's general authority over
military affairs should not preclude judicial protection of individual
constitutional rights-and judicial acknowledgment of the extant legal
constraints on executive action -does not guarantee meaningful judicial
scrutiny of executive action and enforced adherence to the rule of law.
Even when courts acknowledge the role of the judiciary as guardian of
constitutional rights, they often defer to military factual determinations
based purely on the military's experience and expertise over national
security issues. This acquiescence to the government's factual claims in
wartime cases renders operative legal constraints functionally toothless,
just as did deference based on the Executive's particular role in military
affairs. Self-propelled into accepting military proffers of fact at
essentially face value, Article III courts have transformed "strict
scrutiny" and other rights-protecting doctrines into exercises in artful
pleading. An executive branch actor haled into court to defend its
wartime actions need only allege sufficient facts to justify its choices and
declare the question otherwise inscrutable to judicial eyes.
Perhaps the most striking example of overwrought judicial deference
to an "expert" military is Korematsu, a case that achieved infamy on
other grounds. Korematsu marked the first appearance of "strict
scrutiny" for laws that classify by race (in this case, the exclusion of
recent immigrants of Japanese descent from the West Coast in 1942) and,
notoriously, is one of only two cases in which such a violation has ever
been judicially sanctioned. 6 Yet the case also contained the seeds of
another insidious judicial practice, one that has continued to operate on a
regular basis. In Korematsu, the factual determinations upon which the
racist exclusionary and curfew orders rested received no meaningful
scrutiny from the Court. Deference to the military was essentially
unbounded.
When the United States entered World War II against Japan in
December of 1941, military leaders and civilian populations were
immediately gripped by fear of a Japanese invasion along America's west
coast.37 Executive reaction to this putative threat was drastic. The United
States military forcibly evacuated all Japanese-Americans (including the
36. Korematsu 1, 323 U.S. at 216 ("[AIII legal restrictions that curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.
It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.").
37. See id. at 223 ("[Tlhe properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West
Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures .... ").
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American citizen children of immigrants) from the so-called
"exclusionary zone" along the coast. pursuant to an order issued by the
commander in charge of coastal defense, General J. L. DeWitt."
Korematsu arose from a legal challenge to one aspect of this forced
evacuation-viz., a curfew imposed upon Japanese-Americans in
particular locations-on the grounds that the curfew denied due process
and equal protection on the basis of race.39
Yet the Supreme Court did not dispose of Korematsu merely by
claiming that the President's plenary wartime constitutional power
negated the judiciary's role as final arbiter of infringement of
constitutional rights-it eschewed the illogical move described above in
Section A. Indeed, the Court upheld the military's action only after
applying what it termed "the most rigid scrutiny" to the legal issues
involved.4" Instead, the Korematsu Court announced that the military's
factual assertions (the framework upon which its legal case was built)
deserved almost limitless deference because of the Executive's particular
expertise in military affairs. Rather than hold that courts were
structurally proscribed from reviewing the military's race-based
detention, the Court essentially declared them institutionally
incompetent. Justice Black's opinion for the majority bears the stamp of
a Court unwilling to inquire appreciably into General DeWitt's claims or
his order's factual predicate:
[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military
authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that
population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and
quickly ascertained. We cannot say that the war-making branches of
the Government did not have ground for believing that in a critical
hour such persons could not readily be isolated and separately dealt
with, and constituted a menace to the national defense and safety,
which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to
guard against it.4
38. Id. at 215-16.
39. See id. at 216 ("It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect."); id. at 232 (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("I
had supposed that if a citizen was constrained by two laws, or two orders having the force of law, and
obedience to one would violate the other, to punish him for violation of either would deny him due
process of law."); id. at 234-35 (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("Being an obvious racial discrimination, the
order deprives all those within its scope of the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment.").
40. Id. at 216; see also Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, go
MICH. L. REV. 213, 232 (1991) ("Hirabayashi and Korematsu undeniably employed language
suggesting that racial classifications were presumptively objectionable and thus subject to the most
rigorous judicial scrutiny. Yet in both cases, notwithstanding the grandiose rhetoric, the Court actually
applied its most deferential brand of rationality review.").
41. Korematsu 1, 323 U.S. at 218 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 8i, 99 (I943)).
Hirabayashi upheld a curfew imposed upon Japanese immigrants and Americans of Japanese descent
on essentially the same grounds. As the quotation indicates, much of Hirabayashi's reasoning was
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Even Justice Jackson's dissent, famous for its warning that "a
judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain this order
is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order
itself," adopted the majority's deferential posture.42 Justice Jackson
explained, "[I]n the very nature of things, military decisions are not
susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal."'43 His assessment of the
Court's options reads as a self-fulfilling prophecy: "[T]he Court... has
no choice but to accept General DeWitt's own unsworn, self-serving
statement.... And thus it will always be when courts try to look into the
reasonableness of a military order."'
By contrast, Justice Murphy's dissent employed precisely the type of
"intelligent judicial appraisal" of the government's case that Justice
Jackson had deemed impossible, and it did so with devastating success. 45
Justice Murphy's agility with a more searching type of review, and the
categorically opposite result that he reaches, highlighted the failings
inherent in the majority's sweeping factual deference. Justice Murphy's
statement of the inquiry he planned to undertake offers a robust
understanding of courts' role in enforcing the rule of law: "[T]he military
claim must subject itself to the judicial process of having its
reasonableness determined and its conflicts with other interests
reconciled. ''46 Justice Murphy selected a standard of review that can
hardly be considered taxing given the rights at stake, demanding only
"that the action have some reasonable relation to the removal of the
dangers of invasion, sabotage, and espionage. '47 Yet General DeWitt's
orders and justification could not meet even this level of scrutiny.
Drawing upon readily available evidence, Justice Murphy demonstrated
that General DeWitt had ordered the exclusion of all persons of
Japanese ancestry, rather than only those considered to pose genuine
threats, not (as General DeWitt claimed) because separating loyal from
disloyal would have proven too difficult or time-consuming, but rather
because he held the racist view that all Japanese must be considered the
enemy45 Justice Murphy then inspected General DeWitt's final report of
adopted in Korematsu I, to more drastic effect. By the time Korematsu I was decided, however, there
existed reason to doubt the original veracity of the factual assertions upon which the case rested. See
supra note 48 and accompanying text.
42. Korematsu 1, 323 U.S. at 245-46 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
45. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 235-36 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
That this forced exclusion was the result in good measure of this erroneous assumption of
racial guilt rather than bona fide military necessity is evidenced by the Commanding
General's Final Report on the evacuation from the Pacific Coast area. In it he refers to all
individuals of Japanese descent as 'subversive,' as belonging to 'an enemy race' whose
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the Japanese exclusion, debunking its various claims as "insinuation,
based purely upon speculation and circumstantial evidence. 49 Justice
Murphy's demolition of the rationale for exclusion served simultaneously
to repudiate the Korematsu majority's refusal to engage meaningfully
with the factual questions before them. A supposed lack of expertise
proved an insubstantial barrier to Justice Murphy's reasoned analysis.
Ex parte Endo," a companion case to Korematsu, demonstrates by
contrapositive the Court's reluctance to dispute the military's proffered
justifications on account of that body's supposedly dominant expertise in
wartime matters. Endo closed the relocation camps built to intern
Japanese-Americans; the Endo and Korematsu decisions were handed
down on the same day, and defenders of the Korematsu Court have often
deployed Endo as proof that the Supreme Court's attitude towards the
Japanese internment was not so racially unjust as Korematsu alone would
indicate."
Yet, Endo and Korematsu presented starkly different issues to a
reluctant Supreme Court. Endo turned on the fact that the Department
of Justice (DOJ) had already conceded that Mitsuye Endo, the plaintiff
challenging her confinement, was a "loyal and law-abiding citizen" who
posed no danger to the United States. Not confronted with the difficulty
of challenging on the merits an army contention that Endo posed a
danger, the Court readily concluded as a matter of law that "[t]he
authority to detain a citizen or to grant him a conditional release as
protection against espionage or sabotage is exhausted at least when his
loyalty is conceded."53 Viewed together, these two cases exhibit a court
unwilling to challenge the factual conclusions of an "expert" military or
to offer more than cursory review of the logic behind executive actions
taken in potential violation of external legal constraints. In Korematsu,
the Court's adoption of this level of factual deference rendered its
'racial strains are undiluted,' and as constituting 'over 112,000 potential enemies... at large
today' along the Pacific Coast.
Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). Justice Murphy's assessment was proven correct forty
years later. In 1984, the Northern District of California overturned Fred Korematsu's conviction
according to evidence subsequently unearthed by the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians demonstrating that "race prejudice" and "war hysteria," not military necessity
were the driving factors behind the Japanese internment. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.Supp.
14o6, 1416-17 (N.D. Cal. 1984) ("The Commission found that military necessity did not warrant the
exclusion and detention of ethnic Japanese. It concluded that 'broad historical causes which shaped
these decisions [exclusion and detention] were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political
leadership."' (quoting PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS i8 (t982) (alteration in original))).
49. Korematsu 1, 323 U.S. at 238 n.9 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
50. 323 U.S. 283 (944).
5 I. See generally Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, I16 HARV. L. REV. 1933 (2003).
52. Endo, 323 U.S. at 294.
53. Id. at 302.
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ostensibly stringent legal scrutiny a virtual nullity.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL WAR POWERS AND THE FAILURE TO DEMAND
"SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE"
The tendencies described above-judicial overemphasis of both the
Executive's constitutional role and its expertise in military matters -have
become endemic to Article III courts in wartime. Yet these juridical
proclivities operate not merely as misguided grounds for decision in their
own right, but also as catalysts for far more devastating systematic errors
in the adjudicatory process. To begin with, the judiciary's wartime
conflation of executive authority to act and constitutional restrictions
upon action-the "category mistake" described above-has caused
courts to diminish the strength of existing constitutional checks by
refusing to demand sufficient factual proof before allowing
administrative actors to abridge constitutional rights. Courts have
refused to require the Executive to present substantial evidence before
brushing aside restrictions on executive action.
I. PADILLA V. BUSH AND THE "SOME EVIDENCE" STANDARD
The factual and procedural history of the landmark case Padilla v.
Bush-indeed, even the personal history of Jos6 Padilla himself 54-are
by now well known to lawyers and non-lawyers alike.5 Under these
circumstances, it will suffice to provide only a brief prrcis of the facts
most critical to the succeeding analysis.
On May 8, 2002, Jos6 Padilla, an American citizen, was arrested at
Chicago's O'Hare Airport pursuant to a civilian "material witness"
warrant; the United States government apparently believed that Padilla
possessed material information regarding al Qaeda or other terrorist
organizations. 6 His initial arrest and detention were carried out by the
Department of Justice, as if Padilla were a quotidian civilian detainee. 7
On June 9, 2002, however, the government notified the court that had
issued the warrant for Padilla's arrest,8 that it had reclassified Padilla as
an enemy combatant according to the President's wartime authority.
Padilla was subsequently transferred from a civilian detention center into
military custody and imprisoned in the naval brig in Charleston, South
54. See Deborah Sontag, Terror Suspect's Path From Streets to Brig, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, at
As.
55. For a thorough exegesis on the facts underlying this case, see generally Padilla v. Bush
(Padilla 1), 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The procedural history was ably summarized
in Padilla v. Rumsfeld (Padilla 111), 352 F.3d 695, 701-02 (2d Cir. 2003).
56. Padilla 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 568--69, 573-74.
57. Id. at 568-69.
58. The warrant had been issued by the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New
York. Id. It is for this reason that Josd Padilla's habeas petition was filed in that court, rather than (for
instance) in Chicago or South Carolina.
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Carolina.5 ' There, Padilla was denied all contact with the outside world,
and precluded from meeting with his lawyer, contacting family members,
or accessing the courts as a means of endeavoring to free himself from
confinement.60 On June II, 2002, Padilla's court-appointed public
defender, Donna Newman, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief as
Jos6 Padilla's next friend.6' The district court's initial disposition of
Padilla's habeas petition-the first judicial word spoken on this case-
stands as a paradigmatic example of the misdirected path that
constitutional role-based deference can cause a court to tread.
Chief Judge Mukasey of the Southern District of New York began a
review of Padilla's habeas petition in a manner befitting typical civilian
judicial oversight (i.e., lacking in indicia of significant deference to the
military). The court held that the President's authority to detain Padilla
indefinitely without trial turned on the question of whether he was
indeed an enemy combatant,6' and found the government's factual
determination of Padilla's status juidicially reviewable."
Though the Padilla district court did not significantly explore the
issue, the "law to apply" in this situation was duplicative and mutually
reinforcing. The Secretary of Defense's claim of affirmative authority to
detain Jos6 Padilla rested upon the factual and legal contention that
Padilla is, in fact, an unlawful combatant. The detention of a non-
combatant under military authority would constitute an action outside of
the law.6' Furthermore, as an American citizen arrested on American
soil, Padilla was entitled to some sort of due process6' before being
deprived of his liberty, again at least requiring a finding that he is an
enemy combatant and thereby either outside the boundaries of normal
criminal due process, or entitled only to the process he received, viz.,
determinations by the President (and presumably a court) of his status.
59. Padilla 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 568-69,571.
6o. See Sontag, supra note 54, at Ai.
61. See Padilla 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
62. In so doing, the court held that the President possessed statutory authority to detain
individuals who were properly classified as enemy combatants. See id. at 597-99 ("Accordingly, the
detention of Padilla is not barred by 18 U.S.C. § 4ooi(a); nor, as discussed above, is it otherwise barred
as a matter of law."). For a more extensive discussion of the district court's resolution of this issue, see
supra note 23; infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
63. See Padilla I, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 587-88.
64. See id. at 588 ("Does the President have the authority to designate as an enemy combatant an
American citizen captured on American soil, and, through the Secretary of Defense, to detain him for
the duration of armed conflict with al Qaeda? ... If so, by whatever standard this court must apply-
itself a separate issue-is the evidence adduced by the government sufficient to justify the detention of
Padilla?").
65. The Padilla court notes correctly, in another context, that the contours of this due process
right are hardly well-defined. Id. at 6oi ("'[W]hat emerges from [the] disparate cases and lines of
thought [interpreting the Due Process Clause] is, quite clearly, less than a solidly grounded or
coherently elaborated right of judicial access."' (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 759 (2d ed. 1988)) (alterations in original))).
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The latter constraint molds the former: an insufficient procedural
opportunity to prove that he is not an enemy combatant-and therefore
that he may not be administratively detained without trial-would
deprive Jos6 Padilla of liberty without due process.66
The Padilla district court next embarked upon a substantial factual
examination into the ancillary question of whether Padilla should be
granted the opportunity to consult with an attorney in advancing the
claim that he is not an enemy combatant. The government maintained
that allowing Padilla access to a lawyer would "jeopardize the two core
purposes of detaining enemy combatants-gathering intelligence about
the enemy, and preventing the detainee from aiding in any further
attacks against America." Refusing to defer to the government's
viewpoint, however, the district court attacked the logic behind the
Administration's assertion that to permit Padilla to consult with a lawyer
would interfere with its interrogation and allow him to transmit
dangerous information. The court observed that this argument "proves
far too much" and was unsupported by proffered facts: "the
government's conjecture is, on the facts presented to me in [its
affidavits], gossamer speculation. '" 6' Critically, Chief Judge Mukasey was
not required to lay claim to any particular expertise in the fields of
terrorism or national security in order to make such a judgment. Instead,
the court simply recognized the flaws of the government's reasoning and
deduced from these that the government had failed to prove that Padilla
would be capable of any further harm to the nation's security were he
simply allowed to consult with counsel.69 Chief Judge Mukasey eventually
66. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld (Padilla 11), 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the
court must confirm that "Padilla's detention is not arbitrary, and that, because his detention is not
arbitrary, the President is exercising a power vouchsafed to him by the Constitution").
67. Padilla 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
68. Id. at 603-04.
69. Id. The government had argued first that allowing Padilla contact with an attorney would
interfere with their attempts to interrogate him. Id. at 603. The court rejected this contention, pointing
out that Padilla would be allowed counsel only for the purpose of arguing the factual claim that he is
not an enemy combatant, not as part of a general right to counsel that might be employed under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to close off communications with authorities. Id. The Administration
next claimed that permitting Josd Padilla communication with the outside world through his attorney
would unlock the potential for him to transmit messages to other terrorists. Id. It was this assertion of
threat that the district court characterized as "gossamer speculation," unsupported by the facts offered
in the government's own declarations and curable by other means. Id. at 604.
The court noted that, despite the Administration's asseverations to the contrary, there was no
indication that Padilla had been trained to pass information through an intermediary, or that the
military could not effectively monitor his communications with his counsel-a respected, ethical
member of the bar-in order to detect or prevent such information from being transmitted. Id.
Moreover, Jos6 Padilla had already been permitted to meet once with an attorney during the period of
time in which the Department of Justice was holding him in civilian custody. Id. Presaging the
dissenting opinions in Detroit Free Press I and North Jersey Media I, discussed infra section 2.D.I, the
court noted correctly that any damage Padilla might reasonably be expected to perpetrate through
dissemination of intelligence had most likely already occurred. Id.
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held that the Department of Defense must permit Padilla to meet with
his attorney." Thus, granting the Secretary of Defense appropriate
deference commensurate with the government's expert role did not
necessitate accepting a factual conclusion for which support was wholly
lacking.7
Yet the district court's subsequent discussion of the standard of
proof that the government must meet in order to establish Jos6 Padilla's
unlawful combatant status diverged drastically from this mode of logical
review. After describing the President's plenary authority in matters of
national security, the court concluded that the President's constitutional
powers, in addition to the powers delegated to him by Congress,
compelled the judiciary to afford the Executive wide deference with
regard to its wartime factual assertions."
Notably, the Padilla district court awarded heightened deference to
the Secretary's factual assessments based purely on the President's
70. Id. at 61o. The government apparently viewed the possibility that Jos6 Padilla might be
allowed to meet with his court-appointed public defender as such a potential calamity that it refused to
allow Ms. Newman access to Padilla even after the court initially ruled that such access was legally
required. In an extraordinary turn of events, the court was forced to order the Department of Defense
to allow Padilla to meet with Newman a second time. Padilla 11, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (writing-after
the government refused to allow Padilla to consult with an attorney and attempted to relitigate the
question -"[liest any confusion remain, this is not a suggestion or a request that Padilla be permitted
to consult with counsel, and it is certainly not an invitation to conduct a further 'dialogue' about
whether he will be permitted to do so. It is a ruling-a determination-that he will be permitted to do
so"). Despite the court's strong language, Chief Judge Mukasey subsequently agreed to certify an
interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit, effectively staying the order granting Padilla access to his
attorney. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. Supp. 2d 218, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
71. The court continued to apply this type of logical, fact-based scrutiny in response to the
government's motion for reconsideration, which included supplemental written testimony arguing that
the government's interrogation of Padilla would suffer irreparable harm if he were allowed to see an
attorney. See Padilla 11, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 53.
The point of the above discussion is not to show that Admiral Jacoby's prediction of
adverse consequences from permitting Padilla to have contact with lawyers is wrong.
Rather, the point is that although that prediction is plausible, it is only plausible. There are
other equally plausible scenarios, at least some of which, suggested above, would be far
more beneficial to the government than the prospect of waiting while Padilla, conceded to
be a seasoned veteran of imprisonment, toughs it out for whatever period of time he may
think someone on the outside might help him. It is a paradox of the government's own
making that what prevents Padilla from becoming aware of the possibility that his avenues
of appeal could be swiftly foreclosed is that he is not permitted to consult with a lawyer.
Id.
72. See Padilla I, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 6o5 .
It is the President who wields "delicate, plenary and exclusive power.., as the sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations-a power which does not
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress." And where as here the President does
act with statutory authorization from Congress, there is all the more reason for deference.
Indeed, Articles I and II prominently assign to Congress and the President the shared
responsibility for military affairs. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; art. II, § 2. In accordance with
this constitutional text, the Supreme Court has shown great deference to the political
branches when called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy,
national security, or military affairs.
Id. (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3 d 278, 282 (4th Cir. 2002)) (internal citations omitted).
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"special constitutional role" and without relying upon the Executive's
greater expertise over the subject matter. To the contrary, Chief Judge
Mukasey noted that the determination of whether adequate facts exist to
support Padilla's classification as an unlawful combatant is one to which
Article III courts are particularly well-suited.73 In fact, it resembles
strongly the general inquiry into whether a fact-finder's determination is
supported by facts on the record, one to which courts have become well
accustomed in other contexts.74 It was Justice Jackson's famous phrase -
"we decide difficult cases presented to us by virtue of our commissions,
not our competence" 75 -that carried the day instead. The Padilla district
court simply believed that it would be improperly controverting the
President's (and its own) constitutional roles in wartime were it to
challenge the Executive's claims in any consequential fashion. 6
In so doing, the Padilla district court succeeded in begging the
crucial question. In light of Chief Judge Mukasey's antecedent analysis,
the question of whether the President held the authority to detain Jos6
Padilla was no longer in doubt. The court had already verified that the
73. Padilla 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607-08.
The deference to which the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit refer is due not because
judges are not personally able to decide whether facts have been established by competent
evidence, or whether those facts are sufficient to warrant a particular conclusion by a
preponderance of evidence, or by clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable
doubt. Indeed, if there is any task suited to what should be the job skills of judges, deciding
such issues is it.
Id. Chief Judge Mukasey at one point took the even more drastic step of contravening the
Administration's "expert" opinion on a matter relating to Josd Padilla's confinement and
interrogation, declaring it outside of the government's scope of expertise. Padilla I1, 243 F. Supp. 2d at
52 ("Moreover, the forecast speculates not about an intelligence-related matter, in which Admiral
Jacoby is expert, but about a matter of human nature-Padilla's in particular-in which, most
respectfully, there are no true experts.").
74. Padilla 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 6o7-o8.
The deference to which the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit refer is due not because
judges are not personally able to decide whether facts have been established by competent
evidence, or whether those facts are sufficient to warrant a particular conclusion by a
preponderance of evidence, or by clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable
doubt. Indeed, if there is any task suited to what should be the job skills of judges, deciding
such issues is it.
Id.; see also infra Part II.A.3.
75. Id. at 6o8 (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (I98I)).
76. Despite the government's release of information indicating its belief that Jos6 Padilla had in
fact trained with al Qaeda and intended to commit acts of terrorism within the United States, see
Summary of Jos6 Padilla's Activities with Al Qaeda, United States Department of Defense, May 28,
2004, available at http://news.findlaw.comlwp/docs/padilla/pad528o4dodsum.html (last visited Jan. 5,
2005), the Padilla case may yet come to stand as the paradigmatic example of the devastating
consequences that may accrue if the Administration is permitted to detain suspected terrorists without
meaningful judicial review. According to various news reports, "administration officials now concede
that the principal claim they have been making about Padilla ever since his detention-that he was
dispatched to the United States for the specific purpose of setting off a radiological 'dirty bomb'-has
turned out to be wrong and most likely can never be used in court." Paul Krugman, Travesty of Justice,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2004, at A23 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting a report from NEWSWEEK
MAGAZINE).
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President possessed the power to order enemy combatants detained
without either a judicial warrant or further Congressional authorization.77
Rather, the issue before the court was whether Jos6 Padilla was
himself an enemy combatant, and thus whether the President and the
Secretary of Defense were acting within their lawful authority, or
whether they had instead violated Padilla's Fifth Amendment right to be
free from the deprivation of liberty without due process. It is precisely
this point that Padilla raised, and that the court brushed aside: "Padilla
insists that this court conduct a 'searching inquiry' into the factual basis
for the President's determination that Padilla is an enemy combatant, lest
the court 'rubber stamp' the June 9 Order and thereby enforce a
'Presidential whim."'"8 This request neatly mimics Justice Marshall's
demand in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, Inc., a case
discussed at some length in Part II.A, that courts conduct a "thorough,
probing, in-depth review" of administrative factual determinations.79 The
principles that underlie the two are identical, and stem from the most
basic notions of the "rule of law" described above: where there is law to
apply, the Executive must operate demonstrably within that law, or the
alternative is government by executive fiat or "whim. ' '8°
Nevertheless, the court rejected Padilla's argument according to the
question-begging rationale Padilla had attempted to avoid. The district
court opinion returns (as if in a mantra) to repeated invocations of the
President's constitutional authority in wartime, and in so doing largely
fails to engage with the thrust of Padilla's charge. Explained Chief Judge
Mukasey, "[t]he President, for the reasons set forth above, has both
constitutional and statutory authority to exercise the powers of
Commander in Chief, including the power to detain unlawful
combatants.""' In the end, the court settled upon the government's
suggested standard for the threshold showing the Administration must
make in order to continue to detain Padilla: the government must
77. Padilla I, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 588-90.
78. Id. at 6o6 ("In essence, Padilla argues that he is entitled to a trial on the issue of whether he is
an unlawful combatant or not.").
79. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (97). This topic will be
addressed in extended detail in Part II.A, infra.
8o. See Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACriON 595 (1965). This
interpretation of underlying lawlessness did not escape notice within the popular press. As one
reporter wrote, referring both to Padilla v. Bush (Padilla I) and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi I),
discussed further infra,
[d]etaining two American citizens without charge or access to counsel in military brigs,
maintaining illegal combatants on a foreign island in a legal limbo, keeping lawful aliens
under permanent surveillance while deporting others after secret hearings: these are not the
actions of a republic that lives by the rule of law but of an imperial power reluctant to trust
its own liberties.
Michael Ignatieff, The American Empire; The Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, at F22.
81. Padilla 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 6o6.
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provide only "some evidence to support [the President's] conclusion that
Padilla was ... engaged in a mission against the United States.
82
In this first Padilla opinion the court provided essentially no
guidance regarding the origin or workings of this standard.8' However, in
a second opinion disposing of the government's Motion for
Reconsideration, Chief Judge Mukasey indicated explicitly that he had
borrowed the standard from the Supreme Court's doctrine governing
administrative disciplinary proceedings in prisons. 4  Importantly,
according to the Southern District of New York's formulation, the some
evidence standard-while requiring only a modicum of proof by the
government-would permit Jos6 Padilla to present his own evidence of
"innocence" and challenge the Administration's proffered proofs. The
court "cannot confirm that Padilla has not been arbitrarily detained
without giving him an opportunity to respond to the government's
allegations." ' Yet, Chief Judge Mukasey hinted that Padilla will not fare
even as well as typical prisoners operating under the equivalent level of
review. According to the court, the "chaotic and less accessible setting of
a distant battlefield" may complicate the gathering and examination of
evidence and force the court to permit the government to prevail upon
even a lesser showing. 6
82. Id. at 8o6 (emphasis added).
83. See id.
84. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld (Padilla I1), 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 54-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing a series
of prison disciplinary cases, beginning with Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445
(1985), to give content to the "some evidence" standard). Although the Padilla court did not address
this line of cases, the "some evidence" standard is also found within the Supreme Court's pre-1952
jurisprudence on habeas petitions challenging INS deportation orders. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533
U.S. 289, 306 (2001) (citing United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm'r of Immigration, 273 U.S. to3, Io6
(1927), for the proposition that deportation "on charges unsupported by any evidence is a denial of
due process which may be corrected on habeas corpus").
85. Padilla 11, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 54. The court elaborated at some length upon this interpretation,
explaining that "'some evidence' does not mean any evidence at all that would tend, however slightly,
to make an inmate's guilt more probable. Rather, the evidence must prove the inmate's guilt in some
plausible way." Id. at 55 (citing for support Zavaro v. Coughlin, 970 F.2d 1148, 1I52-53 (2d Cir. 1992)
and Lenea v. Lane, 882 F.2d I 171, 1175-76 (7th Cir. 1989)). "Further," added the court, "the evidence
must carry some indicia of reliability." Id. (collecting cases). The fact that Chief Judge Mukasey felt
compelled to state such a proposition explicitly provides an indication of the razor's edge upon which
Padilla's right to any meaningful consideration of his status balanced.
86. Id. at 56
When I refer to 'the logic of [the prison cases),' I mean only that. Those cases, which dealt
with evaluation of evidence gathered in the relatively accessible setting of a prison, cannot
be applied mechanically to evaluation of evidence gathered in the chaotic and less
accessible setting of a distant battlefield. What allowances will have to be made in applying
the logic of those cases will have to abide whatever submission Padilla may choose to make.
Id. The court's reference to a "distant battlefield" also appears to ignore the fact that Josd Padilla was
arrested in O'Hare Airport in Chicago by civilian authorities. Padilla 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 568.
Whatever evidence exists for or against him, it is not likely to assume the form of scattershot testimony
by combatants on the field of battle. Regardless, Chief Judge Mukasey willingly let slip his own dim
view of Padilla's chances during discussion of the possibility that Padilla might have agreed to
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Though more of a question of legal deference, it is worth noting
further that the district court's importation of the "some evidence"
standard strikes an improperly hostile pose towards Padilla's due process
rights. Defendants in prison disciplinary hearings have already been
convicted of crimes after having exercised their due process rights in full
and fair hearings under a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Indeed,
the lower standard of proof in prisons attaches because the inmates have
previously been properly deprived of their liberty in a court of law.87 For
Jos6 Padilla, the question is precisely whether he has in fact violated the
law and thus subjected himself to confinement. The court's selection of
such a minimal standard of proof consequently would seem
inappropriate.
The district court opinions in Padilla are no longer good law. In
December 2003, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's conclusions that the President possessed statutory
cooperate had he "consulted with counsel, made whatever submission he was inclined to make, if any,
and lost in short order, as he well might under a 'some evidence' standard." Padilla H, 243 F. Supp. 2d
at 52.
87. See, e.g., Hill, 472 U.S. at 454 (basing its selection of the "some evidence" standard on the
"distinctive setting of a prison, where disciplinary proceedings take place in a closed, tightly controlled
environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully
incarcerated for doing so") (internal quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
88. Almost as an aside to its refusal to demand more than "some evidence" before allowing the
United States to hold Josh Padilla indefinitely without trial, Padilla I also contains an excellent
illustration of the judiciary's willingness, on its own accord, to read Congressional empowerments of
the military sufficiently broadly to eliminate questions of the executive's affirmative authority. Padilla
had argued that his detention violated 18 U.S.C. § 40oI(a), which orders that "[n]o citizen shall be
imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." i8
U.S.C. § 400(a) (2000); Padilla I, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 586. Though it held 18 U.S.C. § 40oI(a)
applicable to Padilla's case, the court interpreted Congress's "Authorization for Use of United States
Armed Forces" as meeting the terms of that constraining statute. Padilla 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 597-98;
see Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The salient portion of this statute states
[t]hat the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September I i, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons."
Id. § 2(a). The error in the court's interpretation lies in the fact that the Joint Authorization covers
only those individuals or organizations the President determines "planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks" of September i ith. Id. By comparison, the United States had alleged only
that Josd Padilla was "closely associated with al Qaeda" and might be involved in "preparation for acts
of international terrorism," not that he was actually a member of that organization or bore any
responsibility for the previous attacks. Padilla 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
The June 9 Order is addressed to the Secretary of Defense, and includes seven numbered
paragraphs setting forth the President's conclusion that Padilla is an enemy combatant, and,
in summary form, the basis for that conclusion, including that Padilla: is "closely associated
with al Qaeda," engaged in "hostile and war-like acts" including "preparation for acts of
international terrorism" directed at this country, possesses information that would be
helpful in preventing al Qaeda attacks, and represents 'a continuing, present and grave
danger to the national security of the United States.' (June 9 Order 1 2-5)
Id. The district court attempted to obscure this linguistic defect by arguing that "Padilla is alleged in
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authority to detain American citizens captured on American soil"g-a
conclusion necessarily antecedent to that court's discussion of the
appropriate standard for reviewing Padilla's status. The Second Circuit
thus did not reach the issue of what standard of proof might apply to
judicial review of lawful executive detentions. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari two months later.' In June of 2004, the Court reversed,
holding that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was not the proper
respondent to Padilla's request for habeas relief, and therefore that the
Southern District of New York lacked jurisdiction over the petition.9' In
dismissing the case accordingly, the Supreme Court reached neither the
Second Circuit's holding that the Executive lacked authority to detain
Padilla nor the Southern District of New York's resolution of the
question of the government's burden of proof.9"
Yet although Chief Judge Mukasey's reasoning and analysis on this
crucial issue died with the Supreme Court's dismissal of Jos6 Padilla's
petition, the conclusion he reached appears to have lived on. The
Supreme Court, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a companion case to Padilla
discussed at greater length below, announced that administrative
classifications of prisoners as "enemy combatants" are to be evaluated
according to a standard indistinguishable from Chief Judge Mukasey's
"some evidence" criterion.93 Like a doctrinal moebius strip, Padilla v.
Bush's tortured jurisprudential path ends just where it began.
2. HAMDI v. RUMSFELD: NADIR AND RETRENCHMENT
While Padilla left factual scrutiny in service of the rule of law
dangling by a "gossamer" thread, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Hamdi
sliced the remaining strand completely. The facts and procedural history
of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld- consolidated alongside Padilla for certiorari
the June 9 Order to have been an unlawful combatant in behalf [sic] of al Qaeda," contrary to its own
description of that Order several pages earlier. Id. at 599. The result is a functional expansion of the
Joint Authorization's statutory language to cover even individuals "closely associated" with those
organizations responsible for the attacks of September ilth, an exploitation of minimal statutory
imprecision that seems to contradict the Resolution's unambiguous statement. On appeal, the Second
Circuit reversed the Southern District court and held that the Joint Authorization did not satisfy the
requirements of i8 U.S.C. § 4ooi(a), though it did not reach the particular question of against which
individuals or groups that statute particularly authorized action. Padilla v. Rumsfeld (Padilla I11), 352
F.3d 695,722-23 (2d Cir. 2003).
89. Id. at 698 ("We also conclude that Padilla's detention was not authorized by Congress, and
absent such authorization, the President does not have the power under Article II of the Constitution
to detain as an enemy combatant an American citizen seized on American soil outside a zone of
combat.").
90. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (granting cert.).
9I. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla (Padilla IV), 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2727 (2004) ("The District of South
Carolina, not the Southern District of New York, was the district court in which Padilla should have
brought his habeas petition. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand
the case for entry of an order of dismissal without prejudice.").
92. See generally id.
93. See Part I.C.2., infra.
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review by the Supreme Court'4-are by now as well known as those of its
Second Circuit companion. Little further explication is necessary or
instructive here.95 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit's approach and reasoning in
Hamdi largely mimics the Padilla district court's9 emphasis on the
Executive's special constitutional role. The Hamdi appellate court first
acknowledged that Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, could not be held
indefinitely by the Executive without some fashion of judicial review.'
The Fourth Circuit, like the Southern District of New York, understood
that meaningful judicial review of the legality of an alleged enemy
combatant's detention required consideration of the underlying facts that
gave rise to the President's war power authority to detain combatants in
the first instance. 8 It is inappropriate, explained the Hamdi appellate
court, for Article III courts to second-guess lawful executive decisions in
wartime. However, courts must first ascertain whether those decisions
were indeed lawful, an inquiry that demands examination of the
predicate facts according to which executive action is taken? 9
94. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (granting cert.).
95. A very brief recapitulation will suffice. Yaser Hamdi is an American-born citizen who was
captured in Afghanistan during the United States' post-September sith operations there, and was
being held in a naval brig in Norfolk, VA. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi 1), 316 F.3 d 45o, 459-6o (4 th
Cir. 2003). His father had filed a habeas petition as "next friend" on his behalf. Id. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
(Hamdi I) and Padilla v. Bush (Padilla I) are the only cases within the last half-century to address
substantively the lawfulness of military detention of American citizens.
96. Hamdi was, of course, decided before Padilla, and the latter drew to some degree upon the
former. The time descriptors employed in the text are meant only as a guide to the reader.
97. Hamdi 1,316 F.3 d at 465
While the scope of habeas review has expanded and contracted over the succeeding
centuries, its essential function of assuring that restraint accords with the rule of law, not the
whim of authority, remains unchanged. Hamdi's petition falls squarely within the Great
Writ's purview, since he is an American citizen challenging his summary detention for
reasons of state necessity.
Id.
Under Article V of the Geneva Convention, Yaser Hamdi was also entitled to "an initial
formal determination of his status" as either a lawful or unlawful combatant "by a competent
tribunal." Id. at 468 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Circuit
disposed quickly of this potential source of law, holding that the Geneva Convention was not self-
executing and therefore conferred no basis for a private right of action by an aggrieved individual in
American courts. Id. at 468-69; see also Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978)
(holding that a similar provision was not self-executing); Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1222 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) ("[C]orrective machinery specified in the treaty itself is nonjudicial.").
98. In fact, Hamdi I employed the same rule-of-law formulation described above in Padilla in
characterizing its role in evaluating whether the executive has acted within its constitutional authority:
"This deferential posture, however, only comes into play after we ascertain that the challenged
decision is one legitimately made pursuant to the war powers." Hamdi 1, 316 F.3d at 472.
99. The executive's plenary wartime power, wrote the court,
only comes into play after we ascertain that the challenged decision is one legitimately
made pursuant to the war powers .... Otherwise, we would be deferring to a decision made
without any inquiry into whether such deference is due. For these reasons, it is appropriate,
upon a citizen's presentation of a habeas petition alleging that he is being unlawfully
detained by his own government, to ask that the government provide the legal authority
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Yet the court selected an impossibly low standard for assessing the
government's factual case against Hamdi: if the government has asserted
facts that "would, if accurate, provide a legally valid basis for Hamdi's
detention," the court will not inquire further-the court viewed the
veracity of those asserted facts as beyond its purview. I° The Hamdi
appellate court located the Executive's right to essentially unfettered
discretion over the factual basis for Hamdi's incarceration within the
President's plenary constitutional authority over national security and
foreign affairs, committing the same error of conflation made by the
court in Padilla.' The Fourth Circuit stated further that anything
beyond token judicial oversight would encroach upon the Executive's
Article II war-making powers, ignoring the countervailing notion that
judicial withdrawal might constitute an abdication of the courts' own
constitutional responsibilities." The Fourth Circuit's overly deferential
upon which it relies for that detention and the basic facts relied upon to support a legitimate
exercise of that authority.
Id. The Hamdi I court here employs the term "deference" not in the sense generally described above,
but rather to mean complete judicial detachment from (and refusal to review) wartime executive
actions. As the immediately following paragraphs will elucidate, the court's approach to the
Administration's factual presentation regarding Yaser Hamdi's status was hardly lacking in deference.
too. Id. at 473 (emphasis added). It is a bit of a misnomer to describe this level of review as an
"inquiry" (or even as a "review"), since the Hamdi 1 court has agreed to accept the Administration's
asseverations quite literally without question. Lest there be any doubt regarding the extent of the
Fourth Circuit's surrender, the Hamdi I opinion stated explicitly that even on its face Hamdi's habeas
petition must fail, for his acknowledgment that he was arrested by military authorities in a theater of
war is sufficient to endow the military executive henceforth with unfettered authority over his person.
See id. at 469 ("[W]e conclude that Hamdi's petition fails as a matter of law. It follows that the
government should not be compelled to produce the materials described in the district court's August
16 order.").
ioi. Id. at 471-72 ("We have already emphasized that the standard of review of enemy combatant
detentions must be a deferential one .... ").
102. Id. at 463 ("For the judicial branch to trespass upon the exercise of the warmaking powers
would be an infringement of the right to self-determination and self-governance at a time when the
care of the common defense is most critical. This right of the people is no less a right because it is
possessed collectively."). Unlike Chief Judge Mukasey in Padilla 1, the Hamdi I court explicitly tied
this reliance to the executive's greater expertise.
[T]he executive and legislative branches are organized to supervise the conduct of overseas
conflict in a way that the judiciary simply is not. The Constitution's allocation of the
warmaking powers reflects not only the expertise and experience lodged within the
executive, but also the more fundamental truth that those branches most accountable to the
people should be the ones to undertake the ultimate protection ....
Id. Judicial oversight of administrative detentions, whether achieved through habeas corpus petitions
or other jurisdictional means, is likely fundamental to the American constitutional system of separated
powers and could not be overturned by Congressional manipulation of substantive or jurisdictional
statutes. See generally U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish."); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 345-57 (5th ed. 2003); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1731, 1778-79 (199) (arguing that the Constitution "demands a system of constitutional remedies
adequate to keep government generally within the bounds of law").
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approach to the military compelled it to criticize the district court for
engaging in more searching review and demanding from the government
even a quantum of proof of Hamdi's putative guilt."° Such a standard
strips much of the potency of the rule of law; the government need barely
proffer any proof, much less "substantial" evidence or "a preponderance
of the evidence," before being allowed to detain Yaser Hamdi
indefinitely. By refusing to inquire meaningfully into the facts underlying
and legitimating the government's deprivation of Hamdi's
constitutionally guaranteed liberty, the Fourth Circuit had effectively
demoted its powerful conception of the rights at stake to the status of
mere precatory language."
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Hamdi represents the high water
103. See Hamdi ,316 F.3 d at 472-73.
The district court approached the Mobbs declaration by examining it line by line, faulting it
for not providing information about whether Hamdi had ever fired a weapon, the formal
title of the Taliban military unit Hamdi was with when he surrendered, the exact
composition of the U.S. interrogation team that interviewed Hamdi in Sheberghan, and
even the distinguishing characteristics between a Northern Alliance military unit and a
Taliban military unit. Concluding that the factual allegations were insufficient to support
the government's assertion of the power to detain Hamdi under the war power, the court
then ordered the production of the numerous additional materials outlined previously. We
think this inquiry went far beyond the acceptable scope of review.
Id.
104. While the holding in Hamdi I goes even further than Padilla I, the case's result remains in one
regard more defensible. In his petition, Yaser Esam Hamdi admitted to having been captured in
Afghanistan "during a time of active military hostilities." Hamdi 1, 316 F.3d at 460. The Fourth Circuit
relied specifically on this fact in its analysis of the case. In so doing, it differentiated the prayer for
relief before it from Padilla's situation on the grounds that it would seem reasonable to presume the
accuracy and regularity of a military detention in a zone of military operations, even when the same
would not be true for civilians-such as Josd Padilla-who were arrested on American soil. Id. at 475
("At least where it is undisputed that he was present in a zone of active combat operations, we are
satisfied that the Constitution does not entitle him to a searching review of the factual determinations
underlying his seizure there."); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi M1), 337 F.3d 335, 344 (4th Cir.
2003) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) ("To compare this battlefield
capture to the domestic arrest in Padilla v. Rumsfeld is to compare apples and oranges.").
Nevertheless, it is far from obvious or uncontested that Hamdi was indeed a soldier for the Taliban or,
for that matter, an enemy combatant. See Dahlia Lithwick, Cruel Detentions, SLATE, Apr. 28, 2004, at
http://slate.msn.com/id/2o996i8 (last visited June 5, 2004) ("Dunham [Hamdi's defense attorney]
replies that he was only recently allowed to speak to his client for the first time and that the
government claims Hamdi's communications are classified, so he can't tell the court anything beyond
the fact that there is 'substantial dispute' between Mobbs' view of the facts and Handi's."). Without
meaningful inquiry into the facts underlying Hamdi's case, no court may ever know whether he was,
indeed, an enemy combatant-particularly if, in addition to precluding Hamdi from pressing his case
in court, the Department of Defense continues to preclude Hamdi's attorney from speaking publicly
about his case.
Notwithstanding the court's official explanation invoking "accuracy," the Fourth Circuit may
have had additional, pragmatic reasons-such as the difficulty the government might encounter in
proving its case-for establishing such a low threshold. See Hamdi 1, 316 F.3d at 473. ("The murkiness
and chaos that attend armed conflict mean military actions are hardly immune to mistake. Yet these
characteristics of warfare have been with us through the centuries and have never been thought
sufficient to justify active judicial supervision of combat operations overseas. To inquire, for example,
whether Hamdi actually fired his weapon is to demand a clarity from battle that often is not there.").
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mark in the Executive's efforts to abolish meaningful judicial review of
its official determinations. Handed down nearly two full years later, the
Supreme Court's reversal of that opinion turned back the rising tide of
factual determinism, but only to the line previously established by the
district court in Padilla. The Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld 5 first set about answering the principal question left open
by Padilla's untimely demise, holding that Congress had indeed
authorized the Executive to detain "enemy combatants" and thus
concluding that the Department of Defense possessed affirmative
authority to incarcerate Yaser Esam Hamdi (and, presumably, Jos6
Padilla) if, in fact, he could be so classified.6 The Court then side-
stepped the Hohfeldian category mistake urged upon it by the
government, concluding that the President's commander-in-chief
authority does not fully trump the rights held by individuals. The
Executive therefore cannot escape the independent evaluation (by some
neutral arbiter) of prisoners' claims."
IO5. Hamdi I1, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2oo4) (plurality opinion).
io6. Id. at 2650. ("Because detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield is a
fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of 'necessary and appropriate force,'
Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered
here."). The Supreme Court concluded that the Joint Authorization for the Use of Military Force, 115
Stat. 224, sufficed to meet the statutory mandate for administrative detentions set forth in i8 U.S.C.
§ 4001(a) and cured whatever other constitutional infirmities might remain. See id. at 2638 ("The
capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful
combatants, by 'universal agreement and practice,' are 'important incident[s] of war.") (citing Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)) (alterations in original). Since the beginning of this case, the United
States government has maintained that Hamdi was a member of the Taliban, an organization alleged
to be "harboring" al Qaeda. See id. at 2637 ("The [government's] declaration states that Hamdi
'traveled to Afghanistan' in July or August 2ooi, and that he thereafter 'affiliated with a Taliban
military unit and received weapons training."'). Proof of these factual allegations would thus largely
inoculate the Administration from the linguistic defects that plagued parallel attempts to draw Jos6
Padilla within the ambit of the Joint Authorization. See supra note 23; supra notes 88-92 and
accompanying text.
It is notable that the Hamdi III plurality could muster only four votes for its own opinion
holding, inter alia, that the President maintained the authority to detain Yaser Hamdi as an enemy
combatant. See Hamdi III, 124 S. Ct. at 2641. The fifth vote-the reason that Yaser Hamdi remained
incarcerated after the issuance of the opinion-came from Justice Thomas's otherwise dissenting
opinion, which argued that the government's assessment of Hamdi's guilt could not be challenged or
overturned by the courts. See id. at 2674 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas was thus the only
member of the Supreme Court to adopt the government's position in full.
io7. Hamdi II, 124 S. Ct. at 2650.
In so holding, we necessarily reject the Government's assertion that separation of powers
principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances.
Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo any examination of the individual case and
focus exclusively on the legality of the broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by
any reasonable view of separation of powers, as this approach serves only to condense
power into a single branch of government. We have long since made clear that a state of
war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's
citizens. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. Whatever power the United States Constitution
envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations
in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual
liberties are at stake. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 38o.
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The Supreme Court thus found itself faced squarely with the
question of what evidentiary standard the Executive must meet in order
to carry its burden of proof as to a detainee's status, and, ultimately, the
question of the proper level of deference the courts must afford to the
Executive branch's wartime factual determinations. I" The Hamdi Court's
choice of jurisprudential framework for evaluating this issue was both
familiar and curious. The Court plurality elected to assess the process
due Hamdi according to the balancing of interests set forth in the Court's
well-known line of civilian due process cases that begins with Mathews v.
Eldridge."° After a rather impressionistic balancing of the interests
Id. See also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (It was "the central judgment of the
Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers
into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty").
io8. Between the initial Fourth Circuit adjudication in Hamdi and the Supreme Court's
consideration of this case, the Department of Defense permitted Hamdi to meet with an attorney, and
the Hamdi III plurality held without further discussion that Yaser Hamdi "unquestionably has the
right to access to counsel in connection with the proceedings on remand." Hamdi I1, 124 S. Ct. at
2652.
1O9. Id. at 2626. ("The ordinary mechanism that we use for balancing such serious competing
interests, and for determining the procedures that are necessary to ensure that a citizen is not
'deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,' U.S. Const., Amdt. 5, is a test that
we articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) .... ). According to the test set forth in
Mathews, once a court determines that an individual holds a legally protected liberty or property
interest, the court derives the process due that individual through
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970));
see also Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,576-78 (1972).
Justice Scalia, in dissent, makes much of the Court's borrowing Mathews from the context of
civil deprivations of liberty or-far more commonly-property. See Hamdi 111, 124 S. Ct. at 2672
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[The plurality] claims authority to engage in this sort of 'judicious balancing'
from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), a case involving.., the withdrawal of disability
benefits! Whatever the merits of this technique when newly recognized property rights are at issue
(and even there they are questionable), it has no place where the Constitution and the common law
already supply an answer.") (emphasis and ellipses in original). Justice Scalia is certainly correct that
the application of Mathews to what might fairly be characterized as a criminal detention and
accompanying hearing is hardly a commonplace legal maneuver for the Court: "In our view, the
Mathews balancing test does not provide the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state
procedural rules which, like the one at bar, are part of the criminal process." Medina v. California, 505
U.S. 437, 443 (1992). Indeed, the Court has applied Mathews to a criminal proceeding only twice. Ake
v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (requiring that an indigent defendant who has shown that his sanity
may be an issue at trial must be provided access to a psychiatrist); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.
667 (1g8o) (upholding the authority of magistrate judges to make findings on motions to suppress
evidence). The Medina Court swept those cases aside, concluding that "it is not at all clear that
Mathews was essential to the results reached." Medina, 505 U.S. at 444.
Perhaps by consequence, the Mathews regime has drawn numerous critiques as offering a
framework unduly hostile to individuals' due process rights and unfairly constrictive in the procedures
that courts have tended to award. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. &
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invoked by Hamdi's liberty interest and the government's desire to
detain him, the plurality concluded, not surprisingly, that "substantial
interests lie on both sides of the scale in this case.'
Befitting this cognizance of the forces at play on either side of the
interests equation, the plurality's enumeration of which procedural
protections must be afforded Hamdi and those similarly situated traces a
cautious path among the available extremes:.. A "citizen-detainee
seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must
receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair
opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker ..... Yet these nominal procedural safeguards did not
FEMINISM 189, 266 (i9t) ("Escaping dependence has thus been an irresistible force within procedural
due process jurisprudence. And it has met the immovable object of the contemporary regulatory state.
If there were ever a time when the individual could avoid dependence upon the collective, that time is
gone. If it were ever possible for the citizen to aspire to a balance of power with government, it is
possible no longer."); Jerry L. Mashaw, Dignitary Process: A Political Psychology of Liberal
Democratic Citizenship, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 433, 437 (1987) ("Such an approach is functionally
inadequate to address the problems of governmental or bureaucratic discretion that the due process
clause was meant to address."); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44
U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 48 (1976) ("The utilitarian calculus is not, however, without difficulties. The
Eldridge Court conceives of the values of procedure too narrowly: it views the sole purpose of
procedural protections as enhancing accuracy, and thus limits its calculus to the benefits or costs that
flow from correct or incorrect decisions. No attention is paid to 'process values' that might inhere in
oral proceedings....").
so. Hamdi II, 124 S. Ct. at 2646. What the plurality's analysis lacked in rigor (in the fashion that
interest balancing typically suffers from a deficiency of logical scrupulousness) it made up for in
predictable equanimity. The plurality characterized Hamdi as having advanced "the most elemental of
liberty interests-the interest in being free from physical detention by one's own government," while
remarking that "[o]n the other side of the scale are the weighty and sensitive governmental interests in
ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return to battle
against the United States." Id. at 2646-47 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)
("Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.")). In Foucha, the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional the State of Louisiana's decision to continue to confine an individual who had been
acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity "on the basis of his antisocial personality." Foucha, 504 U.S.
at 78. The Court neither cited Mathews nor employed its balancing test. See id.
siI. That is, it rejects both Justice Thomas's dissent arguing that detainees need not be afforded
the opportunity to contest the government's factual assertions, id. at 630 (Thomas, J., dissenting), and
Justice Scalia's dissent that asserts that Hamdi must either be charged with a crime by civilian criminal
authorities or released. Id. at 626-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
I12. Id. at 6oi (emphasis added) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-
43 (1985) (holding that Mathews required that employees who may be terminated only for cause be
afforded a pretermination hearing at which to contest the charges against them)). The plurality
suggests later that this "neutral decisionmaker" could in fact be a military court, despite the self-
evident lack of neutrality involved in placing the assessment of authority to detain an individual before
the very governmental body attempting to perpetuate the detention. Id. at 604 ("There remains the
possibility that the standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and
properly constituted military tribunal."). It appears that the government may choose exactly this route.
See Phillip Carter, Prisoners' Dilemma: How the Administration Is Obstructing the Supreme Court's
Terror Decisions, SLATE, Aug. 3, 2004, at http://slate.msn.com/id/21O4715/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2004).
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catalyze a concomitantly stringent demand upon the government to put
forth substantial evidence of a detainee's enemy combatant status:
[T]he Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of
the Government's evidence, so long as that presumption remained a
rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided. Thus,
once the Government puts forth credible evidence that the habeas
petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus could shift to
the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence
that he falls outside the criteria." 3
The plurality compounded its retrenchment of executive power by
hinting that other unnamed accommodations of the government (of
unknown detriment to Hamdi's efforts) might be necessary, in light of
the "exigencies of the [wartime] circumstances..'' 14
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld thus leaves alleged unlawful combatants in a
position nearly identical to the one in which they found themselves after
the district court opinions in Padilla v. Bush. Though military detainees
are granted an opportunity to challenge the Executive's case against
them and to present evidence that they are improperly characterized, the
government's factual conclusions will benefit from a judicial presumption
of accuracy. Indeed, detainees may be presumed "unlawful combatants"
until proven otherwise, and courts are unlikely to force the
Administration to adduce more than "some evidence" in support of its
asseverations."5 The plurality opinion intentionally and explicitly
113. Hamdi 11, 124 S. Ct. at 2649.
114. Id. ("At the same time, the exigencies of the circumstances may demand that, aside from
these core elements, enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon
potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict."). The plurality indicated
further that various other evidentiary protections, such as the rule against hearsay evidence, may not
apply to citizens such as Hamdi the government seeks to hold as unlawful combatants. Id. ("Hearsay,
for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government in
such a proceeding.").
115. See Padilla v. Rjmsfeld (Padilla 11), 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Hamdi I11, 124 S.
Ct. 2645-47. Parallel analysis of these two cases is confused somewhat by the divergent uses of the
phrase "some evidence" within the opinions. (The courts' inconsistencies are likely engendered by
shifts in the government's nomenclature.) As described above, in Padilla II, Chief Judge Mukasey
explained that the "some evidence" standard-which he had borrowed from the context of prison
disciplinary proceedings- "does not mean any evidence at all that would tend, however slightly, to
make an inmate's guilt more probable. Rather, the evidence must prove the inmate's guilt in some
plausible way ... and must carry some indicia of reliability." Padilla 11, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 55
(collecting cases). Moreover, even under this standard the court would afford a detainee "an
opportunity to respond to the government's allegations." Id. at 54; see also supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
In Hamdi III, by contrast, the executive was advancing a far more restrictive interpretation of
the same "some evidence" standard (again borrowed from the context of prison disciplinary hearings),
according to which "a court would assume the accuracy of the Government's articulated basis for
Hamdi's detention, as set forth in the Mobbs Declaration, and assess only whether that articulated
basis was a legitimate one." Hamdi 111, 124 S. Ct. at 2645 (citing Hamdi 1, 316 F.3d at 473-74 ("The
factual averments in the [Mobbs] affidavit, if accurate, are sufficient to confirm" the legality of
Hamdi's detention.)). This latter conception of "some evidence," in focusing only upon the facts
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delegates to the lower courts the task of fleshing out much of the nuance
embedded in the legal standards it has announced, and Hamdi thus
leaves indeterminate (and undetermined) the precise degree of
deference courts will, in the final analysis, afford the Executive's factual
suppositions. Nevertheless, it appears that in the year since the
Southern District of New York predicted that Jos6 Padilla (and others
similarly situated) would "los[e] in short order... under a 'some
evidence' standard," less has changed than has remained the same. " '
D. MODERN WARTIME REJECTION OF RATIONALITY REVIEW
In concert with their willingness to accept less than compelling proof
of the factual predicates to lawful executive action, courts' deference to
the Executive's expertise in matters of national security has prevented
them from applying meaningful scrutiny to the logic employed by the
Administration to justify constitutionally suspect actions in wartime.
From Padilla and Hamdi to Detroit Free Press, North Jersey Media, and
Center for National Security, the lower courts' modem wartime
jurisprudence has been led astray by continued adherence to mistaken
principles.
I. The INS Hearing Access Cases and the Subjugation of
Rationality
The power of the Administration's invocation of its experience and
expertise in national security matters, and the deleterious effect this
power can have on litigants' attempts to invoke constitutional rights, has
been on display more recently in two cases that touch upon the current
"war against terror." North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft and Detroit
Free Press v. Ashcroft are two parallel lawsuits challenging the
Department of Justice's decision in the wake of the events of September
II, 2001, to close certain "special interest" Immigration and
Naturalization Service deportation hearings to the public and the
proffered by the government, would have stripped Hamdi of the opportunity to confront or challenge
the Administration's evidence and eliminated the requirement that the adduced facts prove his
"culpability" in some "plausible" fashion. In rejecting the government's harsher novel construction of
the some evidence standard, the Hamdi III plurality aligned itself with the more judicially assertive
stance struck by the Padilla district court. See id. at 2648 (holding that the process "proposed by the
Government" does not "strike[] the proper constitutional balance when a United States citizen is
detained in the United States as an enemy combatant").
1i6. See id. at 2652.
We anticipate that a District Court would proceed with the caution that we have indicated
is necessary in this setting, engaging in a fact-finding process that is both prudent and
incremental. We have no reason to doubt that courts faced with these sensitive matters will
pay proper heed both to the matters of national security that might arise in an individual
case and to the constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties that remain vibrant
even in times of security concerns."
Id.
117. Padilla I, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
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media."" The deportation hearings selected for closure were those
involving individuals that the Department of Justice, in the person of
Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy, had decided "might have
connections to or knowledge of the September II, 2001 terrorist
attacks.' '. 9 The Administration apparently feared that information
critical to the effort against terrorism might be disclosed during these
proceedings. 20 The plaintiffs in both cases-local media organizations
that had been denied access to these hearings-asserted First
Amendment rights under Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia'2' to
open proceedings. In both cases the trial courts recognized such rights
and held that the government must demonstrate a compelling interest if
it wished the hearings sealed. 22
To prove such a compelling interest (in the form of a grave threat to
national security), the Department of Justice and the INS submitted
declarations from two anti-terrorism officials who laid claim to significant
expertise on the subject: in Detroit Free Press, James S. Reynolds, Chief
of the Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section of the Justice Department's
Criminal Division, and in North Jersey Media, Mr. Reynolds and Dale
Watson, Executive Assistant Director for Counter Terrorism and
Counterintelligence of the FBI.' 3 It is the courts' treatments of the facts
and conclusions alleged in these declarations that illuminate their
extensive deference towards executive determinations of predicate facts,
and the consequences of such deference for constitutional adjudications.
The affidavits of these anti-terrorism experts contained veritable
laundry lists of the possible harms that might result from opening
hearings, or even from identifying the "special" detainees who were
subject to closed hearings. According to the Administration, releasing
information such as the detainees' names, the circumstances of their
arrests, or the evidence against them might disrupt anti-terrorist
investigations by placing terrorist groups on notice that one of their
number had been captured, alert these organizations that a member they
had counted upon would no longer be able to fulfill his tasks, "reveal the
direction and progress of the investigation," impair the government's
ability to "infiltrate terrorist organizations," or any one of a number of
I18. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft (Detroit Free Press 1), 195 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mich. 2002);
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft (North Jersey Media 1), 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002).
Many of the deportees in these "special interest" hearings are suspected of having ties to terrorist
groups. See North Jersey Media I, at 301.
ii9. North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft (North Jersey Media II), 308 F.3d 198, 199 (3d
Cir. 2002).
120. Id. at 200.
121. 448 U.S. 555 (980).
122. See Detroit Free Press 1, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 944-45; North Jersey Media 1, 205 F. Supp. 2d at
301.
123. Detroit Free Press 1, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 946; North Jersey Media I, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
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other dire possibilities.'24
These concerns are not facially unreasonable. Indeed, the CIA and
other intelligence-related agencies have long maintained that the
admission that certain information exists--much less the disclosure of
that information -could endanger the intelligence-gathering process and
deleteriously impact national security.'25 Yet the government's argument
contained one considerable logical flaw: nothing prevented the special
INS detainees themselves, or their lawyers (who would be present at the
closed hearings), from speaking publicly about any portion of the
proceedings.26 In fact, in the event that a detainee succeeded in obtaining
an appeal of the immigration judge's ruling, a complete transcript of the
hearing would become part of the public record.'27 The Detroit Free Press
and North Jersey Media trial courts seized upon this logical gap between
the "facts found and the choice made. ' ' ,,8 Propelled by the irrationality of
the government's position, both federal district courts rejected the
government's attempts to demonstrate compelling interests and ordered
the INS hearings opened to the public, noting that "the interests the
Government offers cannot support its closure of [this case] even under
the most deferential standard of review.' ' 29
The skeptical postures these courts assumed towards facially suspect
governmental assertions would be unremarkable were it not for the
contradictory poses subsequently struck by the Sixth and Third Circuits
on appeal.'3 ° The Sixth Circuit's evaluation of the government's interest
in closed hearings in Detroit Free Press appears cribbed directly from the
government's avowed position: "'The identifications of the detainees,
witnesses, and investigative sources would be disclosed .... Methods of
entry to the country, communicating, or funding could be revealed ....
'Information that is not presented at the hearings also might provide
important clues to terrorist [sic] .. . .""" Without mentioning the district
court's argument that this information would be revealed irrespective of
124. Detroit Free Press 1, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 946-47; see also North Jersey Media 1, 205 F. Supp. 2d
at 301.
125. See Exec. Order No. Ia,958, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315, 15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003); CIA v. Sims, 471
U.S. 159, 176-78 (1985); Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 244, 245 (7th Cir. 2004); Phillipa v. Central
Intelligence Agency, 546 F.2d oo9, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Pipko v. CIA, 312 F. Supp. 2d 669, 679
(D.N.J. 2004); Martin E. Halstuk, Holding the Spymasters Accountable After 9/il: A Proposed Model
for CIA Disclosure Requirements Under the Freedom of Information Act, HASTINGS COMM. & Err. L.J.
76, 116 (2004).
126. See Detroit Free Press 1, i95 F. Supp. 2d at 947.
127. See North Jersey Media 1, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
128. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, i68 (1962)).
129. Detroit Free Press 1, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 947.
130. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft (Detroit Free Press I), 3o3 F.3d 681 (6th Cit. 2oo2); North
Jersey Media II, 3o8 F.3 d at 198.
531. Detroit Free Press H, 3o3 F.3 d at 7o6 (citing Gov't Brief at 47-49).
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whether the hearings were opened, the circuit court accepted the
government's asseverations in wholesale, uncritical fashion. Crucially,
the circuit court attributed its deferential posture to the executive
branch's superior expertise. Wrote Judge Keith for the court,
"[i]nasmuch as these agents' declarations establish that certain
information revealed during removal proceedings could impede the
ongoing anti-terrorism investigation, we defer to their judgment. These
agents are certainly in a better position to understand the contours of the
investigation and the intelligence capabilities of terrorist
organizations."'32
The Third Circuit court took up the same issue, to similar results, in
its review of the lower court's decision in North Jersey Media.'33 After
restating the government's now-familiar mantra of potential harms
resulting from open hearings, the North Jersey Media majority
announced not only its intent to defer to the government's superior
expertise, but its explicit reluctance to become judicially involved in
matters of national security. Explained the court, "[w]e are quite hesitant
to conduct a judicial inquiry into the credibility of these security
concerns, as national security is an area where courts have traditionally
extended great deference to Executive expertise.' '34 Like the Sixth
Circuit before it, the Third Circuit then anchored its decision to the
supposed knowledge and reliability of the individuals who had submitted
affidavits. The court assessed the government's arguments based upon
the titles of the people making them, not their substantive merit:
The assessments before us have been made by senior government
officials responsible for investigating the events of September i ith and
for preventing future attacks. These officials believe that closure of
special interest hearings is necessary to advance these goals, and their
concerns, as expressed in the Watson Declaration, have gone
unrebutted"'
Even under its current idiom of deference, the court's last statement
was particularly misleading-the government's concerns had in fact been
specifically rebutted, not on contested factual grounds but through pure
logical refutation, by two district courts. As Judge Scirica noted in
132. Id. at 707. The court did hold that the closure of all INS deportation hearings was not
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling interest, and ordered the hearings opened on a case-by-case
basis. Id. at 707-10.
133. The Third Circuit interpreted the "logic" prong of the Richmond Newspapers test (for
determining whether a judicial proceeding should be opened) as encompassing the question of
"'whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question."' North Jersey Media 11, 308 F.3d at 216 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S.
I, 8 (1986)). It thus reached the question of what harm might result from opening hearings at the
anterior stage of deciding whether a right to open hearings existed in the first instance.
134. North Jersey Media 11, 308 F.3d at 219 (citing for support Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696
(2001)).
135. Id.
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dissent, "[alt issue is not whether some or all deportation hearings of
special interest aliens should be closed, but who makes thatdetermination." 36
The contrast with immigration cases the judiciary has not implicitly
labeled "national security" is quite striking. Zadvydas v. Davis, a case
relied upon by both the Sixth and Third Circuits in Detroit Free Press and
North Jersey Media, concerned the INS's indefinite peacetime detention
of an illegal immigrant pending deportation.'37 In the face of judicial
inquiry into the constitutionality of a statute that appeared to authorize
infinite confinement, the INS argued that its authority over, and
experience with, immigration matters counseled for judicial deference to
its determinations regarding when a particular detention might be
necessitated for security reasons.' The Supreme Court rejected this
approach, refusing to defer to the Administration's view of the facts and
declaring that under exogenous law (the Due Process Clause,
operationalized through a writ of habeas corpus) it must decide the
matter de novo.'39 In so doing, the Court recognized the fundamental role
of judicial review as a bulwark against administrative disregard for the
rule of law: "This Court has suggested.., that the Constitution may well
preclude granting 'an administrative body the unreviewable authority to
make determinations implicating fundamental rights.". 4 Nonetheless,
the Court in dicta specifically excluded "national security" cases from
this general principle without further elaboration or explanation-the
mere invocation of a threat to the country appeared sufficient to derail
the general presumption of judicial oversight. 4'
136. Id. at 221 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
137. Although the Supreme Court did not understand Zadvydas as a "national security" case in
the classical sense, the detainees in that case were hardly common immigration violators. Rather,
every individual subject to indefinite detention by the INS fit into one of a number of specific
categories of heightened importance or perceived threat. The aliens were either "inadmissible aliens,
criminal aliens, aliens who have violated their nonimmigrant status conditions, and aliens removable
for certain national security or foreign relations reasons, as well as any alien 'who has been determined
by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of
removal."' Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6)) (emphasis added).
138. See id. at 699.
139. Id. at 699.
The Government seems to argue that, even under our interpretation of the statute, a federal
habeas court would have to accept the Government's view about whether the implicit
statutory limitation is satisfied in a particular case, conducting little Or no independent
review of the matter. In our view, that is not so. Whether a set of particular circumstances
amounts to detention within, or beyond, a period reasonably necessary to secure removal is
determinative of whether the detention is, or is not, pursuant to statutory authority. The
basic federal habeas corpus statute grants the federal courts authority to answer that
question.
Id.
i4o. Id. at 692 (citing Superintendant, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,450 (1985)).
141. Id. at 696 ("Neither do we consider terrorism or other special circumstances where special
arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the
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2. CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: TERRORISM'S SUBVERSION OF
LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE
Contemporaneously with the closures of "special-interest" INS
deportation hearings that gave rise to the Detroit Free Press and North
Jersey Media, a number of independent organizations filed Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA")'42 requests with the Department of Justice,
seeking disclosure of the names of all individuals detained "in the wake
of the September ii terrorist attacks," as well as the names of their
attorneys.'43 The Department of Justice denied these requests, claiming
that such information was exempted from disclosure under FOIA's own
statutory terms,"' and the FOIA petitioners turned to the courts. In
Center for National Security Studies v. United States Department of
Justice, the federal district court for the District of Columbia initially
ordered the Department of Justice to release the names of its detainees
and their attorneys.'45 The court of appeals, employing a methodology
precisely congruent to that of the Third and Sixth Circuits in North Jersey
Media and Detroit Free Press (and begging the same questions), reversed
the district court and permitted the DOJ to withhold the demanded
names against all queries. '46
FOIA contains within its four corners a panoply of explicitly
enumerated exceptions to its general rule of broadly compelled
disclosure. In response to the Center for National Security plaintiffs'
requests, the Department of Justice asserted three separate exceptions as
defenses to its duty of production. Such information, explained the
government, is properly classified as
information compiled for law enforcement purposes [that]... (A)
could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement
proceedings.... (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.... or (F) could reasonably
be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.'47
The court of appeals-relying solely upon the first of these
exceptions-concluded that the DOJ had adduced sufficient proof that
disclosure of the names of detainees and their attorneys could
substantially impair the "law enforcement action" that is the war on
terror. I48 As in North Jersey Media, the government's offer of proof on
judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national security.").
142. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
143. Ctr. for Nat'l See. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3 d 98, 920 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
s44. See id.
145. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, I13 (D.D.C. 2002).
146. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec., 331 F.3 d at 920.
147. Id. at 922 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 5 22(b)(7)(A), (C), (F)).
148. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec., 331 F.3d at 932 ("Inasmuch as the concerns expressed in the government's
declarations seem credible-and inasmuch as the declarations were made by counterterrorism experts
with far greater knowledge than this Court-we hold that the disclosure of the names of the detainees
[Vo1. 56:441
A HARD LOOK OR A BLIND EYE?
this issue consisted entirely of the sworn declarations of two now-familiar
figures: "James Reynolds, Director of the Terrorism and Violent Crime
Section of the Department of Justice, and Dale Watson, FBI Executive
Assistant Director for Counterterrorism-officials with central
responsibility for the ongoing terrorist investigation."' 49 These affidavits'
conclusory descriptions of the harms that would likely result from
divulgement of the information plaintiffs had requested again neatly
paralleled the government's case in Detroit Free Press and North Jersey
Media:
[T]he declarations state that release of the requested information could
hamper the ongoing investigation by leading to the identification of
detainees by terrorist groups, resulting in terrorists either intimidating
or cutting off communication with the detainees; by revealing the
progress and direction of the ongoing investigation, thus allowing
terrorists to impede or evade the investigation; and by enabling
terrorists to create false or misleading evidence.'5°
Despite the fact that these affidavits offered only "vague, poorly
explained arguments,"'' 5' the D.C. Circuit extended substantial
deference'52 to the conclusions they contained and adopted those
conclusions in full: "Inasmuch as the concerns expressed in the
government's declarations seem credible-and inasmuch as the
declarations were made by counterterrorism experts with far greater
knowledge than this Court-we hold that the disclosure of the names of
the detainees could reasonably be expected to interfere with the ongoing
investigation."'53 Again, in assuming such a deferential stance the circuit
court placed its two feet squarely upon the Administration's putatively
superior skills at fighting terrorism and evaluating threats to national
security and that branch's concomitantly designated institutional role in
undertaking such assessments.'54 Just as in the INS detainee cases, the
could reasonably be expected to interfere with the ongoing investigation."). The court arrived at this
holding without any apparent appreciation for the irony of categorizing the war on terror as a "law
enforcement action" just as other courts were going to great lengths to distinguish terrorism-related
detentions from traditional civilian, law enforcement-based, confinement. See, e.g., Padilla v. Bush
(Padilla 1), 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 6oo (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Hamdi 1, 316 F.3d at 473; see also infra notes
268-274 and accompanying text.
149. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec., 331 F.3 d at 923.
I5O. Id.
151. Id. at 937 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 926-27 ("It is equally well-established that the judiciary owes some measure of
deference to the executive in cases implicating national security, a uniquely executive purview.")
(citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001); Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530
(1988) ("courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in
military and national security affairs")).
153. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec., 331 F.3d at 932.
i54, See id. at 928 ("It is abundantly clear that the government's top counterterrorism officials are
well-suited to make this predictive judgment. Conversely, the judiciary is in an extremely poor position
to second-guess the executive's judgment in this area of national security."); id. at 931 ("The court
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court was unswayed by the fact that since "each of the detainees has had
access to counsel, access to the courts, and freedom to contact the press
or the public at large," the prisoners themselves were at liberty to reveal
all of the facts the DOJ maintained were so desperately worth
guarding."'
Yet, in affording such deference to the DOJ's assertions of fact and
probability the District of Columbia Circuit neglected more than merely
the logic of the situation-it ignored the balance of interests Congress
had enshrined within FOIA. FOIA exists to vindicate "the public's right
to know 'what [its] government is up to.'"'" 6 That the defense of
fundamental rights may demand the disclosure of information that the
controlling administrative agency would not otherwise choose to
publicize is central to the law's mission, not an ancillary consequence to
be judicially minimized. Judge Tatel's dissenting opinion gave voice to
this crucially overlooked understanding:
The law that governs this case is the same law that applies whenever
the government's need for confidentiality in a law enforcement
investigation runs up against the public's right to know... FOIA fully
accommodates the government's concerns about the harms that might
arise from the release of information pertaining to its investigations.
To be sure, the statute strongly favors openness, since Congress
recognized that an informed citizenry is "vital to the functioning of a
democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the
should not second-guess the executive's judgment in this area. '[lit is the responsibility of the
[executive] not that of the judiciary' to determine when to disclose information that may compromise
intelligence sources and methods." (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 18o (1985) (alterations in
original))); id. at 932 ("It is within the role of the executive to acquire and exercise the expertise of
protecting national security. It is not within the role of the courts to second-guess executive judgments
made in furtherance of that branch's proper role.").
155. Id. at 922. In addition to this fact, Judge Tatel in dissent exposed myriad gaps and flaws within
the government's case-and the majority's, as it adopted the Administration's conclusions without
caveat. A few examples should suffice to provide a flavor of the court's reasoning. See id. at 943 (Tatel,
J., dissenting) ("Reynolds never explains how a list of names of persons unknown to terrorist
organizations would tell the terrorists anything at all about the investigation, much less allow them to
'map [its] progress."') (alteration in original); id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("[The majority] treat[s] all
detainee information the same, despite the fact that each item of information that plaintiffs seek about
the detainees -names, attorneys' names, dates and locations of arrest, places of detention, and dates
of release-is clearly of very different value to terrorists attempting to discern the scope and direction
of the government's investigation."); id. at 942 (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("[Ajlthough the court assumes
that all those detained on material witness warrants 'have relevant knowledge about the terrorism
investigation' because a federal judge issues such warrants 'based on an affidavit stating that the
witness has information relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation,' Op. at 931, that assumption
seems unwarranted given the government's concession that 'it may turn out that these individuals have
no information useful to the investigation,' Reynolds Decl. 36."); id. at 950-51 (Tatel, J., dissenting)
("Indeed, if the government is so worried about retaliation against lawyers, why did it release a
comprehensive list of attorneys representing federally charged detainees?").
156. Id. at 938 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,773 (1989)) (alteration in original).
[VOL. 56:441
February 2005] A HARD LOOK OR A BLIND EYE?
governors accountable to the governed., 57
It is this fundamental purpose that drives judicial application of
FOIA and informs the operation and construction of its provisions. Even
the law's "'limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that
disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act."' 5
Consequently, courts are instructed to "narrowly construe" the statutory
exemptions, and "the burden is on the agency to sustain its action." '59 B
accepting the government's "vague, poorly explained arguments"4
despite their inherent logical flaws, and refusing to insist that the
government prove that the Executive's alleged harms "could reasonably
be expected to' I6' result from the disclosure of detainees' information,
the D.C. Circuit allowed its own conception of deference to trump the
balance between disclosure and security chosen by the legislature.
"Neither FOIA itself nor this circuit's interpretation of the statute,"
explained Judge Tatel, "authorizes the court to invoke the phrase
'national security' to relieve the government of its burden of justifying its
refusal to release information under FOIA. ',, 6, Yet it was that mere
invocation of "national security" that allowed the Administration to
carry the day.'
63
II. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS:
STATE FARM, CHEVRON, AND THE GENERALITY OF HARD LOOK AND
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE REVIEW
To modern eyes, the instrumentalist picture of administrative
agencies is intuitively simple. Agencies are the government's institutional
specialists, designed to direct significant resources and expertise towards
157. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec., 331 F.3d at 938 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citing NLRB v. Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 0978)).
158. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (quoting Dep't of Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)).
159. Dep't of Air Force, 425 U.S. at 356 n.3 (citation omitted).
t6o. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec., 331 F.3d at 938 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting John Doe Agency, 493 U.S.
at 152).
161. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)( 7 )(A) (2ooo).
162. Ctr. for Nat'l. Sec., 331 F.3d at 939 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
163. One remarkable aspect of this case -again overlooked by the Center for National Security
majority-is FOIA's explicit exemption from disclosure of documents that are "(A) specifically
authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order." 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(I) (2000). This exception would appear tailor-made for cases such as the instant one in
which national security concerns formed the crux of the Administration's objections to disclosure. Yet
the government never invoked exception (b)(I)-forcing the court to rely disingenuously upon the
"law enforcement" justification in order to uphold the government's claim to secrecy-because (in all
likelihood) the President had never bothered to classify this information or stamp it with the official
indicia of secrecy. Failure to do so was not a simple bookkeeping error, as claims of government
officials in support of exempting information under subsection (b)(i) are unquestionably afforded
"substantial weight." Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692,697 n.io (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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solving particularly difficult or intractable economic or social problems.
Agencies are typically granted expansive authority over their subject
matter areas and endowed with the structural capability (in the form of
scientific resources, specially trained employees, and other necessary
components) to research and analyze technical or obscure questions with
a capacity far beyond that which Congress could muster on its own.'
64
The body of jurisprudence known as administrative law has grown out of
courts' efforts to deal with the distinct types of legal problems raised by
these specialized agencies: how to adjudicate complicated issues not
easily cognizable by others than the experts authorized to study them,
what force to assign the broad delegations of statutory authority granted
executive branch (Article II) agencies by Congress, and how to hold
agencies within the legal boundaries established by Congress and the
Constitution.
These are precise!y the same questions that confront courts
attempting to adjudicate the Executive's military-related activities during
wartime. Similar to civilian administrative agencies, the executive
branch's war-making organizations possess unrivaled expertise and
broad Constitutional (and often statutory) authority over national
security, foreign affairs, and the military. Any court scrutinizing the
legality of executive military actions must wrestle with both its own
comparative ignorance of the questions involved (and the Executive's
comparative proficiency) and the specific constitutional role assigned to
the Executive for management of these issues. The inquiry is, in most
respects, identical to that of a typical administrative case. Indeed, many
of the executive actors charged with military operations, including the
Departments of Defense and Justice, are "agencies" under the governing
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Thus, unless there exists some
rationale by which to distinguish general administrative cases from those
classified as "military," the approaches to administrative law dictated by
the Supreme Court would seem to bear directly upon the judiciary's
handling of wartime adjudications.
Administrative law, and in particular decisions concerning the
degree of deference courts will award to administrative agencies
regarding factual or legal determinations within the scope of their
authority, incorporates the exposition of three broad principles. First, the
modern overthrow of NLRB v. Hearst's regime of expertise-based
164. See Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675 (I98o)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("Congress may wish to exercise its authority in a particular field, but
because the field is sufficiently technical, the ground to be covered sufficiently large, and the Members
of Congress themselves not necessarily expert in the area in which they choose to legislate, the most
that may be asked under the separation-of-powers doctrine is that Congress lay down the general
policy and standards that animate the law, leaving the agency to refine those standards, 'fill in the
blanks,' or apply the standards to particular cases.").
[Vol. 56:441
A HARD LOOK OR A BLIND EYE?
deference and the rise of "hard look" or "rationality" review and
"substantial evidence" scrutiny signal that courts should no longer defer
to an agency's findings of fact based purely on its superior experience
and institutional competence. Judicial guardianship over the "rule of
law" demands meaningful inquiry into the factual predicates of executive
action.
Second, the concurrent existence of State Farm's hard look review
doctrine and Chevron's deferential attitude towards agencies'
interpretations of their own legal restraints indicate that notions of
authority and constraint remain separable and distinct, even as applied to
administrative agencies. Administrative law independently confirms
Professor Hohfeld's notion of "category mistake": rights may cut across,
and even trump, a power or authority to act.'
65
Third, the Court's willingness in Chevron to acknowledge the often
permissive nature of congressional delegations to administrative
agencies-and to allow those agencies to interpretively fashion their own
statutory guidelines -establishes that an abiding fear of "democratically
unaccountable fourth-branch bureaucracies" cannot be the driving force
behind the Court's imposition of rationality review. The need for judicial
scrutiny of the factual predicates for action under law, even the actions of
expert bodies, derives from the more fundamental requisites of liberal
legality-requisites that exist whenever there is exogenous law to apply.
The general applicability of these administrative law principles to
cases involving expert executive branch organizations ultimately lays
bare the judiciary's misconceived approach to the military cases
described in Part I. Where there exists law to apply, courts must examine
the logic behind wartime decisions and demand that an agency adduce
substantial evidence in support of its factual predicates for action. The
executive determinations at issue in Detroit Free Press, North Jersey
Media, Korematsu, Padilla, and Hamdi deserved rigorous scrutiny, not
unjustified deference awarded in the name of "national security."
A. HARD LOOK AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE REVIEW: LEGAL BOUNDARIES
FOR EXPERT AGENCIES
I. The Rise of "Hard Look" Rationality Review
a. The Early Model: Expertise-Based Institutionalism
Administrative agencies exist in large degree as institutional
mechanisms for solving policy questions whose intricacies and difficulties
exceed the capabilities of Congress itself. Staffed by experts within the
field, agencies are charged with formulating policy while drawing upon
the organizations' superior experience and capacity for gathering and
165. See Part I.A., supra.
February 2005]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
analyzing technical information. According to this ontological model,
deference by courts to agencies in the performance of these functions
appears intuitively appealing. Judicial officers have no particular skill in
the substantive areas of administrative inquiry and appellate courts
generally lack the institutional ability or resources to make sound policy
decisions according to extensive and complicated factual records.'
Judges are legal generalists, rather than subject-matter specialists. In
accordance with this understanding, what might be termed administrative
law's "institutional competence" model of judicial review held that
courts may reassert control and authority over agency decision-making
only when the task at hand, such as statutory interpretation or legal
analysis, is one to which the courts are themselves best suited.
'6 7
NLRB v. Hearst'68 ("NLRB") stands as the apotheosis of this
principled thrust. In NLRB, the question confronting the Supreme Court
was whether the "newsboys" who sold papers on the streets of Los
Angeles were "employees" within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act.' 69 In addressing this question, it was necessary for the
Court to consider a number of ancillary issues, ranging along a
continuum from highly legalistic'7 ° to specifically fact-based, or "ground
level.".'7' The Court awarded deference to the Labor Relations Board's
interpretation or determination on a particular issue based upon where it
fell along this continuum-reviewing legal questions de novo, '72 yet
reacting deferentially to the Board's findings on factual issues"-
according to the rationale that the Board possessed the necessary
knowledge, experience, and expertise to make factual judgments, while
the courts themselves were expert at deciding legal questions.'74 The
I66. This view on the limitations of Article III courts when handling certain types of controversies
has spawned numerous structural developments beyond the growth of agencies. The Federal Circuit's
appellate jurisdiction over all patent cases and the advent of bankruptcy courts represent efforts, for
example, to channel difficult technical evaluations to judicial decision-makers more capable of their
resolution.
67. This model-in some sense the "original" theory of administrative law-held sway until 1971.
See PETER L. STRAuss, TODD RAKOFF, Roy A. SCHOTLAND & CYNTHIA R. FARINA, GELHORN AND BYSE'S
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CASES AND COMMENTS 554-614 (9th ed. 1995); Part II.A.2., infra.
68. 322 U.S. III (1944).
169. Id. at 113.
170. As an initial matter, the Supreme Court had to adjudge whether the term "employee" was
meant to be interpreted with reference to state common-law definitions or in line with some other,
federal understanding. Id. at 124.
171. Having answered the statutory question, the next step was to determine the duties involved in
a typical newsboy's job in order to ascertain whether they were covered under the statute. Id. at 128-
32.
172. See id. at 130-31 ("Undoubtedly, questions of statutory interpretation, especially when arising
in the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve .... " ).
173. See id. at 131 ("[T]he Board's determination that specified persons are 'employees' under this
Act is to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law." ).
174. See id. at 130 ("Everyday experience in the administration of the statute gives it familiarity
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Court adopted a similarly expertise-based approach to an agency's
statutory interpretation in Skidmore v. Swift,'75 decided later the same
year. There, the Court announced that it would draw upon the legal
"rulings, interpretations, and opinions" of an administrative agency only
to the extent that they were based upon sound judgment regarding
matters within the agency's field of expertise. In other words, the expert
agency's interpretations would be afforded deference according to their
"power to persuade,' ' 6 motivated primarily by the agencies' experiential
authority over the matters to which they spoke.
b. The Rule of Law and the Demand for Rationality Review
Despite its apparent logic, the expertise-based model for judicial
deference carried with it one inherent flaw. In the absence of meaningful
oversight of an agency's factual determinations (and consequently the
policy choices made on the basis of those determinations), the potential
existed for an agency to take inconsistent positions, arrive at
unsupported policy choices, or to otherwise operate in frustration of the
purposes and ideals embodied in the agency's empowering statutes. The
threat has as much a meta-legal character as a legal one. An agency
whose factual decisions were so unwarranted or irrational as to depart
from the strictures of its statutory mandate would disobey the
fundamental demand of liberal legality'" that the government operate
according to laws and rules, not executive fiat, just as it exceeded its own
governing authority., 8 Failure to meaningfully review the factual
with the circumstances and backgrounds .... The experience thus acquired must be brought
frequently to bear on the question [of] who is an employee under the Act.").
175. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
176. Id. at 140.
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this
Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.
Id.
177. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 237-39 (Harvard University Press 1971).
[A]ctions which the rules of law require and forbid should be of a kind which men can
reasonably be expected to do and to avoid .... The rule of law also implies the precept that
similar cases be treated similarly .... The requirement of consistency holds of course for
the interpretation of all rules and for justifications at all levels .... [T]here is no offense
without a law (Nullum crimen sine lege) .... [Tihe rule of law requires some form of due
process: that is, a process reasonably designed to ascertain the truth ....
Id.
178. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH i86 (1962) (confining the
questions left wholly to the discretion of the political branches to those involving "[rlecognition of
foreign governments and unilateral abrogation of treaties ... the nature of the general welfare for
whose promotion the federal government may tax and spend ... [u]niform geographic restrictions on
travel... [and] which nationalities of aliens may be excluded or deported" and arguing that "[tihese
are discretionary functions of the political institutions which are unprincipled on principle, because we
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determinations underpinning an agency's policy choices threatens to
effectively eliminate the very force of the legal strictures that bind and
cabin the universe of potential agency actions.
This concern was powerfully raised in Justice Jackson's famous
dissent in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp.'79 In
Chenery, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had
determined in an administrative adjudication that the Chenery
Corporation's proposed plan for reorganization was not "fair and
equitable" as required by relevant statute.' 8° However, the SEC had not
promulgated any sort of rule that purported to define "fair and
equitable" or establish the requirements for a plan that would meet that
requirement; instead, it had proceeded to weigh Chenery's proposal
against the SEC's own heretofore unannounced standards." ' The SEC
had followed the procedural commands of its organic statute and had
adopted a case-specific understanding of "fair and equitable" that
withstood judicial inquiry. Yet it had proceeded against the Chenery
Corporation without first announcing what standards it would employ in
judging a plan against the statute's "fair and equitable" mandate, and
without adopting any generalized guidelines or rules."' To Justice
Jackson, this action was anathema to the very foundation of liberal
legality and ordered government because it authorized an agency to
proceed with factual determinations that carried legal weight despite the
lack of a legal framework to constrain them. 83 By consequence, an
aggrieved regulatory target possessed no basis by which to challenge the
agency's action against it. In the absence of a governing agency
regulation, the amorphous "fair and equitable" standard remained the
only law to apply.' 84
think 'that the job is better done without rules."'); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 76 (1955) ("Liberty is not the mere absence of restraint, it is not a
spontaneous product of majority rule, it is not achieved merely by lifting underprivileged classes to
power, nor is it the inevitable by-product of technological expansion. It is achieved only by a rule of
law."); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare not Speak its Name,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1935-36 (analyzing cases that delineate "associational rights" and concluding
that those rights that play a role "in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our
constitutional scheme.., cannot be subordinated to, or 'balanced away in the name of, generalized
societal interests, however legitimate and even weighty those interests might otherwise be."')
(citations omitted).
179. 332 U.S. 194 (i947).
18o. Id. at 204.
i8i. Id. at 207-08.
182. Id. at 214 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 212 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The difference between the first and the latest decision of
the Court is thus simply the difference between holding that administrative orders must have a basis in
law and a holding that absence of a legal basis is no ground on which courts may annul them.").
184. See id. at 210 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("I feel constrained to disagree with the reasoning
offered to rationalize this shift. It makes judicial review of administrative orders a hopeless formality
for the litigant, even where granted to him by Congress. It reduces the judicial process in such cases to
[Vol. 56:441
A HARD LOOK OR A BLIND EYE?
Justice Jackson's response to the Court's proffered justification for
this deference-the familiar justification of "administrative
experience"X5 - was most telling. Justice Jackson argued that
"administrative experience is of weight in judicial review only to this
point-it is a persuasive reason for deference to the Commission in the
exercise of its discretionary powers under and within the law. It cannot
be invoked to support action outside of the law."' 8 Successive sentences
indicate that Justice Jackson believed he was merely arguing that the
agency determination at issue fell further towards the "legal
interpretation" end of the Hearst/Skidmore fact/law continuum, not
proposing a revolutionary principle for decision. 8 Yet his explication of
the problem reaches to the precise concern that would soon hold sway
within the Court: an agency that could not be held within extant legal
boundaries would become "a law unto itself," subverting the rule of law
and the requirements of liberal legality.'88
Moreover, a short and logical leap takes one from Justice Jackson's
admonition that agencies are due deference only when they operate
"within the law" (and its concomitant charge to courts to scrutinize legal
determinations with care) to significant, substantive review of even
factual findings, the type of agency findings to which an institutional
competence model of judicial review would counsel deference. The point
is fundamental to the meaning of the "rule of law" itself. "The 'law' does
not operate in a vacuum. The application of law requires a factual
predicate; an action without such a predicate is lawless. A finding of fact
which is based on no more than the will or desire of the administrator is
lawless in substance if not in form."' ' This argument captures within it
a mere feint.").
t85. Id. at 213 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
i86. Id. at 215 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
187. See id. (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[W]hat action is, and what is not, within the law must be
determined by courts, when authorized to review, no matter how much deference is due to the
agency's fact finding.").
188. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Surely an administrative agency is not a law unto itself, but the
Court does not really face up to the fact that this is the justification it is offering for sustaining the
Commission action.").
189. JAFFE, supra note 8o, at 595; see also JUDGE JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 14 (Princeton
University Press 1949) ("If you scrutinize a legal rule, you will see that it is a conditional statement
referring to facts."). Professor Jaffe traces this argument to Justice Lamar's opinion in ICC v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 91-92 (1913) ("A finding without evidence is arbitrary and baseless.
And if the Government's contention is correct, it would mean that.., where rights depended upon
facts, the Commission could disregard all rules of evidence, and capriciously make findings by
administrative fiat."). Nonetheless, Justice Lamar's view was, for that time, anomalous-in 1938, the
Court viewed the type of review advocated by Jaffe and Lamar in a highly unfavorable light in Pacific
States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 882 (935)
Whether it was necessary in Oregon to provide a standard container for raspberries and
strawberries; and, if so, whether that adopted should have been made mandatory, involve
questions of fact and of policy, the determination of which rests in the legislative branch of
the state government. The determination may be made, if the constitution of the State
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both the intellectual logic behind the desire for "rule of law" constraints,
and the concerns that precipitated their arrival. If a government's factual
determinations cannot rationally justify the choice it has made, subject to
a legal constraint, then the government is not operating according to the
dictates of the constraint but at the whim of its executive.
It is upon this understanding that the Court's construction of "hard
look review" doctrine is based. This doctrine-first announced in 1971 in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,'" then reaffirmed twelve
years later in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers v. State Farm'9 - had its
genesis in cases that required the judiciary to consider pragmatic agency
decisions made according to developed factual records, a variety of
policy options, and some measure of cost-benefit analysis. These types of
fact decisions would have received maximum deference under NLRB v.
Hearst.'92 Yet the Court rejected the agencies' conclusions in each case
after performing a type of searching review of the agencies' analyses that
would have been utterly foreign to courts operating according to Hearst's
institutional competence model.93
Writing for the majority in Overton Park, Justice Marshall described
the Court's role as one of active examiner: "[T]he generally applicable
standards of § 7o6"9 [of the Administrative Procedure Act] require the
reviewing court to engage in a substantial inquiry. Certainly, the
permits, by a subordinate administrative body. With the wisdom of such a regulation we
have, of course, no concern.
Id.
190. 401 U.S. 402 (1970.
191. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
192. Overton Park concerned the Secretary of Transportation's decision to authorize the
construction, using federal funds, of an interstate highway through Overton Park, a 342-acre city park
located near Memphis. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 405-06. The operative statute precluded the
Secretary from making such an authorization if a "'feasible and prudent' alternative route exists," Id.
at 405. The case centered around the question of the Court's authority to review the Secretary's
determination that no such route was available. Id. at 410. State Farm involved the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) rescission of its own rule requiring that all new cars come
equipped with "passive restraints" including safety devices, such as airbags or automatic seatbelts, that
operate even without action by the passenger. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 34-37. The agency's organic
statute had mandated that the Secretary of Transportation (NHTSA is a department within the
Department of Transportation) issue standards and rules based upon "'relevant available motor
vehicle safety data,' whether the proposed standard 'is reasonable, practicable and appropriate' for the
particular type of motor vehicle, and the 'extent to which such standards will contribute to carrying out
the purposes' of the Act." Id. at 33-34 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f)(I), (3), (4)). The question
presented in the case was whether NHTSA's decision to rescind the passive restraint rule operated
within those legal guidelines, and thus whether the evidence and reasoning upon which the agency
relied supported its contentions.
193. This approach had in fact been specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in a precursor to
Hearst. See Pacific States Box & Basket, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
194. The importance (or lack thereof) of the Administrative Procedure Act in shaping this more
rigorous standard of review is discussed in greater depth in notes 202-209, infra, and accompanying
text.
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Secretary's decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity.... 95 But
that presumption is not to shield his action from a thorough, probing, in-
depth review."' 6 This review would necessarily involve an inquiry into
"whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.' ' 97
Adopting and expanding upon this rule, Justice White in State Farm
announced what is now viewed as the modem encapsulation of "hard
look review": "the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate
a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.""'
Despite its self-admittedly "searching" character, "hard look"
review should not be confused with either a full de novo inquiry or some
sort of a factual contest or "battle of the experts" that challenges the
agency's evidence on an equal basis. The Court's own language settles
the first possibility. In addition to the "presumption of regularity"
granted the agency, the court will only ask generally whether, on the
facts, the agency's decision "can reasonably be said to be within" the
law."9 Nor did the Overton Park or State Farm Courts challenge the
respective agencies with controverting evidence. Overton Park demands
only that a court inquire into whether the agency has reached a
reasonable judgment based on the evidence available to it,2"° while the
195. Here Justice Marshall cited Pacific States Box & Basket Co., 296 U.S. at 185, the case from
which he was about to announce a significant departure.
196. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415.
197. Id. at 416.
t98. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)). Despite its invocation of the phrase "rational connection," this type of review requires far
more probing judicial inquiry than the so-called "rational basis review" applied in non-suspect-class
Equal Protection cases. See, e.g., United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 ("The only
remaining question is whether Congress achieved its purpose in a patently arbitrary or irrational
way."). Though frequently referred to as "rationality review" (since its ultimate touchstone is the
logical link between the agency's extant information and its conclusions drawn), hard look review
subjects the agency's substantive decision (indeed, even "its thought processes") to comparatively
intense scrutiny.
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise. The reviewing court should not
attempt itself to make up for such deficiencies: "We may not supply a reasoned basis for the
agency's action that the agency itself has not given."
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196); cf Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179 ("Where, as
here, there are plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of course,
'constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision' because this
Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute.") (internal
citation omitted).
199. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415-6.
200. Id. at 46 ("To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.") (citations
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NHTSA's decisions in State Farm were defeated because the agency had
apparently operated "without any consideration whatsoever" of a viable
alternative and had "merely recite[d] the terms 'substantial uncertainty'
as a justification for its actions, .... not because the Court had granted
equivalent weight to some conflicting outside data. Instead, as the State
Farm Court explained, the reviewing court must examine the rationality
of the decision and the connection between the factual conclusion
reached and the evidence that exists to support it.
Though Overton Park (and, by extension, State Farm) purports to be
a mere interpretation of the APA's "arbitrary and capricious"
language,2 ' it is clear from the reasoning in Overton Park that hard look
review was far from a necessary or inevitable consequence of that
statutory standard."° The Court cited none of its own precedents in
arriving at this new level of scrutiny, relying instead upon a series of
lower court decisions and, most tellingly, Professor Louis Jaffe's
influential treatise. 4 Notably absent during the "development" of this
standard was any mention of the Court's decision in Burlington Truck
Lines v. United States, the 1962 case from which Justice White in State
Farm had borrowed the "rational connection" language.0" Moreover, the
phrase "arbitrary and capricious" itself hardly compels the searching
review that Overton Park demanded-any number of paths of relative
severity were open to the Court, including the belief that the APA
merely codified the traditional Hearst standard of deference? 6 Justice
Marshall seems to have created hard look review more or less from
omitted).
2oi. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51-52.
202. See Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 7o6 (2ooo) ("The reviewing court
shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law .... ").
203. See Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls Over
Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1253 (1992)
The statute the Overton Park Court had to interpret was open to readings both of text and
of legislative history that would either credit or discredit the workability of political
controls. The Court chose a reading that maximized the possibilities of judicial control of
agency decision through litigation, reasoning in part that only this reading could vindicate
the policies that underlay the statute in question.
Id.
204. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
205. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 ("Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made."' (quoting Burlington, 371 U.S. at 168)).
206. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA.
L. REV. 1243, 1246 (I999). Congress enacted the APA in 1946, fully twenty-five years before Justice
Marshall's opinion in Overton Park, see 5 U.S.C. §551 et seq., and the Supreme Court had
encountered APA § 706 on numerous occasions prior to that case. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
Co. v. Aberdeen and Rockfish R.R. Co., 393 U.S 87 (1968); Udall v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428
(1967). If the hard look review standard was indeed a pure matter of statutory interpretation, it was
surely a long time in coming.
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whole cloth, and for reasons beyond the demands of the APA itself.
One can divine the true source of hard look review from an
examination of the severe limitation Justice Marshall places upon the
range of cases to be considered "committed to agency discretion" and
thus beyond any judicial review.7' The Supreme Court held that this
exception will operate only "in those rare instances where 'statutes are
drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to
apply..' '  The legal rule is a near tautology-without law to apply, a
reviewing court could take no action, and would lack any standard by
which to judge an agency's decision.2' Yet by so confining the scope of
cases that will not be reviewed, the Overton Park Court placed its focus
squarely upon the laws that might govern agency action and the question
of whether an agency has acted demonstrably within the boundaries
outlined by those laws. Having determined that rules exist to govern the
agency "game," courts will then inquire into whether the agency is
playing by those rules. In other words, it was the very foundational
principle of the rule of law-not the Congressionally-enacted text of the
APA-that drove the Supreme Court's creation of hard look review.
The rule-of-law principle underlying this type of review is hardly
specific to administrative agencies. The idea that government
organizations of all types must abide by the legal rules that have been
established to govern their behavior, and that meaningful judicial
review"' exists to hold governmental actors to those terms, is
fundamental both to the American constitutional structure and, at a
more elemental level, to liberal legality itself.'" The Court is rightfully
concerned with a government that threatens to operate by executive fiat.
As Professor Jaffe suggested, neglecting to hold a government to its own
rules places matters solely in the hands of the "will or desire of the
administrator .... .According to this understanding, even if Congress were
207. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (20oo).
2o8. Overton Park, 4O U.S. at 41o (quoting legislative history from the passage of the APA, S.
REp. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945).).
209. The further implication of this rule is that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard must be
anchored to some baseline point of legality.
21o. This phrase is intended to describe judicial inquiry that is, in at least some respect, more
searching and thorough than near-complete deference (in the mold of factual review under Hearst) or
so-called "rational basis" scrutiny. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
211. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,369-7o (1886) (Matthews, J., concurring)
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the
principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their
development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the
play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power .... And the law is the definition
and limitation of power.
Id. This idea is most famously captured in the legal axiom, derived from Part the First, Article XXX,
of the Massachusetts Constitution of 178o, that it is to be "a government of laws and not of men." Id.
at 370.
212. JAFFE, supra note 8o. Indeed, the direct threat of government by executive whim may well
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to repeal the APA (and eliminate the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard), courts would still be required to conduct a type of hard look
review of agency decisions in order to ensure their compliance with
whatever governing law existed. To believe otherwise would be to render
that law a nullity."3 More importantly, the universality of the "rule of
law" principle renders it equally and directly applicable to any
governmental body that must operate under some set of rules or
conditions. Where there is "law to apply," a reviewing court must
scrutinize governmental action (including component factual
determinations) to ensure compliance with that law."' No principled line
exists to confine hard look review to the domain of administrative
agencies.
2. Available Facts and the Substantial Evidence Test
Consonant with this need to preserve the rule of law, Congress and
the Supreme Court have also required that the judiciary meaningfully
scrutinize the weight and import of the evidence proffered by
administrative bodies to defend those agencies' adjudicatory decisions.
Administrative judgments made pursuant to recorded facts generated at
an adversarial hearing must be supported by "substantial evidence, 2 5 a
measure of proof equivalent to the evidence necessary to defeat
summary judgment and send a typical civil case to the jury."6 Even when
have played a role behind the scenes of State Farm. The fact that the NHTSA may have rescinded its
passive-restraint rule simply because a new administrator had come to power (due to the election of a
new President) appears to have weighed upon the State Farm Court, at least in the view of one of its
critics. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The agency's changed view of the
standard seems to be related to the election of a new President of a different political party.").
213. The courts' power in this instance would flow directly from their Article III status as arbiters
of cases and controversies. An aggrieved private party might challenge the legality of an agency
decision under law in the same manner as any other lawsuit, and if that party met the standing
requirement (and the statute conferred a private right of action) the lawsuit could go forward.
214. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,696 (2OO1).
The Government seems to argue that, even under our interpretation of the statute, a federal
habeas court would have to accept the Government's view about whether the implicit
statutory limitation is satisfied in a particular case, conducting little or no independent
review of the matter. In our view, that is not so. Whether a set of particular circumstances
amounts to detention within, or beyond, a period reasonably necessary to secure removal is
determinative of whether the detention is, or is not, pursuant to statutory authority. The
basic federal habeas corpus statute grants the federal courts authority to answer that
question.
Id. Some commentators have suggested that other concerns, such as fear of agencies as an unregulated
and democratically unresponsive "fourth branch" of government, are in fact the source of hard look
review. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro and Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch:
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L. J.
387 (1987) (rejecting the "rationalist" rule of law model in favor of a structuralist, separation of
powers understanding). This ontological conception would undermine the general applicability of the
Court's rule of law principle. Its strength will be addressed in Part II.B.I., infra.
215. 5 U.S.C. § 7 o6(2)(E) (2000).
216. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (j986); NLRB v. Columbian
Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939) ("[lit must be enough to justify, if the trial were
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dealing with expert administrative agencies operating with clear
constitutional or statutory mandates, courts must pursue this inquiry with
considerable rigor, going so far as to question an agency's judgments
regarding matters within its expertise, if necessary. "The [agency's]
findings are entitled to respect; but they must nonetheless be set aside
when the record ... clearly precludes the [agencyl's decision from being
justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or
its informed judgment on matters within its special competence or
both. ,217
In congruence with hard look rationality review, the "substantial
evidence" standard stems from courts' duty to ensure that adjudicating
agencies abide by the ground rules of their own proceedings, thus
vindicating and enforcing the rule of law. 1, The inquiry is fundamental to
the precept that courts must exert judicial control in order to effectuate
legal constraints upon executive action: "Reviewing courts must be
influenced by a feeling that they are not to abdicate the conventional
judicial function. 2 9  By consequence, Congressional repeal of the
Administrative Procedure Act could not eliminate substantial evidence
scrutiny as a judicial dictate any more than it could terminate hard look
review.2 ° The principles underlying substantial evidence review are thus
general to all expert executive branch bodies: absent some ulterior
motivation, they should be applied with equal force to ostensibly
"military" cases as they are to administrative ones. The next section
takes up this argument with reference to the standard of judicial
deference announced in Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council,
to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for
the jury.").
217. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1950-
218. See id. (noting that courts hold the "responsibility for assuring that the [agency] keeps within
reasonable grounds."); see also JAFFE, supra note 80. The "law to apply" in such adjudicatory settings
most commonly involves internal restraints; for instance, an agency must properly determine whether
a private party has in fact violated the terms of a statute; see, e.g., Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 492
("'If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person
named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice.. ,"). The
necessity of ensuring the accuracy of an agency's legal conclusions drives the concomitant requirement
that courts examine the factual predicates of decision.
219. Universal Camera, 340 U.S.. at 490.
220. See JAFFE, supra note 80. It is true that the "substantial evidence" standard was chosen
specifically by Congress, and it is possible that a lesser standard of inquiry would nevertheless exceed
the minimum requirements of liberal legality and respect for the rule of law. However, the Supreme
Court has described the substantial evidence standard as a curtailment of traditional judicial duties
under law, rather than an enhancement. See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607,
620 (1966) (pointing out that this standard "frees the reviewing courts of the time consuming and
difficult task of weighing the evidence" again de novo). It is unlikely that a further loosening of the
standard would comport with courts' duty to enforce adherence to existing legal rules; Congress may
well have chosen the least stringent level of review that remains consistent with courts' duty to enforce
the rule of law.
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perhaps the best-known of administrative law's modern doctrinal
developments.
B. CHEVRON DEFERENCE AND THE UNIVERSALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
PRINCIPLES
I. Refutation of the "4th Branch" Justification for Judicial Scrutiny
A principal animating factor within administrative law is the
judiciary's desire to ensure that agency action comports with both the
letter and the spirit of constitutional conceptions of separation of powers
and majority rule. "Delegation doctrine"-the line of cases addressing to
what degree Congress may delegate Article I lawmaking power, Article
II executive authority, or even Article III judicial authority over cases
and controversies to executive or legislative agencies -represents the
most self-evident embodiment of this concern.2"' The courts' unease in
these types of separation of powers cases is easily discernible: courts fear
that vesting an ostensibly democratically unaccountable agency with
significant authority will create an unchecked source of power. This
trepidation generates serious consternation regarding whether structural
constitutional mandates have been violated in cases of broad
Congressional delegations of responsibility." '
The Supreme Court's approach to sweeping delegatory legislation,
however, has hardly been cautious or restrained. Instead, the Court has
permitted all but the most vast and unbridled delegations, so long as they
articulate at least an "intelligible principle," viz., some vague statement
of objectives and purpose, to guide the empowered agency. 23 The
221. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the Congressional grant of
prosecutorial authority to an independent prosecutor in the "Independent Counsel" statute);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (permitting an independent
Article I agency charged with administering claims against commodity brokers to additionally hear
typical state law counterclaims through a type of ancillary jurisdiction); Indus. Union Dep't v.
American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 6o7 (I98o) (upholding the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration's delegated power to promulgate regulations "reasonably necessary or appropriate to
provide safe or healthful employment" and places of employment).
222. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 672-73 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (beginning his
discussion by quoting John Locke: "[t]he power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a
positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant conveyed, which
being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer
their authority of making laws and place it in other hands.") (citation omitted); Morrison, 487 U.S. at
698 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("'[T]he great security,' wrote Madison, 'against a gradual concentration of
the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each department
the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The
provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of
attack."' (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison))).
223. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1927) ("If Congress shall lay
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates
is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."); see
also Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n., 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) ("In the history of the Court we
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Court's curbing of the delegation doctrine has functionally eliminated all
but one limiting principle: Congress cannot delegate to a single agency
all-encompassing power to manage the nation's economic affairs. 24
These structural considerations have impacted the issue of judicial
deference to agency determinations in a peculiar manner, triggering
another departure (a notably counter-intuitive one) from the traditional
Hearst model of expertise-based deference. The seminal case that
announced this move was Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Counsel, Inc., where the Supreme Court declared that it would
afford great deference to an agency's legal interpretation of its own
empowering statutes.25 In Chevron, the Court fashioned the familiar
two-part test that awards generous deference to an agency's
interpretation of its own empowering statutes if (and only if) these
statutes are silent or ambiguous:
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.... Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute."'
Chevron and its progeny are indicative of the Supreme Court's
have found the requisite 'intelligible principle' lacking in only two statutes, one of which provided
literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to
regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the economy
by assuring 'fair competition."'); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("Applying this
'intelligible principle' test to congressional delegations, our jurisprudence has been driven by a
practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more
technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad
general directives.").
224. Only twice has the Court abrogated an administrative agency's authority on the grounds that
Congress had overly and impermissibly delegated power. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
415 (1935) ("So far as this section is concerned, it gives to the President an unlimited authority to
determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit.");
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-38 (935) ("But Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws
he thinks may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade or industry."). As
the cited portions would indicate, both of these cases involved the grant of generalized power to the
President to manage a significant swath of the economy without any meaningful Congressional
guidance; also, both were decided at the height of the Lochner era. As the jurisprudence of the last 65
years has indicated, more limited grants of field-restrained authority do not appear to raise
constitutional problems.
225. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron arose from a dispute regarding the Environmental Protection
Agency's construction of the term "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42
U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6). Chevron is undoubtedly one of the most controversial administrative law cases of
the past century, and a full re-examination of the case on its legal and practical merits is well beyond
the scope of its paper; that task has already been ably performed by others. For present purposes, the
discussion of Chevron will simply center around the principles that animated the Court's decision, read
through the language and result of the opinion.
226. Id. at 842-43 (emphasis added).
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attitude towards administrative agencies and the rule of law in two
respects. First, Chevron demonstrates that the Court will reap the
consequences of its own delegation doctrine (or, to some extent, the lack
thereof) with deadly seriousness. Throughout the Chevron opinion, the
touchstone for the Court is its belief that Congress has implicitly
intended to delegate the authority to interpret an agency-empowering
statute to the agency itself;22 not only may Congress delegate to an
agency the power to take certain actions, it may also delegate the
authority to interpret the scope of that delegated power. The Court's
subsequent holding in United States v. Mead, which narrowed the range
of situations in which Chevron deference would apply, emphasizes this
point.2s Justice Souter's opinion for the eight-person majority explicitly
anchored itself with the idea that Congress had not intended to afford
agencies full Chevron rein in deciphering their own statutes when those
agencies were engaged only in more informal proceedings; the type of
agency action at issue functions as the Court's proxy for Congress's
delegatory intent."' For a Supreme Court willing to permit significant
delegations conveying only minimal guidance, acceptance of even an
intended delegation of interpretive authority is merely the next logical
consequence.
The reasoning behind Chevron and Mead belies contentions that
hard look review exists only (or even primarily) due to an image of
administrative agencies as an unaccountable "fourth branch" of
government run amok. 3 Were the Court truly vexed by this possibility,
Chevron and its model of deference would collapse under its own logic;
broad grants of legal freedom are a rather counter-productive method of
constraining an institution seen as possessing a surplusage of
uncontrolled power. By the same rationale, once the Court has granted
227. Id. at 843-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation....
Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit."); id. at 845 ("If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that
were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the
statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have
sanctioned.") (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
228. 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) ("We hold that administrative implementation of a particular
statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority
to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.").
229. See id. at 231 ("There are, nonetheless, ample reasons to deny Chevron deference here. The
authorization for classification rulings, and Custom's practice in making them, present a case far
removed not only from notice-and-comment process, but from any other circumstances reasonably
suggesting that Congress ever thought of classification rulings as deserving the deference claimed for
them here."); id. at 229 ("We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron
treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or
adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.").
230. See, e.g., Shapiro and Levy, supra note 214, at 44o.
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an agency the power (via Chevron) to determine its own path under the
law, hard look and substantial evidence review, with their curtailment of
deference on factual issues, became a comparatively ineffective method
of genuinely circumscribing agency power, particularly when those
doctrines simply require sound reasoning based on available evidence.
The Court that decided Morrison v. Olson23 and Chevron was not
uniquely afraid of untrammeled agency power. Hard look review has its
roots in rule-of-law considerations more fundamental than a fear of the
"fourth branch."
The second administrative axiom revealed by Chevron is the
minimal value placed upon issues of "expertise" in the Court's
calculation of an agency's deserved level of deference on any particular
topic. The notion that an agency's expertise might counsel in favor of
deference to its statutory interpretations makes only a brief appearance
in Chevron. The fact that Congress has chosen to delegate a decision to
an agency is determinative of the approach a court should take,
regardless of whatever expertise either Congress or the court might
believe the agency to possess. 32 Mead does incorporate expertise as a
variable within its calculation of deference, but only after it has
determined first that Congress did not intend to delegate power, and
second that there exists no unambiguous rule of law to apply. Moreover,
it does so only in a remarkably back-handed way. Rather than assuming
that an expert agency deserves deference regarding matters within its
field, the Court demands that any agency prove that its judgments are
worthy of heightened respect. Under Mead, as under Skidmore, an
agency's judgment will be adopted only according to its "power to
persuade." '233 Even the internal logic of Chevron flouts the common
expectations of an expertise-based model of adjudication. Appellate
courts are the institutional bodies best positioned to interpret statutory
language.' 4 The relinquishing of this responsibility highlights the primacy
231. 487 U.S. 654 (I988).
232. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
Perhaps [Congress] consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level,
thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering
the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the
question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of
the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised
by the agency. For judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred.
Id.
233. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (i944)) ("The fair
measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with
circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality,
and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's position ....") (internal citation
omitted); see also Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
234. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. III, 130-31 (1944) ("Undoubtedly questions of
statutory interpretation, especially when arising in the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the
courts to resolve ....").
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of other considerations.
2. Reaffirmation of the Authority/Constraint Disjunction
Chevron and Mead demonstrate further that rationality-based rule-
of-law principles can coexist - and are alive and well - alongside even the
broadest statutory grants of authority and their attendant deference on
matters of statutory interpretation. Chevron did not overrule State
Farm235 and Overton Park l; it did not even mention them.2 37 The
Environmental Protection Agency, given tremendous authority by the
United States Congress to fashion all manner of rules and regulations
carrying the force of law and even to interpret its own statutes in the
process, is still subject to rationality (or, where appropriate, substantial
evidence) review of its environmental decisions in order to ensure that
they remain logical and supported by available evidence.23 s The structural
framework of administrative law itself demonstrates the concurrent
operation of legal empowerment and legal restraint.
39
The Supreme Court has also applied this understanding to cases
outside of the typical administrative context. In Zadvydas v. Davis,24 for
instance, the Court held that Congress's "plenary power" over
immigration did not release it from external "important constitutional
limitations" such as the Fifth Amendment."' Respect for the rule of law
requires only that an executive actor abide by the legal limitations that
already exist, not that the actor have no hand in shaping those rules.
Prior to the existence of "law to apply" (anterior to the settling of rules),
235. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
236. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1970).
237. See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
238. Cf Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 6io (D.C. Cir. 1995). In Shalala, Chief Judge Edwards (for the
court) and Judge Wald (concurring) reached the same result but were unable to agree as to whether
the court should analyze the case under State Farm's "hard look review" rubric (for factual
determinations) or Chevron's doctrinal framework for questions of law, implying that the two
represent separate and concurrent legal considerations.
While I agree with the panel's conclusion that the Food and Drug Administration's ('FDA')
rule is justifiable, I would resolve the case under the Chevron step two challenge which was
presented by the parties and addressed by the trial court, rather than grounding our
decision on a different facet of Administrative Procedure Act ('APA') review.
Id. at 619 (Wald, J., concurring)
239. 533 U.S. 678 (2001); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
240. See generally supra notes 1 13-1H6.
241. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695. Again, Zadvydas is notable in that several of the lower courts to
consider military cases (see supra notes 113-lI6) have specifically relied upon Zadvydas's dicta
indicating that greater deference might be due the executive in cases relating to terrorism. Id. at 696.
We think, however, that the exercise by Congress of its control over jurisdiction is subject to
compliance with at least the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. That is to say, while
Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts
other than the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that power as to deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or to take private property without
just compensation.
Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948)
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there is nothing of which an agency may run afoul.242
The rule of law principle lurks in the background in other respects,
too. Mead involved one of approximately ten thousand customs rulings
produced each year, a structure of adjudication that carried with it the
threat of widespread internal inconsistencies and contradictions. 43 The
prospect that the resultant disparate treatment of similarly situated
parties might frustrate the rule of law appeared to weigh upon the Mead
Court, despite the Court's attempt to subsume the issue under the
question of whether those letters carried the force of law.2" Furthermore,
Chevron's initial inquiry as to whether Congress has spoken to an issue
or whether the statute is silent or ambiguous245 remains a final bulwark
against government in violation of the rule of law. Statutory silence or
ambiguity is synonymous with the idea that there is not yet "law to
apply," and thus an agency may act to set the rules for its own operation.
If a reviewing court finds that a statute is unambiguous, the Chevron
presumption is turned upon its head-there is law to apply, and the
agency must be held to it. 46 Only once this essential question has been
answered does the window of broad deference open for the
Administration.
C. APPLICATION OF HARD LOOK AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE REVIEW TO
MILITARY CASES
The ramifications of administrative law's jurisprudential approach
for the wartime cases discussed in Part I are straightforward. The district
court decisions in Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media exemplify
the proper functioning of rationality review. Importantly, the trial courts'
inquiries into the Administration's claims of harm resultant from open
hearings did not require any particular expertise in military matters, and
242. The Chevron Court is surprisingly explicit about this point, noting on several occasions the
possibility that Congress had deliberately chosen to "punt" the tough decisions about what rule of law
should exist to the agency, both sides to the argument seemingly content with leaving these choices in
the hands of a third, executive branch party. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 ("If this choice
represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care
by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that
the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.") (emphasis added) (internal
quotations and citation omitted); id at 865 ("[P]erhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on
either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the scheme
devised by the agency.").
243. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 238 n.i9 (2oo0 ).
244. See id. at 231-33 (discussing whether Customs letters have precedential value, concluding that
they likely do not, and stating that this fact brings them directly into conflict with the heart of the
"Chevron regime").
245. This inquiry is commonly known as Chevron "step one." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
246. Chevron's "step two", the court's inquiry into whether "the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute," id. at 843, operates in a philosophically similar fashion. By
definition, an impermissible construction would constitute agency action beyond even ambiguous
statutory bounds, in other words a violation of the (limited) rule of law that is present.
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neither court was forced to second-guess the substance of the facts and
predictions asserted by the Department of Justice . 7 The courts' analyses
in no way resembled either de novo review or the proverbial "battle of
the experts." Rather, the trial courts' examinations of the
Administration's position focused precisely on the logical errors
contained within its argument, viz., the "rational connection [or lack
thereof] between the facts found and the choice made," as dictated by
Overton Park."' On appeal, the Sixth and Third Circuits disregarded this
analysis and accepted the government's declarations at face value,249
based purely on the expertise of the government declarants. The
appellate courts' jurisprudential approach runs contrary to
administrative law's dictates regarding treatment of an expert agency's
proffered factual predicates. Administrative law precedent would
demand that the Circuit courts hew more closely to the approaches
adopted by their inferior trial courts.
The Supreme Court's inquiry in Korematsu ought to have functioned
in much the same way. Rather than accepting "the judgment of the
military authorities" simply because they were "charged with the primary
responsibility of defending our shores""25 and thus presumptively
possessed the greatest institutional expertise on the subject, State Farm
and Overton Park dictate that the judiciary should have probed the
military's explanation in a manner far closer to that undertaken by
Justice Murphy in dissent. The available evidence contradicting General
DeWitt's assertions and raising questions as to his racial biases, 5' if
examined thoroughly, could have pointed the Korematsu majority in the
247. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft (Detroit Free Press 1), t95 F. Supp. 2d 937, 947 (E.D. Mich.
2002); North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft (North Jersey Media 1), 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301
(D.N.J. 2002).
248. Detroit Free Press 1, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 947 ("Furthermore, neither in the Creppy directive nor
elsewhere does the Government prohibit detainees in special interest cases.., from revealing that
information to the press and public."); North Jersey Media 1, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 301-02 ("The problem
with the Creppy Memo is that there is nothing in it to prevent disclosure of this very information by
the 'special interest' detainee or that individual's lawyer, both of whom are permitted to be present in
the 'special interest' proceedings."). In these cases, the "facts found" necessarily included those
pertinent facts that the Government had neglected to mention, namely that the detainee and her
lawyer would themselves be present at any hearing, and that at least the attorney (if not the detainee
herself) would be able to communicate any desired message to the public. However, this fact was
uncontested on all sides, and thus did not require any particularized knowledge or fact-finding by the
courts.
249. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft (Detroit Free Press 1I), 303 F.3d 681, 707 (6th Cir. 2002)
("[W]e defer to their judgment. These agents are certainly in a better position to understand the
contours of the investigation and the intelligence capabilities of terrorist organizations."); North Jersey
Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft (North Jersey Media 11), 308 F.3d 198, 219 (3d Cir. 2002) ("The
assessments before us have been made by senior government officials responsible for investigating the
events of September ilth and for preventing future attacks .... To the extent that the Attorney
General's national security concerns seem credible, we will not lightly second-guess them.").
250. Korematsu v. United States (Korematsu 1), 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944).
251. See id. at 235-36.
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divergent direction advanced by Justice Murphy. The Court's complete
failure to scrutinize the military's claims stands, alongside Korematsu's
eventual outcome, as one of the unfortunate legacies of that case. Even
more than the Court's racially discriminatory constitutional holding,
which has never been replicated, its exaggeratedly deferential attitude
towards military assertions has lain "about like a loaded weapon ready
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of
an urgent need." 52
Administrative law's application to Padilla and Hamdi is equally
plain. The Supreme Court unwisely grafted the meager "some evidence"
standard to a case that warranted far greater scrutiny."3 Instead, the
Court should have demanded that the government proffer "substantial
evidence" in support of its conclusions that Jos6 Padilla and Yaser
Hamdi were unlawful combatants. Meaningful judicial scrutiny of the
factual predicates for administrative decisions is a necessary condition
for ensuring that the rule of law prevails, even as applied to expert
executive agencies acting within their assigned fields. Judicial abdication
of the oversight responsibilities established throughout the Supreme
Court's administrative law jurisprudence threatens to deny Padilla and
Hamdi their right to fair treatment under law, and offers the prospect
that many others may similarly find themselves in the hands of an
unfettered Executive.
III. THE SEARCH FOR A PRINCIPLED BASIS:
POTENTIAL GROUNDS FOR DIFFERENTIATING MILITARY CASES FROM
PEACETIME ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS
Courts have been curiously opaque when justifying and
substantiating their decisions to afford deference to the military's factual
determinations based on the decision-makers' assumed expertise or
constitutional role. For example, the Sixth Circuit in North Jersey Media,
after extensive discussion of the propriety of acquiescence to the
Department of Justice's expert judgment, rationalized its deference
primarily on the basis of "tradition." '54 Nevertheless, there exist five
principled bases that might provide legitimate justifications for the
distinction between courts' compliant adjudications of national security
matters and their less deferential behavior with regard to concomitantly
"expert" civilian administrative agencies. First, wartime cases may
involve demonstrably higher stakes, rendering the price of an incorrect
anti-military decision so prohibitive that courts must adopt a deferential
252. Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
253. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla (Padilla IV), 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
254. North Jersey Media II, 3o8 F.3 d at 2I9 (citing Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530
(1988), for the proposition that "courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority
of the Executive in military and national security affairs").
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approach as a hedge against harm. Second, military cases may involve
exigencies that thwart the type of considered decision-making upon
which courts rely, putting judges to a Hobson's choice between
significant deference and highly fallible snap decisions. Third, military
agencies and the President may possess comparatively greater expertise
vis A vis courts than do similarly positioned civilian agencies; military
decisions may indeed not "be susceptible of intelligent judicial
appraisal" '255 to the same degree as other factual questions. Fourth, the
mandatory statutory or constitutional standard for review of the military
determinations that arise in wartime cases may be less stringent than the
APA's "arbitrary and capricious," thus enshrining deference within the
controlling legal strictures themselves. Fifth, the Executive's sui generis
constitutional role as Commander-in-Chief (of the nation's military and
foreign policy) might set the wartime executive apart from administrative
agencies that receive their mandate only through Congressional
enactment. Yet as the following discussion will demonstrate, none of
these principles provides a valid basis for defending the discrepancy
between civilian and wartime judicial review.
A. HIGHER STAKES
The notion that the elevated price of a misstep in a military case
justifies increased reliance upon the military's expert judgments carries
with it strong logical and intuitive appeal. Proponents of this view may
argue that wartime situations are often critical. If the United States
military has become involved in some wartime manner on the home
front, a serious threat to the country must be present. A responsible
court must naturally defer to the judgment of the authorities charged
with the task of alleviating such dangers."' Embedded in this principle,
however, are three structural flaws: the theory, on its own terms, is
hardly self-evidently correct; calculations of this sort systematically
understate or ignore the danger to the national interest of an overly
255. Korematsu 1, 323 U.S. at 245.
256. Though it does not so state explicitly, the Third Circuit appeared to be reasoning along such
lines in North Jersey Media 11. The court understood the case before it as demanding a weighing of
"the community benefit of emotional catharsis against the security risk of disclosing the United States'
methods of investigation and the extent of its knowledge." North Jersey Media , 308 F.3d at 219. The
court appeared to believe not only that such an act of balancing was logically impossible, but also that
such judicial balancing would be unwise for a court to undertake under conditions of such potential
danger.
We are keenly aware of the dangers presented by deference to the executive branch when
constitutional liberties are at stake, especially in times of national crisis, when those liberties
are likely in greatest jeopardy. On balance, however, we are unable to conclude that
openness plays a positive role in special interest deportation hearings at a time when our
nation is faced with threats of such profound and unknown dimension.
Id. at 220 (emphasis added). Under such conditions, the Third Circuit evidently believed that a court
should be especially wary of substituting its own judgment, however soundly reasoned, for those of the
military authorities.
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deferential judicial posture, just as they overstate the potential harm that
might result from failing to defer; and, most importantly, the principle
begs, in circular fashion, the only important question-the actual
magnitude of the risk at hand.
I. Equivalent Dangers
As an initial matter, an examination of some of the more prominent
case law leads to the conclusion that the penalties for misjudgment in
wartime cases are not always demonstrably larger than in quotidian
civilian administrative lawsuits. While the specter of a Japanese invasion
of the West Coast loomed somewhere above Korematsu, the specific
danger in allowing people of Japanese ancestry to remain in the area, as
alleged by the military, was that they would engage in "espionage and
sabotage," not that they would take up arms against the United States
and actively begin guerilla warfare within the country.257 While even this
threat was certainly no small matter, it belies the hyperbolic rhetoric
employed to justify the Korematsu decision, including the suggestion that
perfidious Japanese-Americans "constituted a menace to the national
defense and safety. ' '2, Likewise, while the information that terrorists
might glean from INS deportation hearings could well be significant (and
it is not difficult to imagine the government painting a particularly dire
picture), it seems unlikely that tens of thousands of lives hung in the
balance. In the course of their analyses, the Detroit Free Press and North
Jersey Media appellate courts engaged in a type of overestimation
parallel to that in Korematsu. Those courts' assessment of the attendant
dangers subsume the entirety of the war on terrorism and all of its
possible consequences, coalescing them under a general "terrorism"
heading, rather than focusing particularly upon the harms that might
stem from the alternative courses of action in the case at bar. 59
However, according to the Administration's own facts, thousands of
lives did depend on the passive restraint (airbag and automated seatbelt)
regulations at issue in State Farm.60 Prior to canceling its own
regulations, NHTSA had conducted a study and concluded "that passive
restraints could prevent approximately 12,000 deaths and over I00,000
serious injuries annually."" Even the seeming bureaucratic mundanities
addressed in typical administrative law cases, the type for which the
Court designated hard look review appropriate, may carry utilitarian
257. See Korematsu 1, 323 U.S. at 217.
258. Id. at 218.
259. See, e.g., North Jersey Media II, 3o8 F.3d at 220 (speaking generically of the war on terrorism,
not of the specific threat posed by the release of information at INS detention hearings, and stating
that "our nation is faced with threats of such profound and unknown dimension").
26o. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 35
(983).
261. Id. at 35 (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 34298).
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consequences of the same order of magnitude as prototypical wartime
adjudications.
2. Under-Estimation of Deference's Resultant Harms
Courts have placed preeminent emphasis upon the grave harm that
may result from judicial failure to defer in the absence of concomitant
appreciation of the national harm potentially resultant from the act of
deference itself. Many of the cases that allegedly present the greatest
danger to national security are litigated over military prescriptions that,
if permitted, might themselves inflict grievous harm upon the nation.
Korematsu stands as a paradigmatic example. The potential harm to the
nation were the military not given free rein counseled strongly (and
likely carried the day) in favor of near-complete deference to General
DeWitt's decision." At the same time, the forcible evacuation and
internment of Japanese-Americans has itself inflicted tremendous injury
upon those thousands of people, and the country as a whole, over the
subsequent decades. 63 The hazard the United States supposedly faced in
1942 gave birth to an extreme measure that may well have left a deeper
scar than even an actual attack by the Japanese ever could have.
Opposing the Executive's plans in many wartime cases are not mere
statutory dictates but closely guarded constitutional rights whose
infringement, even when not easily measurable in lives lost, could deal
substantial injury to public confidence in the government and in an open
and free society.2 The rights-and thus the threat of intangible harms
262. See Korematsu 1, 323 U.S. at 223.
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race.
He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly
constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to
take proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the
situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West
Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war
in our military leaders-as inevitably it must-determined that they should have the power
to do just this.
Id.
263. See, e.g., DONNA K. NAGATA, LEGACY OF INJuSTICE: EXPLORING THE CROSS-GENERATIONAL
IMPACT OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (1993); PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS at i8 (1982) ("[A] grave injustice
was done to American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry who, without individual review
or any probative evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the United States
during World War II."); Korematsu v. United States (Korematsu 11), 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1413 (N.D.
Cal. 1984) ("Fortunately, there are few instances in our judicial history when courts have been called
upon to undo such profound and publicly acknowledged injustice.").
264. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press 1, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 944 ("The right to a public trial is not only to
protect the accused but to protect as much the public's right to know what goes on when men's lives
and liberty are at stake ... It is important that our citizens be free to observe court proceedings to
insure a sense of confidence in the judicial process.") (internal quotations and citation omitted)
(alteration in original); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft (Detroit Free Press 11), 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th
Cir. 2002) ("The Executive Branch seeks to uproot people's lives, outside the public eye, and behind a
closed door. Democracies die behind closed doors. The First Amendment, through a free press,
protects the people's right to know that their government acts fairly, lawfully and accurately in
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should those rights be eviscerated-opposing action by the Department
of Transportation, in Overton Park, or the automobile industry, in State
Farm, do not rise to the same level.
3. Question-Begging
Finally, to claim that executive actors deserve deference in wartime
cases because of the magnitude of risk at hand is to begin the inquiry by
begging the fundamental question. Frequently, the Executive's
asseveration of imminent harm constitutes but another administrative
determination that may itself not deserve significant deference under
applicable law.165 Arguments for deference based upon the present
deportation proceedings.").
Judge Tatel eloquently expressed this concern in his dissent to Center for National Security
Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice:
First, no one can doubt that uniquely compelling governmental interests are at stake: the
government's need to respond to the September i I attacks-unquestionably the worst ever
acts of terrorism on American soil-and its ability to defend the nation against future acts
of terrorism. But although this court overlooks it, there is another compelling interest at
stake in this case: the public's interest in knowing whether the government, in responding to
the attacks, is violating the constitutional rights of the hundreds of persons whom it has
detained in connection with its terrorism investigation-by, as the plaintiffs allege,
detaining them mainly because of their religion or ethnicity, holding them in custody for
extended periods without charge, or preventing them from seeking or communicating with
legal counsel.
331 F.3d 918, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Tatel, J., dissenting). Judge Tatel's exegesis neatly captures the
dichotomous character that any inquiry into "harms" must rightly assume: Though prohibition of
executive action in wartime may carry with it the potential for damage to the nation, so too may
permission of such action present the threat of widespread, often inchoate, harm. Courts have not so
much failed to balance these harms correctly as they have neglected to consider this second category
of damage altogether. See id. at 938 (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("But although this court overlooks it, there
is another compelling interest at stake in this case .. ") (emphasis added).
265. For all of the courts' discussions of the superior expertise at war-making and intelligence-
gathering mustered by the executive branch (including the Departments of Defense and Homeland
Security and the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the President himself), recent events have
illustrated vividly the gross misjudgments of imminent harm those ostensibly proficient agencies are
capable of. For instance, the government appears to have drastically overstated the value of-and
therefore the harm posed by-the alleged al Qaeda operatives detained at the military prison at
Guantinamo Bay.
In interviews, dozens of high-level military, intelligence and law-enforcement officials in the
United States, Europe and the Middle East said that contrary to the repeated assertions of
senior administration officials, none of the detainees at the United States Naval Base at
Guantdlnamo Bay ranked as leaders or senior operatives of Al Qaeda. They said only a
relative handful-some put the number at about a dozen, others more than two dozen-
were sworn Qaeda members or other militants able to elucidate the organization's inner
workings.
Tim Golden and Don Van Natta, Jr., U.S. Said to Overstate Value of Guantdnamo Detainees, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 21, 2004, at AI. That the Administration could so overestimate the potential harm
stemming from a select population such as this one is hardly surprising, given the concomitant inflation
(whether purposeful or not) of the threat posed to the United States by Saddam Hussein prior to the
initiation, in March 2003, of the war to remove him. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, Senators Assail C.I.A.
Judgments on Iraq's Arms as Deeply Flawed, N.Y. TIMES, July sO, 2004, at At ("In a scathing,
unanimous report, the Senate Intelligence Committee said Friday that the most pivotal assessments
used to justify the war against Iraq were unfounded and unreasonable, and reflected major missteps by
American intelligence agencies."). The practical case against granting substantial deference to the
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danger thus quickly devolve into a familiar circularity. Indeed, the
government's assessment of harm (and the amount of deference that
assessment warranted) was the primary factual question at issue in
Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media. The courts in those cases
decided the appropriate level of deference to award the Executive's
factual claims before they analyzed what type or degree of risk the
country might actually face from unsealed "special interest" deportation
hearings.26
Furthermore, there exists no internal mechanism to prevent
executive branch actors from simply alleging generalized threats to
national security at the outset of any wartime adjudication. Indeed, the
very classification of "wartime cases" signals intuitive acceptance by the
judiciary of such reasoning. Credulous acceptance of such claims by the
judiciary, followed by excessive deference to the military's formulation of
whatever factual issues might remain, effectively bars the judiciary from
imposing meaningful scrutiny upon the substantive merits of a case.2 Far
from justifying an habitual judicial posture of deference, continued
operation of this circular algorithm threatens to truncate wartime
adjudications before they have meaningfully begun.
executive's predictions of harm could hardly be more forcefully made.
266. See Detroit Free Press H, 303 F.3d at 705 ("The Government contends that '[cllosure of
removal proceedings in special interest cases is necessary to protect national security by safeguarding
the Government's investigation of the September i i terrorist attack and other terrorist conspiracies.")
(citation omitted); North Jersey Media II, 308 F.3d at 218 ("Watson presents a range of potential
dangers, the most pressing of which we rescribe [sic] here."). Even in Korematsu I the defendant had
raised a legitimate question of fact regarding whether the danger of Japanese invasion of the West
Coast had in fact passed by May 1942, the date that General DeWitt issued his race-specific exclusion
order. See 323 U.S. at 218.
267. For instance, the Fourth Circuit approached Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi I) under the
potentially mistaken belief that Yaser Hamdi-or other, similarly situated detainees-posed a
significant threat to the nation's security. See 316 F.3 d 450, 465 (4 th Cir. 2003) ("As we emphasized in
our prior decision, any judicial inquiry into Hamdi's status as an alleged enemy combatant in
Afghanistan must reflect this deference as well as a recognition that government has no more
profound responsibility than the protection of American citizens from further terrorist attacks.")
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This generic perception of national danger-and the
concomitant deference it catalyzed-prevented the court from ever reaching the genuine merits of the
case, viz., whether or not Yaser Hamdi actually qualified as an enemy combatant.
The designation of Hamdi as an enemy combatant thus bears the closest imaginable
connection to the President's constitutional responsibilities during the actual conduct of
hostilities. We therefore approach this case with sensitivity to both the fundamental liberty
interest asserted by Hamdi and the extraordinary breadth of warmaking authority
conferred by the Constitution and invoked by Congress and the executive branch.
Id. at 466. In essence, the military executive-and the court-had substituted a factual truism (the
terrorist threat to national security) for the more nuanced question of Hamdi's genuine status. The
result was decisive: The court's immediate acceptance of the government's conceptualization of
national threat effectively foreclosed any potential for meaningful consideration of whether Hamdi
properly belonged within the "enemy combatant" category into which he had been placed.
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B. WARTIME EXIGENCIES
The relative exigencies of wartime situations present another
articulable case for awarding particular deference to military decision-
making. The military may be forced to act hurriedly and decisively in
order to forestall some imminent potential danger, making careful
hindsight-aided judicial review an unjust basis by which to judge its
actions. Courts may also be forced to decide wartime cases with undue
haste, robbing them of the opportunity for meticulous consideration
upon which their judgments depend. Korematsu is something of an
example of the first type of these cases. Although the Korematsu decision
only issued in 1944, the military had ordered the internment in May 1942,
at the height of public fears of invasion (though over six months after the
attack on Pearl Harbor).68 Ex parte Quirin, while not involving issues
of factual judicial deference as defined in this Article, is an example of
the second of these types. Quirin was, by necessity, argued on a
drastically expedited schedule (on direct review to the Supreme Court)
and decided by the Court the day after argument. The opinion was only
issued three months later,27 after the defendants in the case had already
been executed.
Many more cases, however, bear a closer resemblance to Detroit
Free Press, North Jersey Media, Padilla, and Hamdi, in which both
district and appellate courts have ample opportunity to deliberate and in
which the governmental action at issue is judged on its merits according
to the elongated schedules familiar to judicial decision-makers."' In such
situations, there is no reason to presuppose or even suspect that a judge,
or a military commander, is placed under any greater time pressure than
that which occurs in the course of typical peacetime lawsuits. The harm
in many cases-even when inchoate or ongoing-is not irreparable: a
court may take all the time it wishes in deciding whether to open INS
deportation hearings to the public '72 with the knowledge that its chance
268. See Korematsu 1, 323 U.S. at 217; id. at 223-24 ("There was evidence of disloyalty on the part
of some, the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We
cannot-by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight-now say that at that time these
actions were unjustified.").
269. 317 U.S. i (1942). Quirin concerned the lawfulness of the military detention of German
saboteurs who had infiltrated the United States in civilian dress with the intention of destroying
factories and causing other damage. The German soldiers had filed habeas corpus petitions
challenging their detention and trial by military authorities (rather than in civilian courts), and the
Supreme Court was called upon the adjudicate this question as a prelude to their impending execution
as unlawful combatants.
270. Id, at 19-20
271. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft (Detroit Free Press 1), 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 940 (E.D.
Mich. 2002) ("These proceedings have been closed to the press and public.... [P]laintiffs in three
separate cases seek an injunction against such procedure in any future hearings.").
272. In fact, the circuit split between Detroit Free Press H and North Jersey Media H indicates that
these cases will almost certainly be heard by the Supreme Court, pushing their timetables back many
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to influence events will not slip past. Furthermore, these cases present
situations that bear little resemblance to the typical parade of horribles
mustered in support of broad administrative deference.273 Courts are not
instructing military commanders in the field on how to conduct wars,
battalions are not being asked to carry along judges to advise them of
their constitutional powers and restrictions, and soldiers need not consult
legal treatises before firing. In this respect, the argument based on
exigency seems to lack broad applicability.
C. COMPARATIVE DIFFICULTY
The third potential principled distinction-that military cases are
comparatively more difficult for courts to evaluate than civilian
administrative ones-does not carry the same intuitive weight as other
justifications. 74 To the contrary, courts seem hardly less capable of
understanding military cases than technical civilian administrative ones.275
more months.
273. See supra note 2o and accompanying text.
274. The utter indecipherability of wartime facts, and possibly even the comparatively greater
difficulty a court would have in grappling with them than with the factual questions underlying a
peacetime administrative action, appeared to be the animating principle behind the Fourth Circuit's
deferential attitude in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi 1), 316 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 2003).
The reasons for this deference are not difficult to discern. Through their departments and
committees, the executive and legislative branches are organized to supervise the conduct
of overseas conflict in a way that the judiciary simply is not. The Constitution's allocation of
the warmaking powers reflects not only the expertise and experience lodged within the
executive, but also the more fundamental truth that those branches most accountable to the
people should be the ones to undertake the ultimate protection and to ask the ultimate
sacrifice from them. Thus the Supreme Court has lauded "[tihe operation of a healthy
deference to legislative and executive judgments in the area of military affairs."
Id. (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66 (I98i)); see also Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("America faces an enemy just as real as its former
Cold War foes, with capabilities beyond the capacity of the judiciary to explore.").
This passage from the Hamdi I opinion raises the related prospect that courts such as the
Fourth Circuit have drawn such distinctions between civilian and military cases based upon the belief
that whether and how to fight a war are uniquely questions that must be addressed solely to the
nation's "democratic" branches, viz., the President and the Congress, and to which courts-consonant
with their role as apolitical neutral arbiters-may not appropriately speak. See, e.g., President's State of
the Union Address to Congress and the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003, at A12 ("Sending Americans
into battle is the most profound decision a president can make."). This rather facile argument ignores
the point that wartime cases such as those at issue in this Article do not concern the commitment or
disposition of military forces, but rather involve such jurisprudential mundanities as the lawfulness of
detention without trial and First Amendment rights of media access, issues that have traditionally and
consistently been given over to the sound discretion of the courts. See supra note 20 and accompany
text; Detroit Free Press I, 303 F.3d at 687 (discussing the courts' traditional authority over
immigration cases).
275. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 938 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
Second, while the governmental interests in this case may be uniquely compelling, the legal
principles that govern its resolution are not at all unique.... The law that governs this case
is the same law that applies whenever the government's need for confidentiality in a law
enforcement investigation runs up against the public's right to know what [] government is
up to.... In all such situations, FOIA fully accommodates the government's concerns about
the harms that might arise from the release of information pertaining to its investigations.
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Educated generalists such as judges are no more qualified to determine
the proper placement of a highway or the benefit of mandatory airbags
than the danger of an invasion of the West Coast or the potential threat
from revealing the names of deportees.276
War and national security are matters of intense national debate. To
the extent that they are impenetrable to judges, it is often because
military authorities have simply refused to share relevant and necessary
information;277 as with other potential distinctions between wartime and
peacetime cases, this rationale thus rests upon a circularity. In addition,
many so-called "wartime" cases may turn on issues that have little to do
with actual military strategy and involve instead more general
questions -such as the effect that awarding counsel to a suspect will have
upon that individual's willingness to cooperate with authorities -about
which military administrators hold no particular expertise.278 Hard look
review of agency factual determinations exists despite the fact that
agencies were created precisely in order to deal with technically difficult
topics that do not submit easily to lay analysis.
Moreover, rationality and substantial evidence reviews are designed
to draw not upon any specialized knowledge on the part of the
overseeing judiciary, but rather upon judges' nomological reasoning
abilities and their facility at divining linkages (or the lack thereof)
between facts and the conclusions that have sprung from them. These are
precisely the types of analyses to which judges are best suited and best
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
276. See generally Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., v. Volpe, 4oi U.S. 402 (1970); Korematsu v.
United States (Korematsu 1), 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Detroit Free Press 11, 303 F.3d at 681; North Jersey
Media II, 308 F.3d at 198.
277. Compare the Korematsu majority decision.
[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress
that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could not
be precisely and quickly ascertained. We cannot say that the war-making branches of the
Government did not have ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not
readily be isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national
defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard
against it.
Korematsu 1, 323 U.S. at 218 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), with Justice Murphy's
dissent:
In support of this blanket condemnation of all persons of Japanese descent, however, no
reliable evidence is cited to show that such individuals were generally disloyal, or had
generally so conducted themselves in this area as to constitute a special menace to defense
installations or war industries, or had otherwise by their behavior furnished reasonable
ground for their exclusion as a group.
Id. at 236 (Murphy, J., dissenting)
278. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld (Padilla 11), 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Moreover, the
forecast speculates not about an intelligence-related matter, in which Admiral Jacoby is expert, but
about a matter of human nature-Padilla's in particular-in which, most respectfully, there are no true
experts.").
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situated to perform. 79 Hard look review demands only that courts
scrutinize agency decisions for a "rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made," demanding ratiocination- and frequently
merely syllogistic reasoning-not necessarily nuanced interpretation of
technical data."' Although a court may be forced to delve into
administrative details in the course of evaluating policy alternatives not
adopted or facts left unconsidered, most hard look review adjudications
turn simply upon the rationality of the agency's logical connections." '
Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media are precisely these types
of cases. In those adjudications, the district courts were capable of
dismissing the government's argument for refusing to open INS hearings
simply by virtue of the weakness of the government's syllogism in light of
available facts, not with reference to some purported font of expert
knowledge regarding terrorist practices or national security.82 Indeed,
279. Cf Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) ("The construction of
written instruments is one of those things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors
unburdened by training in exegesis."); Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 241 (199I) ("A
judge attempting to predict how a state court would rule must use not only his legal reasoning skills,
but also his experiences and perceptions of judicial behavior in that State."); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S.
104, 116-117 (1985) (discussing the division between questions of law and questions of fact with
reference to the varied abilities of judges and juries).
280. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (internal quotations and citation omitted)
281. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 236 F.3 d 729, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Were this the first time
the FCC was asked to consider whether a carrier was dominant in a given market, the explanation
provided by the Commission in the Forbearance Order may well have been adequate; but it is not the
first time that the Commission has addressed this issue. Indeed, the FCC has considered this question
on several occasions, each time applying a test different from that applied here to determine whether
the firm in question retained market power."); Sloan v. HUD, 231 F.3d 10, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("The
Secretary's decision is at best a half-hearted attempt to address appellants' claim for relief. And, as is
true with portions of the ALJ's decision, the Secretary's decision seems to blame the appellants for the
blunders committed by agency investigators. In short, the decision fails to articulate a satisfactory
explanation for [the agency's] action including a rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original); Ctr. for Auto
Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1344-50 (D.C. Cir. r985) (scrutinizing the data relied upon by the
agency in order to determine whether they support the agency's conclusion, while refusing to displace
the agency's expert conclusion regarding the fungibility of automobile bumpers of divergent heights en
route to evaluating which data to rely upon); Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486,
1511-12 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Despite explicit concessions as to the shortcomings of the ICC rate base
formula and the recognized advantages of a rate base formula derived from the original cost, FERC
rejected the original cost alternative.... We find that none of FERC's explanations for its rejection of
an original cost rate base satisfies accepted standards of reasoned decisionmaking."); Int'l Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 822-23 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Our review of the
record and the Secretary's explanation of his decision indicates that the Secretary has not given
sufficient consideration to factors that may be highly relevant to the Department's ability to enforce
the Act without homework restrictions.").
282. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft (Detroit Free Press 1), 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 947 (E.D. Mich.
2002); North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft (North Jersey Media I), 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301-02
(D.N.J. 2002); see also Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3 d 918, 939 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("But requiring agencies to make the detailed showing FOIA requires is
not second-guessing their judgment about matters within their expertise. And in any event, this court
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the analytical approach adopted by the Detroit Free Press and North
Jersey Media district courts directly parallels that of State Farm, where
the Court concluded (presumably without the aid of a prior study) that a
mandatory airbag standard would save more lives than a standard that
did not require passive restraints; and did so solely with reference to the
NHTSA's own logic and argument. s3 The Executive's contention that
courts are not equipped to apply hard look or substantial evidence
review to ostensibly complicated military decisions is a logical non
sequitur. Regardless of whether or not military cases are in fact more
difficult for courts to comprehend, rationality and substantial evidence
reviews are intentionally impervious to such a concern.4
D. INTERNAL LIMITATIONS ON REVIEW
The concept that the laws governing executive action in wartime
might, by their very terms, dictate a lesser standard of review than the
APA's "arbitrary and capricious" or "substantial evidence" provisions
represents yet another variant of the claim that it is necessary to
constrain "fourth branch" administrative agencies to a greater degree
than other governmental bodies. In this form, the argument has two fatal
flaws. First, the "law to apply" applicable in most military cases compels
a far higher standard of judicial review than the APA's "arbitrary and
capricious" language. In contrast to Overton Park and State Farm's mere
statutory constraints, military cases invoke some of the most closely
guarded and prized constitutional rights, including freedom of speech
and the press,"' equal protection,6 and due process. 87 According to
traditional constitutional jurisprudence, and by the courts' own
admissions, the abrogation of these rights by the executive branch calls
for the most searching scrutiny the judiciary can apply28 In order to
is also in an extremely poor position to second-guess the legislature's judgment that the judiciary must
play a meaningful role in reviewing FOIA exemption requests.").
283. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46 ("The first and most obvious reason for finding the rescission
arbitrary and capricious is that NHTSA apparently gave no consideration whatever to modifying the
Standard to require that airbag technology be utilized.").
284. It is for perhaps this reason that the "disparate institutional competence" model's most
famous proponent, Justice Jackson, appears conflicted on the issue. Despite having argued in
Korematsu I as grounds for judicial restraint (or abstention) that "[i]n the very nature of things,
military decisions are not susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal," Korematsu v. United States
(Korematsu 1), 323 U.S. 214, 245 (I944) (Jackson, J., dissenting), Justice Jackson is frequently quoted
for the principle "that we decide difficult cases presented to us by virtue of our commissions, not our
competence." Padilla v. Bush (Padilla 1), 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 6o8 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Justice
Jackson in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (i98i)).
285. See Detroit Free Press I, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 937; North Jersey Media 1, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
286. See Korematsu 1, 323 U.S. at 254.
287. See Padilla I, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 564; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi 1), 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir.
2003).
28& See Korematsu 1, 323 U.S. at 216 ("[C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.");
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft (Detroit Free Press I1), 3o3 F.3d 681, 705 (6th Cir. 2002)
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ensure executive compliance with the constitutional "law to apply" in
these cases, courts have already determined that judicial inquiry must
assume an even more aggressive posture than "arbitrary and capricious"
hard look review.
Second, one fact often overlooked amidst the unprincipled jumble of
wartime cases is that the Department of Justice, the Department of
Defense (DOD), the Department of Homeland Security (containing
within it the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS),
formerly known as the Immigration and Naturalization Service) and
other related war-related agencies are administrative agencies within the
meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, and consequently are
subject to arbitrary and capricious review under APA § 7o6."' The
Administrative Procedure Act's definition of its applicable scope is
("[Glovernment action that curtails a First Amendment right of access.., must be supported by a
showing that denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest.") (internal quotations and
citation omitted); North Jersey Media 1, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 301 (same); Hamdi 1, 316 F.3d at 466 ("We
therefore approach this case with sensitivity to [] the fundamental liberty interest asserted by
Hamdi .... ).
289. In none of the cases discussed at length in this article did the court so much as mention that
the executive action in question had been perpetrated by an administrative agency, much less attempt
to grapple with the implications of APA § 706 upon the case before it. See generally Detroit Free
Press 1, i95 F. Supp. 2d at 937; North Jersey Media 1, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 288; Detroit Free Press II, 303
F.3 d at 681; North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft (North Jersey Media II), 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002): Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice., 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Padilla 1, 233
F. Supp. 2d at 564; Hamdi 1, 316 F.3d at 450.
Among those cases that one could conceivably consider modem wartime adjudications, in
only one instance did the court deign to examine an agency decision according to the APA's "arbitrary
and capricious" standard. In December 2ooi, pursuant to the President's authority under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq., the Department
of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control ("OFAC") declared the Holy Land Foundation-an
ostensible Muslim charity-a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" and froze all of the assets that
the Holy Land Foundation possessed within the United States. See Holy Land Found, for Relief and
Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 159-6o (D.C. Cir. 2003). Holy Land Foundation filed suit in federal
court attacking this designation and the concomitant seizure on a number of grounds, among them the
claim that OFAC's action had been "arbitrary and capricious" per APA § 7 o6(2)(A). See id. at 16o-62.
The district court rejected this argument (as well as the rest of Holy Land Foundation's claims) after a
"detailed review of the administrative record" that revealed "substantial evidence" supporting
OFAC's conclusions. Id. at 16t. The court of appeals affirmed. See generally id.
The opinion gives no particular indication regarding why this, of all cases, garnered hard look
review; it is possible that this is simply the only action in which the plaintiffs raised a claim based upon
the APA. Alternatively, the OFAC's categorization decision may have more strongly resembled a
commonplace administrative action than the other adjudications discussed here that touched upon the
war on terror. The Department of the Treasury surely is less easily characterized as a "warmaking"
agency than are the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense, and the agency action at issue in
Holy Land involved assets controlled by an organization with ties to terrorism, not the detention of
any individual thought to be a terrorist. Id. at 159. In this field of law it is easy to lose sight of the fact
that claims for relief under the APA ought to be the rule, rather than the exception; it is the absence of
explanation in North Jersey Media I and Detroit Free Press I for those courts' failures to address the
APA's demands of rationality-rather than the corresponding silence regarding the Holy Land
Foundation court's consideration of that statute's strictures -that begs for elucidation.
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comprehensive: "'agency' means each authority of the Government of
the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by
another agency."" While the Supreme Court has held the APA
inapplicable to the President, 9 ' the only cognizable exceptions that might
exempt a military agency such as the DOD from APA strictures are the
narrow ones written into the statute itself: the APA "does not include ...
(F) courts martial and military commissions; (G) military authority
exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory.'
No litigant has ever successfully employed the "military authority"
exception, so its outer limits remain somewhat murky. Yet courts have
outlined numerous domestic situations in which the exception does not
apply and in doing so have provided some guidance as to the categories
of situations they believe it contemplates. The judiciary has generally
construed this exception narrowly and literally, constraining its
application to genuine military operations in theaters of battle, as
exemplified by the D.C. Circuit's language in Doe v. Sullivan:
We think the 'military authority' exception is not on point.
[The plaintiff] currently does not ask us to review military
commands made in combat zones or in preparation for, or in the
aftermath of, battle. His claim, as now advanced, entails no judicial
interference with the relationship between soldiers and their military
superiors.'93
Though dicta, the court's gloss on the exception's inapplicability is
illuminating: "[W]hen he adopted the rule, [the Secretary] did not
purport to be exercising the President's powers as Commander in
Chief.""
The Doe principle, if adopted, would immunize administrative
actions that rely principally upon the President's constitutional
Commander-in-Chief power (often those undertaken by military forces
themselves) - as opposed to statutory delegation based on other
constitutional provisions-from scrutiny under the APA. Hamdi,"
290. 5 U.S.C. § 551() (2000).
291. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 8oo-oi (1992).
292. 5 U.S.C. § 55I(i)(F), (G) (emphasis added).
293. 938 F.2d 1370, 138o (D.C. Cir. 199i) (discussing an emergency FDA regulation, promulgated
during the Gulf War hostilities, that permitted the military to use unapproved drugs on soldiers in
certain combat situations without obtaining those soldiers' informed consent); see also Dickson v.
Sec'y of Defense, 68 F.3d 1396, 14o6 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding the "military authority" exception
inapplicable to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records' decision not to waive the statute
of limitations period for former servicemen to apply for upgrades of their discharge statuses);
Guerrero v. Stone, 97o F.2d 626, 628 (9 th Cir. I992) (same); Neal v. Sec'y of Navy, 639 F.2d 1029, 1036
(3d Cir. i98i) (holding the "military authority" exception inapplicable to a denial of reenlistment into
the Marines).
294. Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 138o.
295. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi 1), 316 F.3 d 450, 459-6o (4th Cir. 2002) ("The President
responded by ordering United States armed forces to Afghanistan to subdue al Qaida and the
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Padilla,296 and Korematsu,7 all of which concerned deprivations of
individual rights performed by military authorities, fall into this first
category. However, non-military, statute-driven actions such as the
closing of INS deportation hearings in Detroit Free Press98 and North
Jersey Media' almost certainly fall outside of the "military authority"
exception." Nor are these actions "committed to agency discretion, 3 .
since "law to apply" per the Overton Park standard (in this case, the First
Amendment) is obviously present. It is thus possible to formulate a
colorable argument that the APA § 706 "arbitrary and capricious"
standard should control judicial review of the INS decisions in Detroit
Free Press and North Jersey Media. Though the contours of this doctrine
governing Taliban regime supporting it. During this ongoing military operation, thousands of alleged
enemy combatants, including Hamdi, have been captured by American and allied forces.").
296. See Padilla v. Bush (Padilla 1), 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (detailing Jos6
Padilla's arrest and "the President's designation of Padilla as an enemy combatant associated with a
terrorist network called al Qaeda-Padilla is now detained, without formal charges against him or the
prospect of release after the giving of testimony before a grand jury, in the custody of the U.S.
Department of Defense at the Consolidated Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina."). Padilla's
case appears somewhat more ambiguous, since he was originally arrested "in Chicago, on a material
witness warrant issued by" the Southern District of New York, and "[his arrest and initial detention
were carried out by the U.S. Department of Justice." Id. at 568-69. However, Padilla had since been
transferred to military custody, and the military's intention to detain him indefinitely constituted the
prompt for his lawsuit. Id. at 569. As a result, his case likely would fall outside of the APA under this
rubric.
297. See Korematsu v. United States (Korematsu 1), 323 U.S. 214, 215-16 (I944) ("The petitioner,
an American citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted in a federal district court for remaining in San
Leandro, California, a 'Military Area,' contrary to Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the
Commanding General of the Western Command, U.S. Army....").
298. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft (Detroit Free Press 11), 303 F. 3d 681, 683-84 (6th Cir. 2002)
("Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued a directive (the 'Creppy directive') to all United
States Immigration Judges requiring closure of special interest cases. The Creppy directive requires
that all proceedings in such cases be closed to the press and public, including family members and
friends.").
299. North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft (North Jersey Media I1), 308 F.3 d 198, 199 (3 d
Cir. 2002) ("This category was created by a directive issued by Michael Creppy, the Chief United
States Immigration Judge, outlining additional security measures to be applied in this class of cases,
including closing hearings to the public and the press.").
300. Despite Sullivan's contrary interpretation, there remains the possibility that a court will read
(and apply) the "in the field in time of war" language impossibly broadly to cover even actions within
the United States itself during this open-ended "war against terrorism." Such a dramatic legal
expansion seems unlikely, however. Even one of Hamdi's authors (the case was jointly authored by
Chief Judge Wilkinson and Judges Wilkins and Traxler) distinguished that case's holding from the
disparate conclusion reached by the Southern District of New York in Padilla I on the ground that
Yaser Hamdi was captured in a war zone, while Jos6 Padilla was arrested on domestic soil in Chicago.
See Hamdi 1, 316 F.3d at 465 ("We have no occasion, for example, to address the designation as an
enemy combatant of an American citizen captured on American soil or the role that counsel might
play in such a proceeding. See, e.g., Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, (S.D.N.Y. 2002). We shall, in
fact, go no further in this case than the specific context before us-that of the undisputed detention of
a citizen during a combat operation undertaken in a foreign country and a determination by the
executive that the citizen was allied with enemy forces.").
301. 5 U.S.C. § 70Ia)(2) (2000).
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remain unsettled, in the presence of "law to apply" the APA itself may
possess greater legal muscle than it has heretofore been afforded. The
argument that the externally applicable constitutional law in military
cases sets a less demanding standard of review than the Administrative
Procedure Act founders on all fronts.
E. THE EXECUTIVE'S SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE
The final basis upon which one might attempt to justify greater
judicial deference towards "expert" military organizations is the
Executive's sui generis constitutional role as Commander-in-Chief. The
President enjoys a singular position in the American constitutional order
and possesses all-embracing responsibility for securing the nation against
outside threats." Judicial interference with that authority would seem,
on its face, not only to overreach the prerogative of an expert body but
to violate the very structure of separated powers. Yet this argument
cannot constitute sufficient grounds for deferring to military
determinations when there exists "law to apply." This is merely another
manifestation of the "category error" described in Part I.A., which runs
afoul both of the demands of liberal legality in modern constitutional
structure and of the more particularized dictates of administrative law.3"3
As described above in Part II.B., the simultaneous co-existence of
Chevron's grant of delegated interpretive authority and State Farm's
requirement of rationality review illustrate more particularly the
dichotomous separation of authority and constraint, even as applied to
expert executive actors. Repeated invocation of the mantra that "any
[judicial] inquiry must be circumscribed to avoid encroachment into the
military affairs entrusted to the executive branch" is no longer justifiable
on its own terms.3 4
IV. TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF JUDICIAL ABDICATION
Pervading these modern wartime cases are recurring indications that
reviewing courts-in some inchoate fashion -perceive military decisions
as simply dissimilar to civilian adjudications, lacking in some important
characteristic of judicial accessibility. Judges have thus adopted the
practice of merely asserting the exceptionality of wartime adjudications,
rather than arguing it. The Hamdi court's approach is paradigmatic:
The safeguards that all Americans have come to expect in criminal
302. See, e.g., Ex Pane Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942) (describing how the Constitution invests "the
President as Commander in Chief, with the power to wage war which Congress has declared, and to
carry into effect all laws passed by Congress for the conduct of war and for the government and
regulation of the Armed Forces, and all laws defining and punishing offences against the law of
nations, including those which pertain to the conduct of war.").
303. See Sections I.A. and II.A.I.b., supra.
304. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi 1), 316 F.3d 450,473 (4th Cir. 2003).
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prosecutions do not translate neatly to the arena of armed conflict. In
fact, if deference to the Executive is not exercised with respect to
military judgments in the field, it is difficult to see where deference
would ever obtain.0 5
In similar fashion, the Supreme Court in Zadvydas adverted to this
class of cases simply as "terrorism or other special circumstances,"
without any particular explanation of what might make them special.
36
Courts have also frequently relied upon "tradition" as -a panacea,
providing little additional argument."°  Occasionally a court has
expressed its position not as a matter of doctrine, but simply as a
statement of preference: "We are quite hesitant to conduct a judicial
77308inquiry into the credibility of these security concerns ....
The courts' ceaseless efforts to distinguish military detentions from
normal criminal actions follow in a similar vein. In criticizing the district
court's rigorous analysis of the government's stated rationale for
detaining Yaser Hamdi, the Fourth Circuit went to great lengths to
demonstrate that such scrutiny was inappropriate in the context of a
President's exercise of war powers, as opposed to his mere law
enforcement powers.3" To be sure, the court may well be correct that
some heightened level of deference should apply. However, its method
of insertion into this argument seems backwards and peculiar. The
Fourth Circuit cited two cases for the proposition that military detentions
are significantly distinct from normal criminal proceedings. The first is
Justice Black's dissent in Johnson v. Eisentrager, in which he argued that
even foreign nationals caught and convicted of war crimes overseas
ought to have recourse to the writ of habeas corpus to challenge their
detentions.3"' The Hamdi appellate court can hardly be endorsing that
proposition with any strength, given its decision to functionally eviscerate
any substantive standard of habeas review in the case before it.3"' The
305. Id. at 465.
306. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2ooi).
307. See, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) ("[C]ourts traditionally have
been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security
affairs."); North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft (North Jersey Media 1), 308 F.3d 198, 219 (3d
Cir. 2002) ("[Nlational security is an area where courts have traditionally extended great deference to
Executive expertise.").
308. North Jersey Media H, 308 F.3 d at 219 (emphasis added).
309. Hamdi 1, 316 F.3d at 473.
310. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,791-98 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting).
311. Hamdi I reached the courts on a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and the 4th
Circuit accepted that jurisdiction to hear the petition existed without discussion. See 316 F.3 d at 459.
Nonetheless, the court's eventual decision on the merits displays an obvious lack of desire to impose
stringent substantive standards on administrative detentions, quite in contrast to Justice Black's
dissent in Eisentrager. See 339 U.S. at 793-94
Certainly decisions by the trial court and the Court of Appeals concerning applicability of
that principle to these facts would be helpful, as would briefs and arguments by the
adversary parties. It should not be decided by this Court now without that assistance,
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second is In re Winship, a juvenile delinquency proceeding the Fourth
Circuit referenced for the idea that an elevated burden of executive
proof exists in criminal cases due to the "consequences of conviction,
including social stigma.""31 This is surely an unconventional means of
distinguishing these situations. The consequences of classifying Hamdi as
an unlawful combatant include potentially interminable detention and
far greater stigma than would besmirch a common criminal.
The Southern District of New York set out upon a parallel track in
Padilla, explaining that Jos6 Padilla's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
does not attach due to the fact that his detention is not a "criminal
proceeding."3 '3 From a simple textual perspective, this is an indisputably
correct point of law.3"4 Yet the court was not satisfied and attempted to
further buttress the distinction between criminal and military detentions
in a functionally suspect manner. The court noted that "a proceeding
which may result in deprivation of liberty is nonetheless not a 'criminal
proceeding' within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment if there are
elements about it which sufficiently distinguish it from a traditional
civilian criminal trial. ' 315 It then claimed that "Padilla's detention 'does
not implicate either of the two primary objectives of criminal
punishment: retribution or deterrence.
As an initial matter, Padilla's detention certainly serves to
incapacitate him and prevent future crime, another traditionally
important criminal objective.3 17 Secondly, Administration officials (and
Jos6 Padilla himself) may well conceive of his imprisonment as at least
partly retributive in nature, particularly if, as some have suggested,
Padilla was engaged in a conspiracy against the United States that the
government lacks sufficient evidence to prove in ordinary criminal
particularly since failure to remand deprives these petitioners of any right to meet alleged
deficiencies by amending their petitions.
Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
312. Hamdi 1, 316 F.3d at 473 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,363 (970)).
313. Padilla v. Bush (Padilla 1), 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 6oo (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also U.S. CONST.
AMEND. VI.
314. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25. 38 (976). Even the MiddendorfCourt could not resist
the engaging in the type of tautological literalism that pervades this area of the law. Faced with the
question of whether the Sixth Amendment applied to military servicemembers tried at "summary
courts-martial," the Supreme Court announced first that its previous holdings "surely stand for the
proposition that even in the civilian community a proceeding which may result in deprivation of liberty
is nonetheless not a 'criminal proceeding' within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment if there are
elements about it which sufficiently distinguish it from a traditional civilian criminal trial." Id. What
"sufficiently" distinguished the summary court-martial at issue in Middendorf from a "traditional
civilian criminal trial?" "The summary court-martial proceeding here is likewise different from a
traditional trial in many respects, the most important of which is that it occurs within the military
community." Id. (emphasis added).
315. Padilla 1, 233 F. Supp. at 6oo (quoting Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 38).
316. Id. at 6oo (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,361-62 (1997)).
317. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 n.28 (1976).
February 2005]
HASTINGS LAWJOURNAL
court.3"8
These courts' efforts to categorize Hamdi's and Padilla's detentions
as non-criminal are striking not for their legal conclusion that the
defendants have no entitlement to certain aspects of criminal process, but
rather for the dubious lengths they travel to describe these incarcerations
as if they bear no resemblance to criminal confinement. The Hamdi
appellate court offered a meager explanation for this labored path, an
explanation that may shed more light upon the court than it does upon
the court's decision:
The murkiness and chaos that attend armed conflict mean military
actions are hardly immune to mistake. Yet these characteristics of
warfare have been with us through the centuries and have never been
thought sufficient to justify active judicial supervision of combat
operations overseas. To inquire, for example, whether Hamdi actually
fired his weapon is to demand a clarity from battle that often is not
there."9
In evidence is a court that instinctively views military action as
judicially incomprehensible and legally untouchable. To the Fourth
Circuit, law cannot bend the exigent realities of war to its constraining
will because it cannot extract necessary factual clarity from amidst the
"murkiness and chaos"; courts would thus be well-advised to remain
outside the fray. 2 It is this judicial predilection that necessitates firm
proof of dissimilitude between military and criminal detention. When
military operations assume the form and function of typical law
enforcement acts, courts become hard-pressed to justify their abstention
from the rule-of-law constitutional questions that form the core of their
juridical task.
Despite a body of Supreme Court administrative law doctrine
counseling judicial intervention into areas of executive expertise, and
despite the principle that courts must act to vindicate the rule of law even
318. This contention appears to have been borne out in late May and early June 2004 when the
Department of Justice, in an extraordinary and largely unprecedented step, declassified a report
detailing much of the information it had learned from Jos6 Padilla during the course of his
interrogation. See Summary of Jos6 Padilla's Activities with Al Qaeda, United States Department of
Defense, May 28, 2004, available at http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/padilla/pad528o4dodsum.html
(last visited June 5, 2004). Commenting upon the release of this information, Deputy Attorney
General James Comey admitted that the government never possessed sufficient information to
establish probable cause and thereby detain Padilla pursuant to the ordinary criminal process.
According to The New York Times, had Padilla been charged initially, "'he would very likely have
followed his lawyer's advice and said nothing, which would have been his constitutional right,' Mr.
Comey said. 'He would likely have ended up a free man, with our only hope being to try to follow him
24 hours a day, seven days a week and hope-pray, really-that we didn't lose him."' Eric Lichtblau,
U.S. Spells out Dangers Posed by Plot Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2004, at Ai.
319. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi 1), 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003).
320. See Ctr. for Nat. Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
("America faces an enemy just as real as its former Cold War foes, with capabilities beyond the
capacity of the judiciary to explore.") (emphasis added).
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in fields of overwhelming executive or legislative authority, Article III
courts have come to view military questions as a taxonomic grouping
they are simply incapable of navigating. Yet in this legal area (as in most
others), doctrinal facts ought to drive psychological attitudes. Military
cases do not always hold the threat of substantially greater national peril,
nor offer more pressing exigencies, nor present more intractable fact or
policy questions than do typical administrative law adjudications. Courts
that remain unafraid to pass on the factual rationality of highway safety
regulations that may affect tens of thousands of lives each year should
hold no particular impressionistic aversion towards inquiring into the
legality of detentions or secretive hearings. There, the danger of a
judicial misstep remains speculative precisely because courts have
refused to put the Administration to its proofs.
Moreover, courts themselves possess responsibility for enforcing the
legal limitations that exist to bind administrative actors. To leave
wartime cases exclusively in the hands of the Executive Branch in the
name of "comity" or "deference" would be to reduce fundamental
constitutional guarantees to mere precatory language, slaves to the
vicissitudes of the executive expediency they were meant to curb. Lower
courts need not shrink from validating the rule of law in cases that bear
such resemblance to the administrative law doctrines with which they are
familiar. If they continue to do so, the Supreme Court must act to
reconstitute wartime doctrine along existing precedential lines, lest the
United States reap the consequences of this unfortunate, self-conscious
judicial hand-washing.
CONCLUSION
Over the past three years, the "War on Terror" has become as much
a legal strategy as a military operation. Incursions abroad have been
matched by informational blackouts at home. International manhunts for
suspected terrorists are coupled with detention of American citizens.
Constitutional rights have been eroded by a torrent of ostensibly
security-enhancing measures, and aggrieved individuals have turned to
the courts for redress, just as they did six decades ago when the Japanese
population of the West Coast was interned in the name of national
defense.
Yet courts have behaved solicitously not towards claims of
constitutional deprivations, but rather towards governmental
declarations of necessity and authority over the lives and rights of the
citizenry in wartime. In particular, courts have overwhelmingly deferred
to the executive branch regarding the assertions of fact that form the
factual predicates for governmental actions. Deference has come
according to two rationales: first, the President's unique constitutional
role as guarantor of national security, and second, the Executive's
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superior institutional expertise in wartime matters.
In awarding deference on these grounds, the judiciary has ignored
the operation of the Constitution and laws as contemporaneous
structural constraints on executive military action. The President and the
military hold only the authority vested in them by the Constitution or by
law. Action outside of those legal boundaries is by definition
unconstitutional and unauthorized. Similarly, the Bill of Rights enshrines
individual freedoms that executive action, even if otherwise lawful,
cannot infringe. Moreover, many cases implicating national security turn
on issues of individual statutory and constitutional rights-such as the
lawfulness of detention or free speech rights such as access to
information -that form the archetypal bailiwick of civilian tribunals.
Thus, even in wartime circumstances there is often constitutional and
statutory law to apply, law to which courts must hold the Executive and
the legislature. As courts have nearly unanimously recognized, it is
emphatically the province of the judiciary to vindicate the rule of law by
demanding that government bodies remain within circumscribed
boundaries.
It is in this respect that administrative law can usefully inform the
adjudication of wartime cases. Administrative law jurisprudence
developed to address the particular problems presented by executive
branch agencies possessing tremendous institutional expertise and
resources and specially empowered by Congress to manage technically
difficult subject matter. So-called "military" cases come to Article III
courts within precisely the same jurisprudential framework as civilian
administrative ones: courts must determine the degree to which they
should defer to the legal or factual allegations of an expert, empowered
executive branch organization.
Despite the obvious considerations favoring substantial
administrative deference, the Supreme Court's modern administrative
law jurisprudence stands for the principle that adherence to the rule of
law demands that courts meaningfully scrutinize administrative
determinations of fact. The Court has recognized that enforcement of a
legal stricture is toothless without a concomitant inquiry into that
stricture's factual predicate. It has therefore insisted upon "substantial
evidence" in support of agency judgments before affirming them and
required courts to perform "rationality review", of agency policy
decisions to ensure that agencies have considered all available
alternatives and reached logical conclusions from available information.
The rule-of-law principles that motivate judicial scrutiny of
administrative determinations compel similar treatment for the claims of
fact proffered by the military in the interest of surmounting
constitutional restraints. The reasons that courts advance in defense of
their acquiescence in wartime circumstances are logically unconvincing.
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The military matters that have come before the judiciary are neither
more judicially inscrutable nor more legally intractable than the
administrative issues upon which hard look and substantial evidence
review were founded. If military cases present greater national dangers-
a question that can hardly be answered accurately without judicial review
in the first instance-than their civilian counterparts, they also threaten
more dramatic erosions of civil and constitutional rights. Courts cannot
continue to invoke "national security" as a shibboleth absolving them
from their responsibility, exemplified within the principles of
administrative law, to examine especially those actions taken by broadly
empowered, highly experienced executive bodies.
On September 22, 2004, almost three years after Yaser Esam Hamdi
was taken into custody by American forces in Afghanistan, and nearly
three months after the Supreme Court had ruled that he could not be
held indefinitely without some nature of adjudicative process, the United
States Department of Justice decided that Hamdi's "intelligence value
had been exhausted" and agreed to release him, provided he never again
set foot in the United States.32' Nineteen days later, Hamdi was placed on
a flight bound for Saudi Arabia.32 ' What justification the United States
military believed it possessed for holding Hamdi may never be known;
one can only presume that it would not have withstood even the limited
scrutiny the Supreme Court had prescribed. Hamdi's release completed
the military's circular narrative: it was the executive branch that chose to
incarcerate Hamdi; it was the executive branch that unilaterally chose to
release him; and it appears that the executive branch never ceased
believing that it alone held the authority to -make these decisions. Yaser
Hamdi, Jos6 Padilla, and all American citizens bearing constitutional
rights are entitled to a government that operates by law and logic, not by
executive fiat. Courts must act to vindicate the rule of law if such a
government is to persevere.
321. Richard B. Schmitt, U.S. Will Free Louisiana-Born 'Enemy Combatant,' L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23,
2004, at A25.
322. Joel Brinkley and Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Releases Saudi-American it had Captured in
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at A15.
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